Saturday, 23 May 2026

Martin Empson's "The Time of the Harvest has Come -Revolution, Reformation, and the German Peasant War. Bookmarks 2025

 

“Study the historian before you begin to study the facts.”- Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History?

'Behind the peasant the revolutionary beginnings of the modern proletariat, already red flag in hand and with communism on its lips'". Frederick Engels

“History is the long struggle of man, by exercise of his reason, to understand his environment and to act upon it. But the modern period has broadened the struggle in a revolutionary way. Man now seeks to understand, and act on, not only his environment, but himself; and this has added, so to speak, a new dimension to reason and a new dimension to history.” - Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History?

"Heaven was to be sought in this life, not beyond, and it was, according to Muenzer, the task of the believers to establish Heaven, the kingdom of God, here on earth”. Frederick Engels

Martin Empson is not simply an individual author who happens to have certain political views. He is an organic product of a specific political tendency, the British Socialist Workers Party, and everything he writes on history is shaped, consciously or not, by the theoretical and political framework that tendency has built up over decades. When Martin Empson writes history, whether about the German Peasant War, ecology and capitalism, or any other subject, he does so within this theoretical and political framework. Several specific distortions flow necessarily from it.

The German Peasant War is one of the most important pre-capitalist revolutionary upheavals in European history, and Marxists have always taken it seriously. Friedrich Engels himself wrote the foundational Marxist study, The Peasant War in Germany (1850), composed in the immediate aftermath of the failed revolutions of 1848–49. That timing was no accident. Engels wrote it explicitly to draw historical lessons for the modern revolutionary movement from a great popular uprising that had been defeated.

The material roots of the uprising. The Peasant War was not simply a religious rebellion dressed in the language of scripture. It arose from the concrete, material oppression of the German peasantry and plebeian masses, feudal dues, enclosures, the consolidation of princely power, and the crisis of the old feudal order as early capitalist relations began to penetrate Germany. The Reformation provided the language and ideology of revolt, but the driving force was social and economic antagonism.

Thomas Müntzer is a revolutionary figure. Engels drew a sharp distinction between Martin Luther and Thomas Müntzer. Luther represented the interests of the moderate bourgeoisie and the princes. He wanted religious reform but recoiled in horror from the social revolution of the masses. When the peasants rose, Luther called for their bloody suppression with his infamous tract Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants. Müntzer, by contrast, represented the most radical plebeian wing of the movement. His theology was a revolutionary doctrine in religious disguise. The "Kingdom of God" he preached was, in essence, a demand for the abolition of class privilege and the establishment of a society of equals. Engels called him a "religious and political revolutionary of the first rank."

The SWP and the German Peasant War: How History Serves Opportunism

The question of how the Socialist Workers Party relates to the German Peasant War is not simply an academic matter. It goes to the heart of what the SWP is as a political tendency, how it uses history, what lessons it draws (and refuses to draw), and whose class interests its politics ultimately serve. To understand this properly, we must first establish what a genuine Marxist history of the Peasant War looks like, then examine how the SWP's theoretical and political framework systematically distorts it.

The SWP advocates for its core idea of “socialism from below' as a return to genuine Marxism and opposes Stalinism. However, in practice, it appears to use this idea to dismiss revolutionary leadership. Empson views Müntzer and the peasants mainly as symbols of heroism and spontaneous radicalism but overlooks Engels’ key argument: Müntzer's defeat resulted from the movement lacking the political and organisational conditions necessary to transform mass militancy into victory. The SWP struggles to accept this because recognising it would mean acknowledging the need for the Fourth International, which it has generally opposed.

Thomas Müntzer (c. 1489–1525) stands out as a significant and tragic figure in early revolutionary history. As a theologian and preacher who broke away from Luther's Reformation on the left, Müntzer became the ideological and military leader of the most radical faction during the German Peasants' War of 1524–25, the largest mass uprising in Europe before the French Revolution. Engels offered a detailed, sympathetic, yet strictly materialist analysis of Müntzer in his influential work, The Peasant War in Germany (1850). Written shortly after the failed revolutions of 1848, Engels drew clear political lessons for the proletariat movement. To Engels, Müntzer was not just a religious eccentric but a true revolutionary; his theology was the only way to express a proto-communist agenda within the 16th-century context. Müntzer's idea of the "Kingdom of God" fundamentally advocated for a society without class divisions, private property, or a ruling state authority.

What distinguished Müntzer was his radical departure from Luther. While Luther's Reformation mainly aimed to transfer church wealth from Rome to German princes and create a new bourgeois-Protestant system, Müntzer supported the plebeians and peasants—those most marginalised and argued that the Reformation must genuinely transform real-world conditions. He called for the immediate realisation of the "Kingdom of God" on earth. Engels viewed this as the start of something truly new: a revolutionary who saw religious reform as potentially masking social reaction.

Engels also provided a stern Marxist critique of Müntzer, which serves as a key lesson. As outlined in Chapter 6 on the Peasant War in Thuringia, Müntzer's tragedy highlights the common story of a revolutionary leader who guides a movement whose class base is too weak to support his proposed program. The greatest danger for a leader of an extreme faction is being forced to take control of a government when the movement is not yet ready for the dominance of the class he represents. Instead, he is forced to represent not his party or class, but the class for whom conditions are finally suitable for control.

This analysis highlights Engels at his most incisive, emphasising the limits of the class that imprisoned Müntzer and the peasantry, as well as the plebeian masses he led. As a fragmented, pre-capitalist, land-based class, the peasantry lacked the resources to bring about enduring revolutionary change. They could rise passionately but lacked the means to take control, reorganise production, or form a new state. Their views were mostly local, combining traditional communal values with aims for equality. During crises, the very forces Müntzer inspired failed to respond adequately. The Battle of Frankenhausen in May 1525 ended in a disastrous massacre; Müntzer was captured, tortured, and executed.

Engels drew a notable comparison to 1848, noting that the German bourgeoisie of his era had acted as traitors, like the princes and moderate reformers of 1525. For the proletariat, the message was straightforward. Unlike the peasantry, the modern working class has the potential to seize power and reshape society because it is a direct outcome of capitalist production. Consequently, the Marxist tradition regards Müntzer as an early figure, emphasising that his defeat was not accidental but rooted in systemic factors: revolutionary will, no matter how heroic, cannot replace a revolutionary class.

What connects Müntzer and the SWP?

Initially, they may appear entirely disconnected, a 16th-century millenarian theologian and a 20th-century socialist organisation. However, a common thread exists. Engels' critique of Müntzer revealed a core issue: what occurs when a revolutionary leader or group promotes hopes beyond the existing class forces capable of advancing them? Müntzer reacted by pushing ahead with revolutionary zeal, replacing class analysis with religious conviction, a move that led to disastrous outcomes.

When the SWP and authors like Empson examine the German Peasant War through the lens of "socialism from below," they often introduce consistent distortions: While the SWP tradition celebrates the heroism and radicalism of the peasant masses, it intentionally ignores Engels' conclusion that their lack of proper class leadership and organisation led to their downfall. Although their heroism is authentic, heroism without a clear program, a leading class, or an international revolutionary organisation does not constitute true socialism from below. It remains a tragedy. The SWP focuses on the inspiring aspects of the uprising but neglects the critical lesson: the necessity of building a revolutionary party with a scientific program. This lesson reveals the SWP's own longstanding hesitation to do so.

Engels' prefaces from 1870 and 1874 place the German Peasant War within a global context of class struggle. He compares 1525 to key moments like 1789, 1848, and the rise of workers' movements across Europe. The main lesson highlights internationalism: the working class can only succeed if united as an international movement. The SWP, which parted ways with the Fourth International in 1951 and has criticized Trotskyism for decades, fails to understand this lesson. Therefore, their history remains largely national and episodic, viewing each major uprising as an inspiring but isolated event without a unifying thread leading to revolutionary change. Engels clearly states that the German Peasant War introduced, in a rudimentary and confused way, the issue of state power. Müntzer's program, expressed in theological terms, called for the overthrow of the existing social order and the creation of a new one.

The core issue is who controls state power. The SWP, following Tony Cliff's rejection of the working class's revolutionary role, lacks a true theory of socialist revolution and a plan for the working class to seize state power and dismantle the capitalist system of oppression. Their version of "socialism" is essentially pressure-group politics. In historical analysis, this approach reduces the question of state power to vague ideas of "people's power" or "mass mobilisation” that often culminate in no concrete revolutionary plan.

Martin Empson’s book on the German Peasant War, for all the factual research it may contain, cannot be trusted as a work of Marxist history. The framework through which it interprets the facts is designed, consciously or not, to produce conclusions compatible with the SWP's current political practice, which means conclusions that do not lead the reader toward the revolutionary programme. None of this suggests that Empson's factual research is useless or that his book on the German Peasant War lacks valuable information. Engels, writing in 1850, emphasised that the historical record of the uprising was important and worth examining in detail.

However, the framework Empson uses to interpret that record is politically biased. The test is straightforward: does his analysis guide the reader toward Engels's conclusions — that the failure of the Peasant War was due to a failure of class forces and revolutionary leadership, that moderate reformers were objectively counter-revolutionary, and that the modern working class needs an international revolutionary party to prevent a repeat of that tragedy? Or does it lead the reader to celebrate spontaneous mass struggle, implicitly supporting the SWP's politics of pressure, popular frontism, and subservience to the Labour bureaucracy?

For a genuine Marxist history of this period, read Engels' The Peasant War in Germany in its entirety, all three prefaces and all seven chapters. It is not long, and it remains, 175 years after it was written, the most penetrating analysis of that great uprising ever produced. No SWP book has improved upon it, and none can because improving upon it would require a political honesty that the SWP's entire existence depends on avoiding.

 

Friday, 22 May 2026

Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? by Philip K Dick, SF Masterworks 1968

“If you find this world bad, you should see some of the others.”

Philip K Dick

Man will make it his purpose to master his own feelings, to raise his instincts to the heights of consciousness, to make them transparent, to extend the wires of his will into hidden recesses, and thereby to raise himself to a new plane, to create a higher social biologic type, or, if you please, a superman.

Leon Trotsky- Literature and Revolution

Although Philip K. Dick was not a superman, he certainly pushed his physical and mental limits to elevate both his own consciousness and that of his readers. His 1968 novel, 'Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?', is among the most philosophically ambitious science fiction works of the twentieth century.  disparity.

This novel embodies Dick's humanist viewpoint, delving into the key question: what truly defines being human amid a heavily dehumanised world? Set in a post-nuclear-war wasteland where most animals are extinct, and much of humanity lives in off-world colonies, the story explores themes of alienation. Rick Deckard, the bounty hunter tasked with hunting androids, focuses more on character development and the desire for genuine emotions in a world that feels largely synthetic and empty.

The novel's social commentary is powerful. The androids (Nexus-6 models by Rosen Corporation) act as a form of slave labour created to serve, deprived of rights, and hunted when they escape. Dick clearly compares the androids' lack of "empathy" with the spiritual numbness capitalism causes in humans. The "empathy boxes" and the shared religious practice of "Mercerism," which is eventually shown to be fake, symbolise a desperate collective longing for genuine human connection in a world driven by commodification.

The way animals are treated is equally important. In the novel, owning a real, living animal serves as a status symbol in a world filled with death, and Deckard's shame about his electric sheep reflects how capitalism diminishes all relationships, even the most personal, to their exchange value. This embodies a core Marxist idea: the commodity form becomes so embedded in life that the line between real and simulated dissolves completely.

Ridley Scott's Blade Runner, inspired loosely by Dick's novel, is renowned for its stunning visuals. Its depiction of a rain-soaked Los Angeles filled with neon ads, off-world colony signs, and deteriorating urban splendour has shaped dystopian sci-fi aesthetics over the years. Roy Batty's final monologue ("I've seen things you people wouldn't believe...") remains profoundly impactful.

The film simplifies many of Dick's social critiques. While it still explores the key existential question about whether replicants are truly human more deeply, it downplays the portrayal of the Tyrell Corporation as a capitalist entity that creates enslaved beings. Elements like the novel's critique of consumerism, the emotional connection to the electric sheep, and the depiction of a working-class bounty hunter feeling alienated are overshadowed by visual spectacle and personal existential dilemmas. Consequently, the focus becomes more on spectacle, reducing the emphasis on broader social themes.

Carlos Delgado's review of Denis Villeneuve's Blade Runner 2049 highlights a key critical insight precisely: "A more rigorous artist might have explored the social and psychological implications of 'synthetic' beings that have become sophisticated enough to exhibit human traits. They could at least have drawn parallels between the plight of the replicant 'slaves' and our current labouring class. However, aside from a brief scene in a child labour sweatshop, Villeneuve appears uninterested in depicting the conditions faced by workers, whether human or artificial."[1]

The review comes to a harsh conclusion: "This is bleakness without understanding, the work of artists who perhaps sense an impending social catastrophe but lack the tools to identify its source or to raise awareness or protests." This effectively captures a common aspect of contemporary dystopian art — an aesthetic of crisis that lacks the intellectual framework to recognise capitalism as the cause or the working class as the agent of change.

Philip K. Dick (1928–1982) was a deeply innovative and reflective mind in postwar American science fiction. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he focused not on technological marvels or space tales, but on exploring what it truly means to be human amid systematic social dehumanisation. He authored 44 novels and over 120 short stories before dying of a stroke at 53. His works have inspired numerous major films. Hollywood's selective embrace of Dick, adapting his plots but often neglecting his deeper social insights, illustrates how capitalist culture can absorb and neutralise art.

What makes Dick's novel timeless is that it was written amid significant social upheaval in 1968. That year saw the Tet Offensive, the Prague Spring, the assassinations of MLK and RFK, and a global wave of revolutionary fervour. Through fiction, Dick explores whether the dehumanising logic of capitalist society, treating humans as tools, manufacturing desire via advertising, and reducing all worth to exchange value, ultimately turns people into androids.

This is not a mystical question. It connects directly to Marx's concept of alienation: the worker who sells their labour power becomes estranged from the product of their labour, from fellow workers, from their own human potential. Dick's "androids" are capitalism's ultimate product, beings manufactured for exploitation who, in seeking freedom, are destroyed.

This portrays a society profoundly affected by alienation. Genuine emotions, particularly empathy, are now scarce and highly prized. The central mechanism in the novel is that Nexus-6 androids, created by Rosen Corporation for slave labour in the colonies, are indistinguishable from humans through physical tests. They are only identifiable by their absence of spontaneous empathetic responses. The Voigt-Kampff test, which bounty hunter Rick Deckard employs, identifies replicants by measuring whether they instinctively show concern for others' suffering.

Dick's irony lies in the fact that the society which hunts androids for their lack of empathy is itself creating a world where true empathy is absent. People connect through "empathy boxes" to participate in Mercerism, a communal spiritual experience later uncovered as a fake, a televised show. Owning a real animal is a mark of status since many animals are extinct; Deckard's embarrassment over his electric sheep reflects the shame of someone whose emotional life feels inauthentic. The pervasive influence of commodities has so deeply infiltrated human life that genuine feelings are indistinguishable from their artificial counterparts.

This directly relates to Marx's theory of alienation in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, where the worker is separated from the product of their labour, the act of production, other humans, and ultimately their own human potential. Dick's androids are not external threats to human civilisation; they are the results of it—manufactured beings designed for exploitation and discard. As they escape their circumstances, they expose the deep flaws and corruption within the society that created them.

A recurring theme throughout Dick’s work is how we can know what’s real. What do we make of experiences that go outside everyday reality, like madness, religion or drugs? Such philosophical questions are handled lightly. Dick delights in paradox and has a characteristic dark humour. Though his writing addresses abstract questions, it is emotionally engaging. He often writes sympathetically about ordinary people trapped in situations they cannot control.

Emmanuel Carrère’s semi-biography shows us the roots of all this in Dick’s own life. An introverted and anxious teenager, troubled by the thought of a twin sister who had died in infancy, Dick began a lifelong involvement with psychiatry aged 14. His first marriage (of five) lasted some six months. He worked in a record shop, fascinated by high culture, and dreamed of becoming a ‘serious non-SF writer.

Dick wasn’t politically active, except for a deep-seated and lasting hatred of Richard Nixon. He mingled with bohemian pseudo-left circles and shared their criticism of 1950s American consumerist and suburban culture, as reflected in his SF stories from that period. It appears that FBI agents provided multiple-choice questionnaires for Dick and his socialist wife to indicate their opinions on Russia. They carefully considered the options, taking into account Dick’s background in psychological testing.

Dick's portrayal of Nixon's ousting as a major victory against tyranny, seen as the culmination of "reprogrammed variables," exposes a significant limitation. Watergate was not a break in the capitalist power structure; it was a manipulation within it, essentially a palace coup by rival factions of the ruling class. Agencies like the CIA and FBI were heavily involved. The system that elevated Nixon, including the national security state, the imperial presidency, and the surveillance networks, remained fully intact and has only grown more powerful since. Ultimately, emphasising Nixon as the embodiment of evil helped reinforce confidence in capitalist institutions by framing their self-correction as a form of democratic accountability.

By the early 1960s, during his third marriage, Dick was producing as much science fiction as he could. The income helped pay his bills and motivated him to write more and earn more. He also took medication for a heart murmur and agoraphobia, along with pills to handle side effects. His novels, such as *The Man in the High Castle* and *The Clans of the Alphane Moon*, started to succeed, but his marriage was falling apart. He saw a vision of a large, menacing robot face in the sky. A compassionate priest thought it was Satan, leading him to become a Christian, though his beliefs were quite unorthodox. In 1964, Dick moved to Berkeley and entered his fourth marriage. He wrote *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep* in 1966, gaining recognition as a counterculture icon. This stable period ended with the disillusionment of the 1960s, especially after Nixon's re-election in 1968. By 1970, his fourth wife had left, and his home was often filled with drug casualties.

Philip K Dick and Modern Capitalism

Philip K. Dick's 1977 Metz speech is a notably compelling document that warrants a thoughtful materialist analysis rather than dismissal. As a highly insightful literary figure of the 20th century, Dick's keen attention to counterfeit realities, surveillance systems, and the core question "what is real?" is profoundly linked to the social context of American capitalism that influenced him.

The speech's clearest political insight is also its most straightforward: Dick explicitly states that "a state in which the government knows more about you than you know about yourself... is a state which must be overthrown. It may be a theocracy, a fascist corporate state, a reactionary monopolistic capitalism, or centralistic socialism." This statement offers a genuine insight. His novels—The Man in the High Castle, Flow My Tears, the Policeman Said, A Scanner Darkly—mirror a deep, visceral horror of authoritarian surveillance, the suppression of individuality by state power, and capitalism's ongoing falsification of consciousness. These themes are intentional, representing the artistic expression of genuine social contradictions.

His depiction of the "black iron prison"—the oppressive and unavoidable system of control he saw underlying daily American life—aligns closely with the Marxist idea of reification: the process by which capitalism turns human relationships into object-like, alien, and controlling structures that seem natural and everlasting. Dick experienced this, even if he couldn’t articulate it theoretically.

However, this is where the materialist critique becomes crucial. Dick directs his keen perception of a fabricated, alienated reality entirely into an idealist and theological perspective. The answer to the "black iron prison" is not organised revolutionary action by the working class; it is divine reprogramming. The "programmer-reprogrammer" God adjusts variables; chess moves are played against a "dark counter-player"; and liberation is achieved not through collective human effort but via cosmic intervention, experienced mystically by an individual under sodium pentothal.

This is precisely the form that social despair takes in a petty-bourgeois intellectual cut off from the working class. Dick registered the horror of capitalist reality with extraordinary sensitivity. Still, having no connection to the actual social force capable of transforming it, he displaced the solution into metaphysics, Gnosticism, and personal mystical experience. The "orthogonal time" theory is, in a sense, a brilliant literary and philosophical elaboration of the impossibility of imagining social transformation within the framework of isolated individual consciousness.

Dick's emphasis on simulated or artificial realities, referred to here as a "computer-programmed reality," demonstrates a keen intuitive grasp of Marx and Engels' concept of ideology. This process involves the dominant ideas of a given era being presented as inherent, unchangeable, and timeless, reflecting the interests of the ruling class. In Dick's view, the capitalist system functions as a form of simulation — it portrays its exploitative, historically specific structures as if they are natural aspects of human nature.

However, the Marxist perspective on this insight is entirely different from Dick's. Marx views the response to false consciousness not as a mystical awakening into a separate realm, but as the development of class consciousness through the concrete struggles of the working class. While Dick describes the "awakening" as a solitary, drug-induced vision, Marx sees it as a social process where the working class becomes aware of its position within the relations of production and collectively works to alter those conditions.

What is Dick's Enduring Significance

Dick's work has achieved true artistic significance. It remains relevant because the social realities he predicted—such as the surveillance state, manufactured consent, and the commodification of consciousness—have only grown stronger in 21st-century capitalism. The universe of *A Scanner Darkly, where the government uses addictive products to undermine and control people who act as informants, is now more recognisable in today's context of social media influence, opioid crises, and widespread surveillance compared to 1977.

The task is to take Dick's accurate perception of capitalism's falsified, coercive, and alienating nature and anchor it within the only framework that can both explain and challenge it: Marxist analysis. This approach sees capitalism as a unique historical mode of production that inherently produces these conditions. It views the international working class as the force capable of replacing it with a truly human social order. Dick envisioned a garden world, and Marxism explains how to realise it.

Despite flaws such as an emphasis on individual paranoia over collective social critique, influences from drug culture, and Hollywood adaptations, Philip K. Dick remains a significant literary figure because he genuinely posed questions that capitalism urges all thinkers to consider. What does it mean to be human when humans are treated as commodities? How can we identify genuine emotions in a world overwhelmed by artificial simulation? What defines identity amid widespread alienation? These are practical questions, not mystical ones. Marx approached them from a materialist perspective, whereas Dick addressed them through a restless, troubled artistic sensibility confronting American capitalism at its postwar peak. The aim isn't just to admire Dick's dystopias as predictive, but to understand the social forces behind them and develop a political movement to end these conditions.

 

 

 

Notes

Philip K. Dick Speech- Delivered at the Metz Sci-Fi Festival in 1977, www.academia.edu/127936472/Original_METZ_SPEECH_1977_transcription_Philip_K_Dick

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1] Denis Villeneuve’s Blade Runner 2049: A dreary future- www.wsws.org/en/articles/2017/11/20/blad-n20.html 

Thursday, 21 May 2026

Weimar: Life on the Edge of Catastrophe by Katja Hoyer is published by Allen Lane (£30).

"The pauperisation of the petty bourgeoisie, barely concealed by their ties and socks of artificial silk, eroded all official creeds and, above all, the doctrine of democratic parliamentarism... In the highly fevered atmosphere brought about by war, defeat, reparations, inflation, occupation of the Ruhr, crisis, need, and despair, the petty bourgeoisie rose against all the old parties that had cheated it."

Leon Trotsky- What is National Socialism? (1933)

"The class struggle is a law of social development. For ages, that struggle has been between the poor and the rich, the exploited and the exploiters."

Jack London: The Iron Heel

“The 'ordinary German' who populates Daniel Goldhagen’s book is a vacuous generalisation from which all internal social antagonisms and conflicts have been extracted.”

David North

"They can only maintain their position while they honestly believe that civilisation depends on themselves alone..."

Jack London On Oligarchy

To understand Katja Hoyer's contributions to recent historiography, we need to consider the broader academic landscape in which they fit. The 'Ordinary Germans' historiography is central to her latest book’s introduction. Since the postwar era, this field has been shaped by ongoing tensions between Marxist class analysis and various idealist, culturalist, and nationalist perspectives. The question of 'ordinary Germans' extends beyond mere academic debate; it is key to understanding fascism and influences the working class's readiness or inability to oppose it. Since the 1990s, discussions about 'ordinary Germans' have been dominated by three main positions, none of which fully align with a Marxist view. Hoyer’s work synthesises and, in some respects, integrates elements from all three.

The primary perspective linked to Daniel Goldhagen's 1996 bestseller, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, is that the Holocaust was carried out by "ordinary Germans" driven by deeply rooted, centuries-old "eliminationist antisemitism" unique to German culture. Goldhagen argued this belief was so ingrained that it could be activated without coercion or specific circumstances; Germans killed Jews simply because they were Germans. David North's 1997 critique, The Myth of "Ordinary Germans", points out a key methodological flaw: the idea of "ordinary Germans" is an overly broad, abstract category with no internal differentiation, which makes it scientifically meaningless.

As North observes, questioning whether "ordinary Germans" refers to a factory worker, shopkeeper, lumpenproletarian, Junker landowner, or industrialist reveals that this category ignores class differences within German society, unintentionally reinforcing the Nazi myth of a unified Volk in a distorted way. Goldhagen's notion of ewige Deutsche (eternal Germans) as enemies of Jews parallels the Nazi ewige Jude (eternal Jew) as enemies of Germans. Both are racial-nationalist abstractions that erase nuanced history and social class distinctions.

Furthermore, as North emphasises, the Goldhagen thesis relies on making the German socialist movement essentially invisible. In a 622-page book about Germans and the Holocaust, there's not a single mention of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, August Bebel, or the Social Democratic Party, which by 1912 was the largest party in the Reichstag, drawing most of its support from the German working class. This omission is intentional; it's structurally necessary because recognising a large socialist workers' movement with millions of Germans directly contradicts the idea that all Germans shared a uniform antisemitic worldview.

The second perspective is offered by Götz Aly's 'Hitler's Beneficiaries' (2005), which suggests that ordinary Germans mainly supported Hitler for economic reasons they gained from the confiscation of Jewish property, a Nazi welfare system funded through expropriation and war spoils. While this outlook is somewhat more materialist than Goldhagen's, it remains problematic: it portrays the working class as passive recipients of stolen wealth, dismisses acts of resistance, and continues to use the broad category of "Germans" as beneficiaries, oversimplifying the significant class differences in who benefited from the Nazi economy.

The third major perspective most pertinent to Hoyer is the Volksgemeinschaft historiography. Since around the 2000s, this view has been dominant in German academic history and is linked with scholars like Michael Wildt, Frank Bajohr, and the broader 'Nazi society' social history movement. This approach examines how the Nazi idea of the national community was actively built, enacted, and accepted by significant segments of German society, rather than merely being imposed from above. It highlights the roles of participation, consent, social pleasures of belonging, and the integration of the Mittelstand (middle classes) and parts of the working class into a racially defined national identity.

Hoyer and the Volksgemeinschaft Turn

Hoyer's 'Weimar intentionally challenges the so-called "Weimar syndrome' the common tendency to interpret the republic solely as a precursor to Nazism. She aims to analyse the republic on its own terms and emphasise the daily lives of ordinary people who did not anticipate the impending catastrophe. She highlights Weimar's cultural vitality, genuine social reforms, the expansion of women's rights and sexual freedoms, and the democratic activism of the working class through unions and political parties. A crucial point underlying this is that vulgar retrospective determinism, which views fascism as the inevitable outcome of all developments in Weimar, is indeed poor history. However, Hoyer's correction veers too far in the opposite direction, a mistake tied directly to the Volksgemeinschaft historiography.

The core issue goes beyond mere emphasis and highlights what is fundamentally missing. When Hoyer and other Volksgemeinschaft historians analyse the daily lives of "ordinary people" during the Weimar Republic or Nazism, they often blur the distinctions among class, the nation, and the people. The German working class, which nearly achieved socialist power during the November Revolution of 1918, consistently supported the SPD and KPD throughout Weimar and maintained underground resistance networks in Berlin, Hamburg, and the Ruhr well after Hitler's ascent to power.

These workers are frequently portrayed as simply part of the indistinct mass of "Germans" experiencing the republic, depression, and Nazi rise in largely uniform ways. Hoyer’s historiographical approach, though it varies in details from Goldhagen's, reaches a similar conclusion through a different method: it minimises "the relationship between capitalism and fascism" and depicts "all workers, the petty bourgeoisie, industrialists, and bankers as 'the Germans.'"

The evidence opposing the dominant narrative is strong but often overlooked in this historiography. Hans-Rainer Sandvoss's detailed archival research into Berlin workers' resistance to the Nazi regime, utilising Gestapo files that only became accessible after 1989, revealed that the working class in Berlin and other labour hubs largely remained resistant to Nazi propaganda for several years following Hitler's rise to power.

A Gestapo report from March 1936 noted that in Berlin one could go days without hearing the Führer salute, except from officials, uniformed personnel, or provincial visitors. The Nazi party regularly encountered challenges in industrial areas such as mining regions, Hamburg's docks, and factory zones. This is not romanticisation but a reflection of the historical record. Yet, this resistance vanishes completely in a historiography that depicts all Germans as uniformly "ordinary."

Why does this historiography remain so influential? Its foundation lies in the political and intellectual climate established after the fall of the Soviet Union and the so-called "triumph of capitalism." Since the 1990s, numerous historians have justified abandoning honest and objective analysis by pointing to the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Germany, as well as the apparent victory of capitalism. In doing so, they have replaced genuine scientific methods with subjective, postmodern ideologies.

Abandoning class as the primary analytical focus is a politically motivated choice, not a neutral one. As David North notes in his critique of Goldhagen, during the postwar period, framing fascism's class aspects through psychological, cultural, or national-identity lenses was linked to the Cold War objective of undermining Marxism. This also served to hide that fascism was essentially the capitalist ruling class's response to revolutionary threats from the organised working class. Goldhagen attributes this entirely to German national psychology, while Volksgemeinschaft historians approach it more subtly by highlighting consent, participation, and everyday social integration. This indicates that "the Germans" collectively created fascism, instead of acknowledging that a particular class imposed it on a divided society—one in which millions were coerced, terrorised, and ultimately wiped out.

Focusing on Hoyer, there's an additional point to consider. Her earlier book, Beyond the Wall (2023), depicts the GDR as a society with significant social achievements and broad support. This mirrors the strategy used for Stalinism: emphasising the daily lives of "ordinary people" to soften, contextualise, and ultimately justify a regime largely defined by bureaucratic dictatorship over the working class. In both Weimar/Nazi Germany and East Germany, highlighting "ordinary experience" aims to diminish political and class divisions and foster sociological empathy.

Leon Trotsky examined Weimar Germany and German fascism not from the standpoint of current social historians, but through his own contemporaneous writings, which remain unmatched in their analytical insight. He saw fascism not as stemming from German national character or broad social trends, but as a tactic used by the capitalist elite to unite the impoverished petty bourgeoisie—including shopkeepers, artisans, clerks, and disillusioned farmers—against the organised working class, especially when bourgeois democracy proved unable to resolve the social crisis.

This perspective is elaborated in his 1933 book, 'What is National Socialism?'. He describes how the impoverishment of the petty bourgeoisie, barely hidden by their artificial silk ties and socks, undermined all official beliefs, especially democratic parliamentary doctrine. Amid the tense environment created by war, defeat, reparations, inflation, the Ruhr occupation, crisis, need, and despair, the petty bourgeoisie turned against all the old parties that had deceived them.

This analysis focused not on the cultural attitudes of "ordinary Germans" but on the class struggles within a society facing a severe capitalist crisis. Central to the discussion was the question of revolutionary leadership: whether the organised working class would seize power or whether the petty bourgeoisie, with no viable working-class alternative, would be pushed into the arms of a movement supported and financed by large capital interests. The outcome depended on the betrayals by the SPD and the Comintern, rather than on any intrinsic psychological traits of a uniform "German people."

This framework is consistently rejected by "ordinary Germans' historiography, from Goldhagen to Götz Aly, the Volksgemeinschaft school, and Katja Hoyer. This rejection is deliberate, as it precisely identifies the actual determinants of the outcome: class struggle, the crisis of revolutionary leadership, and the counterrevolutionary roles of Social Democracy and Stalinism. These lessons remain highly relevant today, with the rise of the AfD in Germany and the pseudo-left channelling working-class opposition into bourgeois safe havens. Rediscovering these truths requires not a softer or more empathetic history.

Katja Hoyer is a historian of German and British background, author of "Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire" (2021) and, more recently, "Weimar Germany: Democracy on the Brink" (2024). She also wrote "Beyond the Wall" (2023), an alternative perspective on the GDR. Her Weimar book seeks to portray the republic not just as a precursor to Nazi disaster, a "Weimar syndrome" she explicitly aims to go beyond, but as a lively, authentic democratic experiment with notable achievements in culture, social policy, and politics. From a Marxist standpoint, there are serious methodological and political problems with this kind of liberal rehabilitation project.

Like many liberal histories, Hoyer emphasises Weimar's lively cultural scene—covering the Bauhaus, Expressionism, Brecht, Grosz, cabaret, and sexual liberalism. Although these are important and genuine, highlighting them as the city's main achievement shifts focus away from the crucial relationship between culture and politics. The innovative cultural output of Weimar arose from a revolutionary crisis in a drastically changed world. Many key figures, including Brecht, understood that this culture was closely linked to the revolutionary struggle. To focus too much on aesthetics risks neglecting Weimar's political significance.

The Weimar Republic emerged from the German Revolution of November 1918 but was quickly thwarted by Social Democracy. Led by Ebert and Noske, the SPD violently suppressed the revolutionary movement, killed Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and kept the capitalist institutions and the Junker military hierarchy unchanged. Any explanation of Weimar that ignores this foundational betrayal—the counterrevolutionary actions of Social Democracy—fails to truly account for subsequent events.

The so-called cultural boom of Weimar's Goldene Zwanziger era was funded through repeated betrayals of the working class. Under pressure from the Comintern, the KPD called off a planned insurrection at a critical moment—an action that led to a catastrophic failure, enabling German capitalism to stabilise temporarily. These "golden" Weimar years were merely a brief, circumstantial pause rather than a genuine democratic achievement.

The collapse of the Weimar Republic was not mainly caused by weak democracy or mass irrationality. Instead, it resulted directly from the Stalinist "social fascism" theory, which falsely labelled the SPD as equivalent to the Nazis and prevented a united working-class front against Hitler. This was compounded by the SPD's own policies of supporting Hindenburg and collaborating with emergency measures under Brüning and von Papen. Trotsky's writings from that era, such as What Next? Vital Questions for the German Proletariat and The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany are essential resources, offering profound analysis that forecasted the catastrophe. Nevertheless, there was still time to avert it.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) stepped in not to lead the revolution, but to suppress and then drown it in blood. Led by Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Noske, the SPD allied with the old imperial military officers to crush the revolutionary movement. They organised the Freikorps, early fascist-style paramilitary groups, to eliminate the revolution's key leaders. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, founders of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), were pursued and killed in January 1919 under the orders of the SPD government. The traditional Junker military aristocracy, judiciary, civil service, major banks, and industrialists — all reactionary forces — remained untouched behind a newly formed democratic facade. This was the original sin. As the Historical and International Foundations of the Socialist Equality Party (Germany) states plainly: "In 1918, the SPD had strangled the proletarian revolution to save the bourgeois order. The result was the Weimar Republic, in which the old forces of reaction continued to live behind a democratic facade."

The republic experienced continual crises during its short fourteen-year span. In 1923, it faced two major setbacks: the French occupation of the Ruhr and a severe hyperinflation that destroyed the savings of the middle and working classes, causing widespread despair. That year, the KPD, guided by the Comintern, planned a revolutionary uprising but cancelled it at the last moment, which Trotsky later called "a classic demonstration of how it is possible to miss a perfectly exceptional revolutionary situation of world-historic importance." German capitalism temporarily stabilised thanks to American loans under the Dawes Plan, and the mid-1920s are often seen as the "golden years" of Weimar—brilliant in culture, fragile politically, and economically reliant on foreign capital.

Then came 1929. The Wall Street Crash cut off American credit, the German economy collapsed, and unemployment exploded to over six million, roughly a third of the workforce. The social crisis was catastrophic. The middle classes — small shopkeepers, artisans, farmers, white-collar employees — who had already been ruined by inflation and were now devastated by the depression, were thrown into a desperate search for a way out. Into this vacuum stepped Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), offering an intoxicating brew of nationalist demagogy, antisemitism, and violent scapegoating aimed at the most desperate and disoriented petty-bourgeois layers.

As the crisis deepened, the SPD's response was to retreat, capitulate, and appeal to the very institutions of the bourgeois state to save it. In 1930, when President Hindenburg appointed the Catholic conservative Heinrich Brüning as chancellor and began governing by emergency decree, bypassing parliament altogether, the SPD tolerated this, refusing to bring down the government. It feared revolution from below more than dictatorship from above. In 1932, the SPD supported the re-election of the arch-reactionary field marshal Paul von Hindenburg as president. This man would eventually appoint Hitler as the supposed "lesser evil" against the Nazis. When von Papen illegally deposed the SPD-led government of Prussia in a July 1932 coup, the SPD lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court rather than mobilising its millions of members to fight back. As the SGP historical document summarises, drawing directly on Trotsky's analysis, the SPD's attitude was that the fate of Germany depended "not on the fighting strength of the German proletariat... but on whether the pure spirit of the Weimar Constitution... shall be installed in the presidential palace."

Even more grotesque was the behaviour of the trade unions. The ADGB (the main trade union federation) actually dissociated itself from the SPD three and a half months before Hitler seized power, hoping to demonstrate its "reliability" to the new order. They marched under the swastika on May 1, 1933. The Nazis rewarded this servility on May 2 by storming union offices, arresting and murdering union leaders, and dissolving the ADGB entirely.

The Communist Party of Germany was founded in direct response to the SPD's betrayal. It had millions of members and supporters, its own armed Red Front defence organisations, and a working class willing to fight. But under Stalin's domination of the Communist International, the KPD pursued a line of suicidal ultra-leftism, the theory of "social fascism." This theory held that Social Democracy and fascism were not opposites but "twins" — that the SPD was itself "social fascist," and that the main enemy was not Hitler but the SPD. On this basis, the KPD refused any united action with SPD workers against the Nazis. It even made common cause with the Nazis on occasion, supporting a Nazi-initiated referendum in 1931 to bring down the SPD-led Prussian state government. All the while, it consoled its demoralised members with the slogan: "Nach Hitler, kommen wir"  "After Hitler, it's our turn"  the grotesque fantasy that Hitler's regime would quickly collapse and the Communist revolution would follow.

The Weimar Republic and the pseudo-lefts: Then and Now

To understand the pseudo-left's stance towards the Weimar Republic, we first need to identify what truly led to its downfall. The Weimar Republic didn't perish due to internal contradictions or the overwhelming rise of fascism. Instead, it was dismantled by the organised workers' movement, specifically by its leadership. This is the key lesson that the pseudo-left today tries hard to conceal.

The SPD, representing the German working class, showed its true colours with its betrayal in November 1918. Instead of leading the revolutionary effort—which aimed to seize state power and expropriate capital—it chose to defend the existing bourgeois order. The party was responsible for the murders of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, suppressed workers' councils, and upheld the Junker officer caste and state structure that, fifteen years later, helped facilitate Hitler's rise. As noted, "the Social Democratic Party... sided with the bourgeois order in 1914 and became the main supporter of the bourgeois state in the Weimar Republic." In the final years of the Weimar Republic, the SPD backed Brüning's emergency decrees, which gradually dismantled democratic rights and undermined the working class, thereby paving the way for Hitler rather than resisting him.

The devastating role of Stalinism followed. The KPD, controlled by Stalin through the Comintern, dismissed Trotsky's urgent plea for a united front of Communist and Social Democratic workers against the Nazis. Instead, it adopted the destructive "social fascism" thesis, claiming that the SPD was equivalent to fascism and that there was no real difference between bourgeois democracy and fascist dictatorship. This was not just a tactical error but a politically damaging disorientation that froze the German working class, separated Communist workers from Social Democratic workers, and at times even led the KPD to collaborate with the Nazis against the SPD, such as in the 1931 Prussian referendum. Hitler’s rise to power in January 1933 occurred without organised resistance from the German working class, despite the SPD and KPD each having millions of members and their own armed units. This catastrophe proved Trotsky's view that the Communist International was no longer a revolutionary force and that the Fourth International needed to be established.

The Frankfurt School

This reveals the connection to the modern pseudo-left. The Frankfurt School—comprising Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Benjamin—originated directly from the confusion following Germany's defeat. Notably, "Horkheimer and Adorno do not mention [the role of Social Democracy and Stalinism] once and avoid discussing Stalinism in all their other works." This silence was intentional. The Frankfurt School crafted a comprehensive theoretical framework—covering Critical Theory, the Dialectic of Enlightenment, and the theory of the "authoritarian personality"—which attributed fascism to mass psychology, the irrationality of the masses, and the failures of the "Enlightenment," largely ignoring the political betrayals by the SPD and the Comintern.

Why is this important? By framing the crisis of revolutionary leadership as the main explanation, the Frankfurt School adopted a different political stance: moving away from building a revolutionary Marxist party rooted in the working class, and instead emphasising cultural criticism, identity politics, and pressure on bourgeois institutions. This shift lies at the heart of the modern pseudo-left, as David North details in 'The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism, and the Politics of the Pseudo-Left.' The Frankfurt School's move away from viewing the working class as the revolutionary agent—to focusing on the "critical intellectual" and later prioritising racial, gender, and cultural issues—set the stage for all that now claims to be 'left,' but fails to challenge capitalism.

The Contemporary Pseudo-Left

The contrast between the 1930s and today is more than superficial; it’s structural. With the neo-fascist Alternative for Germany (AfD) now Germany’s second-largest party, pseudo-left groups like Marx 21, the SAV, and RIO are, in a modified form, repeating the political crimes that facilitated Hitler’s rise. Marx 21, influenced by Tony Cliff's International Socialist Tendency, cynically invokes Trotsky's "revolver-poison" analogy to justify demanding that the bourgeois state ban the AfD, directly contradicting Trotsky's actual stance. Trotsky opposed the SPD's reliance on the Weimar state and police to fight fascism, understanding that the state was not neutral but filled with reactionary elements. History confirmed this: it was Hindenburg, the Reichswehr, big business, and the judiciary—all institutions the SPD appealed to for protection—that implemented Hitler's appointment. Germany's domestic intelligence agency (the Office for the Protection of the Constitution) was, until recently, led by fascist Hans-Georg Maassen, who secretly met with AfD representatives. Calling on this agency to defend democracy from fascism is the twenty-first-century equivalent of the SPD crying "Help! Intervene!" to the Weimar state.

The SAV, descended from the British Militant Tendency, tends to praise the trade union bureaucracy as a defender against the right and envisions a Left Party–SPD–Green coalition as a "democratic alternative" to the AfD. Yet, as Germany's ruling coalition, the SPD and Greens have carried out the AfD's refugee deportation policies, approved the largest war budget since WWII, and frequently collaborated with the AfD to normalise its presence in parliament. At the same time, trade unions have agreed to austerity measures with the government and corporations. The SAV's approach isn't aimed at "pushing them left" but at aligning working-class frustration with the very forces responsible for it.

RIO, associated with the Morenoite Trotskyist Fraction-Fourth International, claims to support a "united front" and "anti-capitalism from below." In reality, it partners with the SPD, Greens, trade unions, and Fridays for Future. This strategy conflicts with Trotsky's original concept of the united front, which was meant to awaken workers from Social Democratic stagnation and rally them around a revolutionary program. Conversely, RIO's "front" seems designed to align workers with bourgeois parties, often employing radical rhetoric.

What unites these trends, both historically and socially, is their class origin. The Frankfurt School consisted of segments of the bourgeois intelligentsia that had forsaken the working class. Currently, the pseudo-left champions privileged middle-class groups—such as academics, NGO workers, and trade union bureaucrats—who benefit from the current system enough to be wary of a genuine socialist revolution. Their emphasis on identity politics, state intervention, and parliamentary tactics reflects their social standing. Just as the KPD's "social fascism" idea was driven more by the needs of Moscow's bureaucracy than the interests of German workers, today's pseudo-left ideology mirrors the interests of a social class with a very different relationship to capital than that of the working class.

Why Does a Marxist historiography Matter Today

The fall of the Weimar Republic was not due to democracy being fragile, mass irrationality, or fascism being an inevitable historical force. Instead, it collapsed because the organised workers' movement was led by parties — one reformist, one Stalinist — that, for their own class-based reasons, refused to unite the working class in a revolutionary fight against capitalism. The key takeaway is not "defend liberal democracy" or "vote for the lesser evil," but that capitalism's crises lead to fascism.

Only revolutionary working-class mobilisation under genuine Marxist leadership can prevent this. This is the core task of the Fourth International — both then and now. In short, Hoyer's attempt to portray Weimar as a democratic success is ultimately a liberal ideological exercise. It aims to extract lessons about defending "liberal democracy" against modern populism, rather than the true historical lesson that, without a revolutionary Marxist party leading the working class to power, capitalism's crises breed fascism. Trotsky's lesson remains highly relevant today.


Wednesday, 20 May 2026

Radicals: The Working Classes and the Making of Modern Britain-Geoff Andrews, Yale University Press, 2026

Geoff Andrews' new book, Radicals: The Working Classes and the Making of Modern Britain, explores the history of popular radicalism in Britain from the late 1700s to today. Anyone familiar with British history knows that Britain has one of the richest and most debated working-class histories in the world. Studying this history seriously involves recognising a key tension: the ongoing conflict between the authentic revolutionary impulses of the working class and the official leaders' efforts to suppress, control, or direct these energies.

Andrews is a British academic historian associated with the Open University who has written sympathetically about Eurocommunism, most notably his work on the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and on what he broadly frames as the history of "radical" political movements. His intellectual project is fundamentally one of rehabilitation: rescuing Eurocommunism from historical disgrace and presenting it as a sophisticated, relevant tradition for contemporary left politics. From the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism, this project must be examined critically, because Eurocommunism is not a chapter in the history of socialist advance; it is a chapter in the history of Stalinist betrayal and class capitulation.

Eurocommunism arose in the 1970s, mainly through the Italian PCI led by Enrico Berlinguer, the Spanish PCE under Santiago Carrillo, and the 'Euro' faction of the CPGB, whose voice was represented by the magazine Marxism Today (for a time edited by Martin Jacques). Its core idea was to abandon the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and instead pursue a "parliamentary road to socialism” working within bourgeois institutions, forming alliances with social democracy and Christian Democracy, and framing this approach as a sophisticated "renewal" of Marxism adapted to Western contexts.

Eurocommunism was not an accidental deviation; it was deeply rooted in what Trotsky recognised as early as 1938. He noted the dual dependence of Stalinist parties: on Moscow's subsidies and on the super-profits generated by their own imperialist activities, funnelled through trade union and social-democratic bureaucracies. As the Soviet connection became problematic, these national Communist parties increasingly integrated into their respective bourgeois states. The Italian PCI's "Historic Compromise" with the Christian Democrats under Berlinguer exemplifies this trend: even as the working class was shifting leftward in the early 1970s, the PCI actively demobilised it and aligned it with bourgeois stability.

The CPGB's Euros, including figures like Jacques and historian Eric Hobsbawm, served the interests of British capitalism. During the early 1970s, when the working class mobilised, leading to the fall of the Heath government through the miners' strike and the election of a Labour government, it was the Communist Party that limited every protest to trade union action and parliamentary Labour efforts, refusing to advocate for an independent socialist vision. When Thatcher rose to power and Labour surrendered, the Euros blamed the working class for its "decline" rather than addressing the political issues involved.

Andrews' scholarly work, including his arguments in 2026 Radicals, fits within a broader academic-left project to dignify the Eurocommunist tradition retrospectively. The typical move is to emphasise Eurocommunism's criticisms of Soviet repression, its embrace of democratic rights, and its engagement with "new social movements" and to present this as a progressive legacy relevant to today's politics. This framing is deeply misleading for several reasons.

Initially, the Eurocommunists' critiques of Soviet repression were more strategic than principled. Their main aim was to make these parties more palatable to mainstream bourgeois politics. Those Euros who opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had previously been steadfast Stalinists decades earlier. Their claims to democratic values were driven by opportunism rather than genuine belief.

Second, the "new social movements" promoted by the Eurocommunists, such as identity politics, feminism disconnected from class analysis, and environmentalism as a replacement for socialist politics, were actually the tools used to fragment independent working-class politics. These movements scattered opposition to capitalism into various single-issue campaigns, each manageable within bourgeois democratic frameworks. What Andrews may see as a broadening of radicalism was, in fact, a narrowing and abandonment of the aim of socialist transformation in favour of managing capitalism more humanely.

Third, and crucially, the concept of the "parliamentary road to socialism" promoted by Eurocommunism has been discredited by history. The PCI's "Historic Compromise" did not lead to socialism but resulted in austerity, which ultimately reinforced Italian capitalism. The CPGB's Euro sector undermined Britain's only political tradition capable of challenging Thatcherism with a socialist alternative, and it also contributed to the Labour Party's shift towards Blair. Italy's successor party, the Communist Refoundation (Rifondazione Comunista), tried to revitalize left politics within the same framework, but by joining the Prodi government in 2006, it became fully integrated into bourgeois politics, as noted by WSWS, and adopted the very austerity and military policies it initially opposed.

Academic work that rehabilitates this tradition, despite its nuanced discussion of internal debates and sympathy for the genuine idealism of individual participants, serves an ideological role today. It portrays the dead ends of the pseudo-left as viable options. Andrew’s apology for pseudo-left politics permeates the rest of the book. Britain's ruling class, uniquely positioned atop the world's first imperialist power, was able to cultivate within the workers' movement an "aristocracy of labour," a privileged layer of trade union leaders and reformist politicians who "preached the virtues of class collaboration and implacable hostility to Marxism and revolution." This was not incidental to British working-class history; it was its defining structural feature, and it ultimately determined the character of the Labour Party itself: a bourgeois workers' party, resting on mass working-class organisations but committed to the defence of capitalism.

However, this history also includes explosive revolutionary episodes that directly contradict the idea of British workers as inherently moderate and inclined toward parliamentary methods. In Britain, the Chartist movement emerged as the first mass working-class political movement in history. Over a decade, as Trotsky explained, it encapsulated the full spectrum of proletarian struggle, from parliamentary petitions to armed insurrection. The Newport Rising of 1839, where about 10,000 armed workers marched on Newport, represents the most significant revolutionary challenge to British rule in the 19th century and demonstrates the genuine revolutionary potential of the British working class when reformist politics did not bind it.

One of the most important books in this rich history is Robert Tressell's The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists. It is considered one of the most significant works of socialist literature in English and deserves a thorough and enthusiastic review. Robert Tressell, whose real name was Robert Noonan (1870–1911), was an Irish-born house painter and sign-writer. He spent his last years in Hastings, on England's south coast, working in the construction industry under challenging conditions of poverty and instability. From 1906 to 1910, he wrote The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists, creating a manuscript of over 250,000 words in his free time, often after long, physically exhausting work shifts, by candlelight and in longhand. He died of tuberculosis in Liverpool in 1911 at age 40 while on his way to Canada, not knowing whether his book would be published. It was finally published in 1914 in a heavily abridged form, with the full original edition only appearing in 1955.

This biographical detail functions as a concise political statement. Tressell was a worker with a keen socialist perspective, a deep understanding of his class, and exceptional literary talent. However, the capitalist social system he sharply critiqued ultimately frustrated and destroyed him before his work could reach a broader audience. The book acts both as a critique of that system and a tribute to the working class's capacity to think, analyse, and resist. It holds a special place in my own political growth, as it was the first book my father gave me.

The book functions on two levels at once. Primarily, it is a detailed, realistic novel about working-class life, one of the most precise and unsentimental depictions of manual labour, poverty, workplace dynamics, and the daily hardships of wage labour in English literature. Tressell writes from experience. He is familiar with the smell of paint, the heaviness of a ladder, the petty abuses of supervisors, and the anxiety of seasonal unemployment. He understands how poverty damages relationships, erodes dignity, and fosters the servility that allows for continued exploitation. The "philanthropists" referenced are the workers themselves, who, through passivity, deference, and acceptance of the current system, "philanthropically" give their surplus value to their employers.

On a different level, the book serves as an extensive exercise in socialist education. Owen's well-known "Great Money Trick" chapter, where he demonstrates, using bread pieces as raw materials along with wages and commodities, how the capitalist system operates, how surplus value is created, and why workers remain in poverty under capitalism, is among the most brilliant examples of popular Marxist explanation ever written. Tressell transforms Marx's theory of surplus value, as detailed in Capital, into a political economy that is so vivid and tangible that it has educated countless workers about the core mechanism of their exploitation.

What makes The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists truly remarkable and different from sentimental or patronising portrayals of the working class is its complete refusal to romanticise or idealise its characters. Owen's colleagues are not noble victims waiting for salvation. Throughout most of the book, they serve as obstacles to socialist awareness, eagerly echoing the ruling class's prejudices. They ridicule Owen's socialism, vote Tory or Liberal, and are wary of anyone questioning the current system.

Tressell's honesty here isn't pessimism but a serious political stance. He recognises that working-class consciousness isn't naturally revolutionary; that ideology is a tangible force; and that capitalist society systematically shapes workers' ideas to reflect the ruling class. The main role of socialists is to engage in patient, persistent work of political education and persuasion. Owen isn't a messianic figure who suddenly awakens his class with one speech. Instead, he debates, faces rejection, debates again, and endures the frustration of seeing men vote against their own interests. Yet, he never gives up.

This passage distils the core issue of revolutionary leadership into a literary form, reflecting a perennial challenge faced by the working-class movement from the Chartists onward. The working class holds both the social power and the objective interest to revolutionise society. Yet it has historically lacked a political party and a program to elevate its profile and unify its efforts globally. Owen, depicted as a socialist advocate in a small town, cannot solve this challenge alone, and the novel candidly acknowledges this limitation.

From a revolutionary Marxist perspective, the book also has genuine limitations that merit honest examination, not to diminish its value, but to understand it accurately. Tressell wrote during the era of the Second International, before the pivotal events of 1914 (when most socialist parties supported their ruling classes during the imperialist war and the International was betrayed) and 1917 (the Bolshevik Revolution). His socialist views, like those of many progressive workers in Edwardian Britain, combined Marxist economic analysis with the ethical socialism of the Independent Labour Party, a form of socialism driven by moral outrage at capitalism's injustices as much as by scientific understanding of its mechanics. Owen comprehends exploitation with notable clarity; however, his vision of the alternative, the "socialist" society to replace capitalism, remains somewhat vague, more an ethical aspiration than a detailed plan.

More importantly, the novel's politics do not engage with questions about the state, revolutionary power, or the international aspects of the class struggle. Owen tries to persuade his fellow workers through argument. Still, the essential issues of how the working class can seize and wield power, which political party and program are necessary for this, are largely unexamined. This isn't a critique of Tressell personally,

 these questions were only definitively answered through the experience of the Russian Revolution and the formation of the Communist International. However, reading the book in isolation can lead to a reformist view: the belief that the working class merely needs education in socialism and that this education will automatically lead to socialist transformation.

The history of the twentieth century, including the British labour movement that Tressell so accurately portrayed, shows that merely educating workers, fostering class consciousness, and forming strong organisations are not enough. Leadership betrayals have often undermined these efforts in 1926, 1945, and many other instances. What is missing in Tressell's political universe is the Leninist idea of a revolutionary party: a disciplined, internationalist organisation based on Marxist principles, capable of providing the working class with the leadership suited to each era.

None of these limitations diminishes the book's significance. The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists has remained in print for over a century. Generations of British workers have read it as a revelation, recognising their own lives, exploitation, daily frustrations, and humiliations, all expressed with pinpoint accuracy. It has been handed down from worker to worker, from parent to child, like truly essential books are. During the 1984-85 strike, the Miners' Union recommended it. Shop stewards have referenced it, and workers encountering socialist ideas for the first time have discovered a connection between their personal experiences and Marxist theory.

This is the book's deepest achievement: it demonstrates that socialist consciousness is not an abstraction imported from outside the working class by intellectuals, but something that emerges from the working class's own experience when that experience is honestly confronted and honestly named. Tressell wrote it not as a middle-class observer of people with low incomes but as a worker who was himself one of the "philanthropists"— who endured the same conditions, performed the same labour, and drew from that experience not resignation but revolutionary conviction.

The General Strike 1926

Geoff Andrews' book aligns with an important political milestone, the 100th anniversary of the 1926 General Strike, marked on May 4, 2026. This centenary has led to many commemorative articles, scholarly works, trade union events, and retrospectives. Interpreting the 1926 General Strike is more than just an academic matter; it is highly relevant to current politics. The way we view its failure today impacts the policy ideas we craft for the working class.

One of Andrews' chapter titles, "The General Strike and the Condition of England," hints at his interpretive approach. The "Condition of England" is a long-standing literary and social genre that traces back to writers such as Orwell, D.H. Lawrence, and ultimately to Carlyle and Disraeli. It involves examining what defines England, its core values, current problems, and potential for renewal. By framing the General Strike within this tradition, Andrews likely views it as a reflection of the development of a distinct English national identity and culture, rather than merely an event in the broader international class struggle.

This is a politically meaningful choice that accomplishes several things. It tends to domesticate the strike by minimising its international aspects, such as the Russian Revolution, the Comintern, and the Trotsky-Stalin conflict. Instead, it frames it as a mainly British event centred on British people and traditions. The focus is on the elements of cultural identity, community, solidarity, and moral courage that were genuinely present in the strike—rather than on the political and ideological issues that influenced its outcome. Additionally, it paves the way for nostalgic labour movement politics that view 1926 as a golden era of working-class community and culture—something to mourn and perhaps imitate in spirit, rather than analyse as a defeat with specific causes.

Considering Andrews' Eurocommunist intellectual background, his portrayal of the Communist Party's role is probably quite problematic. The CPGB features prominently in the 1926 commemorative mythology as heroic organisers and agitators, many of whom were, at the grassroots level, truly heroic. However, Andrews is unlikely to subject the Comintern's political lines, such as the Anglo-Russian Committee policy, the subordination of the CPGB to the TUC lefts, and the "All Power to the General Council" slogan, to the rigorous Trotskyist critique it requires. This type of critique is exactly what the mainstream of British labour history, influenced by Stalinist and social-democratic assumptions, has avoided for a century.

Andrews' connection of the General Strike with the "Condition of England" also subtly prompts us to consider what England might look like a century later. This highlights the book's relevance to today's political implications. Currently, the "condition of England" is marked by a deep social crisis: the collapse of the National Health Service, widespread poverty and reliance on food banks, deteriorating infrastructure, an unprecedented housing crisis, and a Labour government led by Keir Starmer enforcing harsh austerity while backing imperialist conflicts. Instead of resisting, trade unions act as tools of corporate management, suppressing any struggles that challenge the existing order.

The key question about Andrews' framework is: what does he mean by "radicals"? This term is not neutral or straightforward; it reflects a political choice with significant consequences. Andrews' academic-left background often treats "radicalism" as a broad concept that blurs the important line between reform and revolution. This view groups together Chartists demanding votes, trade unionists advocating shorter hours, Fabians promoting municipal socialism, suffragettes, Eurocommunists, and current identity-politics activists as part of a single progressive tradition of popular radicalism. In this perspective, the working class is seen as representing a democratic, rights-based politics aiming for inclusion and reform within the existing system, rather than its revolutionary overthrow.

This perspective is deeply rooted in British labour historiography, particularly connected to E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class (1963). While Thompson's work is a major scholarly achievement with enduring impact, it also presents some limitations. He emphasised the cultural formation of working-class identity, highlighting experience and agency, and championed "history from below" as a useful counterpoint to the mechanistic economism common in traditional Stalinist historiography.

However, his framework often limited working-class consciousness to a specifically national and English cultural context, highlighting links to pre-industrial radical groups such as the Levellers, the Diggers, and Nonconformist religion. It also tended to underestimate the crucial role of a revolutionary international socialist party as the essential vehicle for advancing working-class consciousness to address the epoch's demands.

Andrews, influenced by the Eurocommunist academic tradition, is likely to push this idea further, drawing on the history of British popular radicalism to advocate for a diverse, broadly defined left politics that goes beyond traditional class-based party structures. Essentially, this echoes the argument that Marxism Today made in the 1980s: the old labour movement has been replaced, and "radicalism" now needs to include a variety of social movements. The future, therefore, lies in coalitions rather than in a revolutionary working-class party.

The general strike symbolises one of the many betrayals Andrews' books discusses, highlighting how various Labour governments—those of 1945, 1964-70, 1974-79, and 1997-2010—have repeatedly let down working-class hopes. Each government, initially propelled by genuine working-class optimism, ultimately implemented austerity, suppressed strikes, prosecuted imperialist wars, and weakened workers' political influence. While the welfare reforms under Attlee were notable, they also aimed to stabilise British capitalism after WWII. They were partly funded by Marshall Plan aid, which was linked to Cold War politics. Socialist figures within Labour, such as Tony Benn, acted as safety valves, channelling socialist ideas into the party and preventing the emergence of an independent revolutionary movement.

Choosing chapters for a 241-page book that covers extensive history is always challenging. However, this review must consider the chapter titled "Making History from Below." The reader understandably needs to understand what the title promises and what it cannot deliver.

The term "history from below" holds significant respect in leftist academic circles. It emphasises uncovering working-class experiences hidden by history and asserts that ordinary people — rather than kings, parliaments, or great individuals — are the true shapers of history. When applied well, this approach has led to meaningful historical insights. However, "history from below" as a method and political stance is not identical to Marxism, and confusing the two has deeply affected how the working-class past is interpreted and the political lessons derived from it.

Andrews, rooted in the intellectual tradition from the Communist Party Historians Group through E.P. Thompson and into the post-Eurocommunist cultural studies environment, inherits both genuine achievements and notable political distortions of that lineage. Recognising the origins of this tradition is vital for evaluating its true potential and limitations. The group's potential and limitations were perhaps best illustrated in the works of E.P. Thompson and his “Culturalist Turn.”

When E.P. Thompson distanced himself from the CPGB following the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, he did not shift toward Trotskyism or the Fourth International, the only movements that had actively defended true Marxism against Stalinist distortions. Instead, he gravitated toward what is now called culturalism—a form of historical analysis that emphasises experience, consciousness, and culture as the main frameworks for understanding class, often neglecting the foundational economic and social factors that Marxism considers essential. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class (1963) is the paradigmatic text. It is a masterwork of historical research, recovering with extraordinary vividness the texture of working-class life and struggle in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But its famous opening declaration — that class is not a "structure" or a "category" but a "historical relationship" that "happens" in human experience — represents a decisive retreat from Marxist materialism. By locating class primarily in experience and consciousness rather than in the objective relations of production, Thompson opened the door to a kind of historical voluntarism: the working class "makes itself" through its own cultural activity, independent of the structural determinations of capitalist production. This is not Marxism — it is a form of idealism dressed in the language of social history.

The political implications were profound. If class is seen mainly as a cultural and experiential category, then questions about leadership — such as the role of the revolutionary party, political programs, or the conscious steering of the class struggle — tend to be overlooked. "History from below" then becomes a celebration of working-class experience and agency, but without analysing whether that experience is geared towards seizing power or is being undermined and betrayed by reformist leaders. This creates a detailed portrait of the class in struggle. Yet, it ignores the crucial question: why has the British working class, despite its militancy and bravery, suffered consecutive defeats throughout history?

Stuart Hall

The line of influence from Thompson to Andrews includes Stuart Hall and the 1980s Marxism Today environment. To be direct, Cultural Studies, with Hall as a key figure, aimed to shift social criticism away from class and toward other social structures, supporting identity politics. Hall was the main theorist behind the CPGB's move toward Eurocommunism, explicitly stepping away from class-based politics in favour of a framework of "new social movements' that considered race, gender, sexuality, and cultural identity as equally important and independent from class struggle. His idea of "Thatcherism" as a cultural-ideological phenomenon rather than a class offensive was hugely influential—and confusing—because it shifted leftist theoretical efforts toward the cultural superstructure just as the bourgeoisie was mounting a deliberate attack on the material base of working-class organisations.

Andrews is deeply engaged with this entire development. His "history from below" project reflects this tradition, featuring a genuine humanist sympathy for workers alongside a shift in focus from Marxist economic theory to cultural analysis. It celebrates working-class agency but remains silent on revolutionary leadership. While it seeks to recover suppressed voices and experiences, it implicitly views social progress as expanding democratic participation within capitalism, rather than overthrowing it.

The fundamental theoretical issue with "history from below" as Andrews applies it is the disconnect between agency and programme. While working people do indeed shape history—such as the Chartists, the miners of 1926, wartime factory shop stewards, and Labour voters in 1945—they were all active agents wielding significant collective power. However, an agency without a clear programme does not lead to liberation; instead, it represents energy that can be directed in various ways, including in support of the status quo. The history of the British working class is fundamentally a record of vast collective agency that has been repeatedly diverted by their leadership, which claimed to represent them, into reformist, nationalist, and class-collaborationist paths.

The "History from below' approach often romanticises this agency while sidestepping the tough question of why it consistently failed to effect revolutionary societal change. Answering this requires more than cultural analysis; it demands a rigorous Marxist examination of the political organisations—such as the trade union bureaucracy, the Labour Party, and the CPGB that serve as intermediaries between working-class energy and historical results.

These organisations systematically hinder the development of a revolutionary path. This type of analysis is precisely what the traditions Andrews relies on tend to avoid, because it involves confronting the record of Stalinism and social democracy not as misguided but as well-meaning allies, but as agents that systematically subordinate the working class politically.

Andrews' Making History from Below belongs to a tradition that has made genuine contributions to the recovery of working-class history, but whose political limitations are built into its foundations. It inherits from the CPGB Historians Group the subordination of history to a nationalist Popular Front politics; from E.P. Thompson the culturalist displacement of Marxist materialism; and from Stuart Hall and the Eurocommunist dissolution, the final abandonment of class as the primary category of social analysis. The result is a history that gives working people a dignified presence in the past while offering them no coherent political direction for the present.

George Orwell and the Working Class

The association of George Orwell with "the working class" in Geoff Andrews's book quickly reveals insight. Orwell exemplifies, in many respects, the ideal patron saint for the politics that Andrews advocates: the Eurocommunist and post-Stalinist academic left that aims to uphold a progressive, anti-authoritarian, morally upright tradition. However, it carefully avoids the revolutionary implications of a truly Marxist view of the working class. This group frequently cites Orwell because he embodies genuine contradictions: he wrote powerfully and sincerely about working-class poverty, opposed Stalinism from a leftist perspective, and despised bourgeois hypocrisy. His political journey ultimately culminated in anti-communism, collaboration with British imperial propaganda, and the equating of socialism with totalitarianism. This ambiguity makes him a complex figure. Any honest assessment of George Orwell must start with what is truly valuable and enduring in his work.

The significance of Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia cannot be overstated. At a time when virtually the entire liberal and left-wing intelligentsia of Britain and the West was either duped by or complicit with the Stalinist smear campaign, which claimed that Trotskyists and the POUM were agents of fascism and Franco's "fifth column", Orwell had the intellectual honesty and personal courage to tell the truth about what he had witnessed in Barcelona. He saw the Stalinist suppression of the revolutionary workers' movement firsthand. He was shot through the throat by a fascist sniper and nearly killed by Stalinist secret police. And he wrote about it all with a clarity and precision that earned him the furious hatred of the worldwide Stalinist apparatus and virtual ostracism in British literary circles.

His earlier social writing, Down and Out in Paris and London (1933) and The Road to Wigan Pier (1937), contains genuine and powerful documentation of working-class poverty and conditions. These books were written from the inside, or as close to the inside as a man of Orwell's background could get: he actually lived as a tramp, washed dishes in Paris kitchens, descended into coal mines in Lancashire and Yorkshire. The Road to Wigan Pier in particular, with its unflinching account of unemployment, malnutrition, overcrowding, and the daily indignities of working-class life in 1930s industrial England, remains a document of lasting value.

By the mid-1940s, Orwell increasingly adopted an anti-Communist stance. Intense pressures characterised this period: the temporary post-war stabilisation of capitalism, the Stalinist bloc's dominance over the left, and the Cold War's division of the world into two blocs. These factors compelled socialist and radical thinkers to take sides. Many who had once supported Stalinism, viewing the Soviet bureaucracy as true socialism, now rejected socialism altogether. Similarly, former opponents of Stalin in the U.S., such as Max Shachtman and James Burnham, shifted to the anti-Communist side. Orwell found himself caught up in this shift.

Orwell's 1946 article, "Second Thoughts on James Burnham," sharply criticises the political stance it discusses. In the piece, Orwell concurs with Burnham's reactionary view that Stalin did not "betray" the Russian Revolution but rather expanded it along its original trajectory—arguing that Stalinism was an inevitable result of Leninism and Bolshevism. Walsh notes that this view was "the basis of one of the great lies of the 20th century." Orwell also misrepresented Trotsky's analysis, reducing it to the notion that "things would have been different if Trotsky had remained in power"—a straw man he dismisses while labelling Trotskyists as "ultra-left sects." By the time Orwell wrote 1984, he openly identified his main goal as critiquing "communism."

And then there is the list. In 1949, a year before his death, Orwell handed over a list of about 130 prominent individuals he believed to be sympathetic to the Stalinist regime to the British Foreign Office's Information Research Department, a secret anti-Soviet propaganda group. As Fred Mazelis' WSWS analysis highlights, this was not simply due to personal fear or selfish motives. Orwell genuinely believed he was combating totalitarianism. However, in doing so, he adopted the stance that the Cold War required: that opposing Stalinism meant aligning with British imperialism and viewing bourgeois democracy as the "lesser evil."

The comparison with Trotsky offers valuable insight and clarity. When the US House Committee on Un-American Activities invited Trotsky to testify in 1939, he intended to use the opportunity to promote his revolutionary ideas, not to give anti-communist witch-hunters a list of names. The invitation was rescinded when they realised this. The distinction is more than just personal character; it highlights two fundamentally different political outlooks: Trotsky's belief that fighting Stalinism must go hand in hand with opposing imperialism and striving for authentic socialism, versus Orwell's growing view that capitalism, even if flawed, was the last safeguard of civilisation against totalitarianism.

Orwell's trajectory was fundamentally limited by a structural political challenge that appeared throughout his career. Notably, his identification with the working class was driven more by emotion and sentiment than by firm scientific conviction. He associated with centrist groups such as the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in Britain and the POUM in Spain—both of which promoted "left unity' influenced by Stalinism and criticised Trotsky's severe condemnation of Stalinism as "sectarian." These organisations, characterised by their centrism and political ambiguity, left the working class vulnerable when the Stalinist regime moved to crush the Spanish revolution.

This gap between Orwell's moral passion and his lack of a comprehensive program is precisely what makes him appealing to Andrews' political tradition. The Eurocommunist and post-Stalinist left share this limitation: they are strong in moral outrage and cultural awareness but have systematically moved away from the Marxist goals of socialist revolution, worker empowerment, and the formation of a revolutionary international party. Orwell's brand of socialism—characterised as ethical, English, empirical, sceptical of abstract "theory," and ultimately leading to a form of despairing anti-totalitarianism that aligned with Cold War interests—served as the literary blueprint that Marxism Today later sought to theorise.

Orwell has been claimed by virtually every political tendency since his death, reflecting his political contradictions. The anti-Communist right claims him as a Cold Warrior who exposed the totalitarian nature of socialism. Liberals claim him as a defender of democratic values and free speech. The social-democratic left claims him as a working-class champion with a conscience. Even sections of the left that should know better treat 1984 and Animal Farm as politically neutral warnings about the abuse of power applicable to any regime, which is precisely how Orwell's own political degeneration made possible the appropriation of these works by the forces of anticommunism.

Andrews' framework examines Orwell and the working class, seeking to revive the earlier, more radical Orwell: the documentary writer focused on poverty, the veteran of the Spanish Civil War, the anticolonial advocate, and someone who worked in mines and hop fields. This rendition of Orwell is what the British labour movement has traditionally admired and is crucial for understanding working-class experiences and consciousness. This material is highly valuable.

Andrews' interpretation preserves Orwell's political ambiguities and his moral seriousness but avoids addressing the failed policies that led him from 'Homage to Catalonia' to the Foreign Office. This approach risks supporting a politics rooted in moral witness and social conscience, which may not provide the revolutionary change the working class requires. Orwell is portrayed as a patron saint of ethical socialism, diverse labour movement culture, and politics grounded in decency and solidarity. While this aligns with the Orwell tradition promoted by Andrews, it also distances Orwell from the revolutionary significance of his most profound work.

Andrew concludes the book with an unusual and somewhat unsettling epilogue. Only when you grasp its significance does something unsavoury become apparent. An epilogue typically appears after the main story ends, signalling that the narrative of the British working class—through the labour movement, trade unions, mining communities, industrial towns, cooperatives, and socialist groups—has come to an end. What Andrews offers is essentially a farewell, a memorial, and a post-mortem. A Marxist must seriously ask: whose conclusion is this, and what political purpose does it serve?

Andrews confronts an undeniable and devastating material reality. The deindustrialisation of Britain, intensified violently under Thatcher from 1979 and maintained by subsequent governments, dismantled the material foundation of working-class communities at an unprecedented scale in the twentieth century. The statistics are clear: at the start of the 1984–85 strike, there were 170 coal pits with over 181,000 employees. Two decades later, only 15 pits remained, with around 6,500 workers. Entire communities—Durham, Lancashire, South Yorkshire, South Wales, and the Midlands coalfields—were not just economically decimated but socially wiped out. In former mining areas, drug addiction affected one in three households. Young people fled, families fell apart, and the NUM was reduced to a shadow of its former self. Trade union membership plummeted from over 11 million in 1984 to less than 7 million, with fewer than 19% of private-sector workers unionised.

This is the material reality of "unmaking", and it is a ruling-class achievement, carried out deliberately, with a specific political objective. As the WSWS analysis makes clear, Thatcher's assault was not primarily about economic "modernisation." It was a conscious class war offensive, prepared for years in advance through the Ridley Plan, aimed at destroying the organised capacity of the working class to resist the globalisation-driven restructuring of capital. The miners were targeted first and most ferociously precisely because they had brought down a Conservative government in 1974 and represented the most militant concentration of working-class power in Britain.

This is where the core limitation of Andrews' method proves crucial. The "unmaking" he laments was not an unavoidable historical process, a natural force, or an inevitable outcome of technological progress. Instead, it was a political loss—one that involved deliberate actions by the very organisations that professed to represent the working class.

The 1984–85 miners' strike marked a turning point from traditional industrial Britain to the deindustrialised wasteland that Andrews criticises. It was not lost due to a lack of courage, solidarity, or determination, as the miners demonstrated all three during a year-long fight characterised by extreme hardship, police brutality, financial pressure, and legal attacks. The defeat occurred because the TUC and Labour Party leadership, rather than supporting the strike, deliberately isolated and betrayed it. As detailed by Marsden and Hyland, the TUC opposed coordinated action; dockworkers' strikes were quickly ended by their leaders, and the miners' strike was sabotaged, without which no pit could operate, and scabbing would have failed. Neil Kinnock, Labour leader, was a well-known opponent of the strike. The TUC General Council, whose predecessors had betrayed the 1926 General Strike, played a similar role in undermining Thatcher in 1984–85.

This explanation for the "unmaking" clarifies that it was not due to capitalism's relentless technological progress. Instead, it was a political defeat caused by a class-collaborationist bureaucracy that had long since ceased to defend the working class. As the WSWS analysis states, this bureaucracy effectively became "a police force on behalf of management." The trade union bureaucracy and Labour Party didn't just fail to stop deindustrialisation — they actively facilitated it, paving the way for capital's aggressive assault on all fronts.

Andrews, operating within the intellectual tradition of the CPGB Historians Group, the Thompsonian New Left and the post-Eurocommunist Cultural Studies milieu, cannot say this plainly. To do so would require confronting the entire tradition within which his work is embedded — the tradition of seeking to reform and pressure the trade union and Labour bureaucracy from the left, rather than recognising these institutions as obstacles to working-class interests that must be overcome through the building of independent revolutionary leadership.

Stuart Hall and the Ideological Preparation for "Unmaking"

What makes Andrews' project especially insidious from a Marxist standpoint is not merely that it mourns the destruction of working-class communities, but that it does so through a theoretical framework that actively contributed to making that destruction politically irresistible. The WSWS analysis of Stuart Hall is essential here. Hall, whose Marxism Today milieu was Andrews' primary intellectual formation, responded to Thatcherism not by strengthening Marxist class analysis but by systematically dissolving it. His concept of "Thatcherism" as a cultural-ideological formation, his argument that Labour could no longer rely on traditional trade-union methods of struggle, his elevation of race, gender and cultural identity over class as the primary axes of social analysis — all of this constituted, as Paul Bond's WSWS analysis demonstrates, an intellectual justification for the political adaptation to Thatcherism that New Labour subsequently carried out in practice.

Eric Hobsbawm's contemporaneous essay "The Forward March of Labour Halted" — celebrated across the same milieu — performed the identical function: attributing the crisis of the labour movement to the decline of the working class itself rather than to the betrayals of its leadership, and thereby providing theoretical cover for Labour's rightward lurch under Kinnock and then Blair. When the working class's defeats are attributed to its own obsolescence rather than to political betrayal, the conclusion that follows is not the building of revolutionary leadership but adaptation to the new bourgeois order — exactly the course New Labour took, with the enthusiastic support of Marxism Today.

Andrews' "unmaking" thesis sits directly within this ideological lineage. By framing deindustrialisation as the dissolution of the working class as such — as the end of a particular historical formation — rather than as a political defeat that must be understood, reversed and overcome, it reproduces the essential move of Hobsbawm and Hall: transforming a crisis of leadership into a crisis of class. The working class is not unmade. It is defeated. These are not the same thing, and the difference is everything.

The ideological basis for "unmaking" these also draws on André Gorz's influence. In his 1980 book, *Farewell to the Working Class*, Gorz argued that the proletariat as a revolutionary agent had been replaced by automation and the post-industrial economy. A Marxist views Gorz’s argument as a typical sign of petty-bourgeois political demoralisation amid working-class setbacks, not as a scientific analysis but as an ideological reflex. By claiming the working class is now a thing of the past, Gorz and his followers avoided the challenging task of forming a revolutionary party, opting instead for lifestyle politics, green utopianism, and post-class social movements. Even if Andrews doesn’t explicitly reference Gorz, the "unmaking" framework serves a similar ideological purpose.

The Marxist view begins with a fundamentally different premise. Although the demolition of pit villages, steel towns, and shipyard communities caused significant human hardship, it did not eliminate the working class. Instead, it reconfigured and reshaped it. Now, new groups such as logistics workers, healthcare staff, retail employees, transport workers, public sector employees, and gig economy workers have emerged. For instance, Amazon warehouse employees, NHS nurses, Deliveroo couriers, and call-centre workers are still subject to capitalist exploitation; they embody the contemporary working class. They remain linked by the same core class relations as miners and steelworkers, but operate under new conditions that require different strategies for struggle and organisation.

The core change was not the dismantling of the working class itself, but rather the collapse of the institutional structures that traditionally organised them. These included trade unions, which acted as protective entities, and the Labour Party, which served as a symbolic voice for workers. The process was mainly driven by trade unions and Labour bureaucracies, which had long betrayed significant working-class struggles since 1926. Thatcher's role was to deliver the final blow to these already weakened organisations, which had become hollow shells from within.

The task of this analysis is not about mourning but about constructing: forming rank-and-file committees and a revolutionary internationalist party that can truly represent the working class against both employers and bureaucratic structures that claim to speak for it. This is the lesson of 1926, 1984–85, and every major working-class defeat in British history. It is the lesson that Andrews' "unmaking" framework, despite its genuine sympathy for working people, consistently inhibits readers from understanding.