Victor,
J. Willi, 2021. The Fourth Ordeal: A History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
1968-2018. Cambridge University Press. Hardcover: $90.76; Paperback: $30.45;
ISBN-10:
1108822452; ISBN-13:
978-1108822459; pp. 588.
Lorenzo
Vidino, 2020. The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Brotherhood in the
West. Columbia University Press. Hardcover: $80.51; Paperback: $30.00; ISBN-10:
023119367X; ISBN-13:
978-0231193672; pp. 296.
Can
one emancipate with a structure that is largely non-emancipatory? And what is
the exact role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the context of the massive
insurrections known as the Arab Spring? Several observers underline a situation
where the revolution has been present, whereas the revolutionaries have been
largely missing (Bayet 2017, Traboulsi 2014). Others note that both the
revolutionaries and the revolution have been active, but the reversal of the
Brotherhood's fortunes indicates a cycle wherein the counterrevolution has
gained the upper hand and that ascendency has not spared the Brotherhood, even
when the latter has always "avoid[ed] revolutions and revolutionary change
[as they are thought to] lead to unexpected consequences." (al-Anani 2022,
2) Still, the predomination of the counterrevolution does not in any sensible
way guarantee that history will work in favour of the counterrevolution
indefinitely. Much has been at play, and the following review essay accelerates
the magisterial findings in both books to go beyond what each one highlights.
To
begin with, Willi's The Fourth Ordeal presumes that the demise of the
Brotherhood—its fall from grace—in the coup of July 2013 is a tactical error.
Differently put, had the proponents of the Society's fourth Guide (el-Tilmsani)
prevailed, the Qutbists (a vanguard subgroup within the Society that follows
the ideology put forth by the radical jihadist Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)) would
have little chance in fragmenting the Brotherhood both just before the surge of
the Arab Spring and after the group's victory in the presidential elections in
June 2012. In what follows, I will show that rapid ascendency, while plausible,
remains untenable in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. In other words, the
demise of the Society could not have been avoided regardless of which competing
wing within it had been in control. The demise of July 3rd, 2013 and the
subsequent fragmentation had not been a tactical miscalculation. And rather, it
has been the undistorted translation of the motoring principle within the
soon-to-be a century-old movement.
My
contention presupposes an unbridgeable methodological divide between strategies
of and for reform and those of revolt. Since Egypt was caught amid a radically
incendiary situation, the means and the mindset of reform subscribe more to the
prerequisites of the counterrevolutionary moment and its demands. This is
different from ascertaining that the Brotherhood is categorically (as a matter
of principle) a regressive or restorative force like, say, the military.
Rather, it is the Society's pseudo-revolutionary dynamic, its political
duplicity that borders on naivety, which is another facet of its theoretical
poverty and distrust of radical youth forces that dictated its vulnerability to
counterrevolutionary forces. The combination of all these shortcomings has
dictated its fourth ordeal.
This
review essay pleads for a radical distinction between the social means of a
revolution, seeking a rupture with the manners of the past, and those tools
aiming at reform, stressing gradualism and long-term change. Once this
distinction serving a methodological axiom is set, the Brotherhood's
performance in the revolutionary situation put forth by the post-2011 situation
cannot be mistaken. This distinction also serves in reading Vidino's The Closed
Circle as it zooms in on what he chooses to study: the Brotherhood's
international branch, meaning: the Brotherhood's affiliates in Western Europe
and the U.S. Perhaps to no one's surprise, both the original/Egyptian
Brotherhood and its structure in the West (Western Europe and North America)
are reformist. And unlike Willi, Vidino seizes on the logical implications when
opting for a reformist track, taking part in the political game and hence the
reverse of fortunes coming with the impasse of its project in both Egypt,
Tunisia as well as in France, Denmark, Sweden, the U.K. and, certainly, the U.S.
Both
Willi and Vidino, from the start, embraced the method of oral history:
conducting not a small number of interviews with rank-and-file members of the
Brotherhood and certain leadership figures and dissenters both in Egypt and
abroad. This method the authors contrast with the approach that reads the
Brotherhood as a social movement. The advantages they advance are multiple. For
interviews-based approach facilitates seeing the movement less like a solid
structure and more as a social actor in the real world, combined with a
heterogeneous pool of opinions across the movement's hierarchal spectrum. In
contrast with Vidino, the interviews Willi conducts are massive, and so are his
readings of memoirs, brochures, and news updates on blogs and websites. Still,
both authors' command of Arabic boosts their grasp on the thematic they engage
with. The result shows in a plethora of details that corroborate their thesis
rooted—unfortunately in Willi's case more than Vidino's—more in speculation
than in a solid historical reading of these facts they amassed.
In
Chapter I: "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Willi stresses that
the niche for his study lies in the lack of serious, reliable, and unbiased
literature addressing the Brotherhood. Most of what exists is produced by
attention-grabbing pseudo-scholars and think-tanks. Against a background
rampant with simplistic studies and severely lacking in written archives,
Victor's project of doing oral history explains the importance of spelling out
the details of the "great saga" (12). He does this by zooming in on
al-Banna's project of reviving the faith within a colonial context in which
Egypt was a British protectorate. Contextualization is vital in beating up
cliches. Willi then considers Banna's precursors in the political revival of
Islam: Mohammed' Abduh, Jamal din Afghani and Mohammed Rachid Rida. The book
does not overlook the Sufi elements in the Banna's vision serving as a 'pure'
fountain for the reactivation of the faith in the sociopolitical order of the
1920s and 1930s. Later, the reader encounters al-Banna's organizational
seven-step blueprint and the basic literature of the movement. He ends the
chapter by reassuring Western audiences that al-Banna's idea of the caliphate
is more of a metaphor, "a catchphrase" (33) for founding a Muslim
parallel to the European Union or the United States of America.
Chapter
II: "The Second Founding (1968-1981)" invokes the post-1954
incarceration of the Brotherhood's leadership under President Nacer. The latter
almost cancelled the Society from existence. However, in the wake of the Arab
defeat of 1967 in the war with Israel and the Student Protests of 1968, the
leaders of the Brotherhood were freed from prisons and connived into Egyptian
social life. But it was until President Sadaat's tenure that Brotherhood
members were grudgingly tolerated a political role. 'Omar al-Tilmsani became
the third Guide officially in 1973 and it was his gradualist approach as
specified in his book, Preachers, Not Judges (1969), resonated with President
Sadaat's policy of appeasement on two levels. The first comes in the context of
a rival group, Jama'at al-Muslimin (Society for Muslims). The latter aligns
itself with a radical jihadi ideology as outlined by Sayyid Qutb, which was
then on the rise and threatened to destabilize the country. The second, which
is no less important but overlooked by Willi, is the prominence of socialist
and communist parties, exerting pressure on the powers of the time. Thus,
al-Tilmsani's rendition of the Brotherhood and his balanced approach served
Sadaat's policy of personalist rule. Sadaat's rapprochement with Tel Aviv and
his eventual assassination in 1981 dictated that this arrangement with the
state becomes now lacking.
Chapter
II: "The Rise of the Vanguard (1981-1991)" refers to how al-Tilmisani's
adherents (proponents of gradualism in dealing with the powers that be as well
as in the decision-making structure inside the Brotherhood) started losing
currency to the more radical elements. Instead, it is now the vanguardist
approach, those followers of Sayyid Qutb's ideology as specified in the latter
book, Signposts on the Road (1964), who are gaining momentum. Other than the
takfiri and jihadi articles of faith, the vanguardists trust in the Qutb's
philosophy of jahiliyyah or modern-day structural ignorance whose raison d’être
explains Society's need for the vanguards, those people "who engage with
society while practising mental and emotional withdrawal from it." (107)
With the vanguards in charge, the Brotherhood expanded both nationally (to all
governorates in Egypt) and internationally (literally, worldwide). Meanwhile,
it expanded into all professional syndicates and won an important number of
seats in parliament.
Of
capital interest in understanding the fourth ordeal of the Brotherhood is the
section titled: "The Brotherhood's Neoliberal Turn" in Chapter IV: "Brotherhood
Incorporated (1991-2001)." The section traces the rise of the
business-minded cadre in the Guidance Office, the likes of Khairat al-Shamir,
who, while a vanguardist and jihadist, is similarly a business tycoon and
strategist. The rise of al-Shamir and his cliques, Willi outlines, echoes the
Brotherhood's overall change of perspective where "Quranic ideals with
newly acquired market economy concepts…the emerging Islamic discourse embraced
the modern business corporation as a model through which one could articulate
specifically Islamic policies and objectives." (157) A subsequent section bearing on the
consequence of the seismic turn marks the "Transformation of the Social
Base" within the several-decades long Brotherhood, ending in a quasi-class
struggle within the movement. Therefore, the decade preceding 9/11 not only
witnessed the break up between various Brotherhood national Chapters over the
first Gulf War but a rupture with classical Brotherhood formation in Egypt
itself.
Chapter
V: "Struggle for Leadership (2001-2011)" carefully reads the decade
spanning the period between 9/11 and the kick-off of the Arab Spring as it
marked a further split between the gradualists and vanguardists groups within
the Brotherhood. The denialist narrative of 9/11 by people introducing
themselves as members of the Society complicated the relationship with the U.S.,
given how neoconservative orientalists branded political Islam. The Guidance
Office started a public relations campaign denying allegations of its alleged
static disposition and succeeded in establishing a rapprochement with the U.S.
administration. On the eve of the January 25th Revolt, Willi specifies that the
Brotherhood spearheaded by the vanguards was never in its best shape. The
author lists several strategically fatal decisions paving the way for its
fourth ordeal.
Chapter
VI: "Revolution, Rise, and Fall (2011-2013)" enumerates several
strategic miscalculations that resulted in the fourth ordeal of the
Brotherhood. Chief among those several miscalculations, in Willi's opinion, is
the inability of the Vanguard group to register the steam and the scale of the real
and unexpected change that the revolutionary situation of post-January 25th has
made possible. Victor notes a mental lag between the old school activism that
marked the leadership on the one hand and the Brotherhood's youth revolutionary
zeal and ardour. Against the specific warnings of the Brotherhood's youth, the
leadership harried toward a hasty and farfetched alliance with the Egyptian
military, expecting to be rewarded for its allegiance with power (al-Aswany
2021). The fiasco illustrates not only how (contrary to its youth) the
negotiating cadres of the Brotherhood showed a lack of imagination but
deep-seated duplicity, as shown in incidents such as the Maspero and the
Blue-Bra Girl. The race for power for its own sake sealed the Brotherhood's
unfortunate fate.
Chapter
VII: "The Beginning of the Fourth Ordeal (2013-2018)" starts with how
General Sissi's cracked up on the Brotherhood sit-ins in both Rab'a and
al-Nahda Squares in August 2013 instead of uniting the remaining leaders, those
who managed to escape or go underground in time, had fragmented them further.
The crack-up, Willi finds out, has been unprecedented in intensity since
Nassers' times in the 1950s and 1960s. Naturally, the second rank leadership
had its chance in steering the Brotherhood. But the vanguard group, both from
prison and exile, refused to secede important prerogatives, resulting in a
feud, which, whether motivated by ego or by ideology, Willi does not specify. However,
he specifies that a non-negligible section in the Egyptian leadership of the
Brotherhood has propagated towards the necessity of the revolutionary path,
including the armed struggle against General Sissi's dictatorship. But with the
execution of Mohammed Kamel in October 2016, the revolutionary path lost
currency. Rivalry and division remain, however, endemic, marking the
Brotherhood to this day (the first half of 2022) even when the book closed its
study in 2018.
Even
if Vidino's The Closed Circle approaches the Western chapters of the Muslim
Brotherhood, it does not substantially differ from Willi's monumental gathering
of facts and analysis. Eternalization of politics and duplicity in using it or
the unprincipled deployment of religion rank supreme among Vidino's critique of
the Western Brotherhood. The seven testimonial chapters are sandwiched between
two introductory chapters varying between definitions and hypothesizing and two
concluding ones as they synthesize the findings and read those findings beyond
the amassed evidence. Hence, concerning Vidino's volume, I am saving the
readers the middle chapters because all the seven testimonies (in the seven
middle chapters) are squeezed into the synthesized findings and the
methodological readings that go beyond the evidence.
Chapter
I, "What is the Muslim Brotherhood in the West?" starts with a
methodological note regarding the sea of confusion in identifying Brotherhood
organizations in the West. The reasons are multiple, but chief among which is
the stigma the name recalls, given the 9/11 attacks and the steeped Orientalist
portrayals that often present the movement outside space and time. Therefore,
policymakers in the West are indeed in the dark, and Vidino's volume sells its
credentials to facilitate practical ways of dealing with not a small number of
Brotherhood offshoots in the West. While invariably sharing the belief that
Islam is complete in and for itself, the Brotherhood groups do not seek to
Islamize Western societies, aiming to facilitate the integration of Muslim
immigrants into these societies. Vidino identifies three major categories of
Brotherhood organizations. He counts a- pure Brotherhood bodies, which prefer
non-public or secretive networking; b- Brotherhood spawns where affiliated
members maintain an emotional link with the original organization but are not
structurally tied to it; c- there are those groups who are only distantly
influenced. All the three varieties have a vested interest in being
representative of Muslim communities and collaborating with governments bodies
in a way that channels partnerships over funds and political capital in the
countries where they are based.
Vidino
outlines in Chapter II: "Joining and Leaving the Brotherhood" the
criteria for selection of members and subsequently the reasons for these
recruits' disillusionment which are inducive for parting ways with the
movement. As to joining, the Brotherhood selects its cadres, not the other way
around. No application in the classical sense is reported. The selection
criteria have to do more on signs that promise piousness and obedience. Now,
concerning leaving the movement, Vidino zooms in on two principal reasons. The
first is disenchantment with the leadership and or dissatisfaction with the
inner workings of the Society. The second specifies the group's ideology,
particularly the Brotherhood's gradualist approach and its political duplicity.
At the end of the chapter, Vidino broaches upon the dissenters' own life after
leaving the Brotherhood, often reported as tough as the former members had had
little, if at all, social life outside the movement.
All
the seven chapters from the III to the IX examine those moments of recruitment
in detail. They contextualize both the joining and the leaving and provide
reasons for each. The format used is a testimony that the author recomposes
from face-to-face interviews and email correspondence. The common thread is the
appeal or radiance that the Brotherhood holds, the enchantment of the early
days and months, even years, and the expectations of serving in a
larger-than-life cause in a movement whose name inspires owe and pride. No less
common is the stifled dissatisfactions stamping the secretive nature of the
Society's inner working, which the dissenters find no solid reason for
maintaining except perhaps due to greed for power and manipulation of the lower
and mid-ranking brothers. Most of the common testimonies Vidino brings note how
the penchant for secrets could be quite an in place when working under or
dealing with autocratic governments such as Egypt, Jordon, or Syria but certainly
out of context when operating in Western democracies. Likewise, the testimonies
note that leading Brothers, those involved with the real decision-making,
rarely bother to read the languages of the Western societies they live in, say
little as to genuine attempts at understanding these societies' histories and
complex dynamics.
Chapter
X: "Joining and Leaving: What the Evidence Suggests" underlines a
methodology in reading the problem of dissenting from the Brotherhood. Most
dissenters left because they thought "current leaders have strayed from
Hassan al-Banna's original message." (179). Others raised the concern of
secrecy and doublespeak in the proceedings, which is thought to serve only "a
small nomenklatura of interconnected activists, an aristocratic elite."
(179) Differently put, ideological convictions are hardly the reason. Only a
tiny minority of the dissenters (Ahmed Akkari, Mohamed Louizi, and the American
Brothers) zoom in on the motoring principle behind the various chapters of the
Western Brotherhood and find it problematic. They list the leaders' duplicity
in playing politics with the powers that be. The face-saving infuriation
concerning the Danish cartoons that featured Prophet Muhammed from 2003 to 2007
reveals how the key leaders can go in trading with their presumably principled
defence of the faith. Other less fatal problems are listed in the chapter.
The
last chapter: "The Western Brotherhood's Future: From the Arab Spring and
Beyond." The video draws the picture of the Western Brotherhood
transitioning toward post-Islamism. Contrary to Western governments' lack of
policy, Saudia Arabia and UAE cracked up on their local chapters and tagged the
principal Brotherhood in Egypt (following the July 2013 coup) with its Western
wing, a terrorist organization stipulating a major geostrategic turn. Adding
salt to injury, as soon as the Arab Spring started, Western Brothers joined
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and other places (their countries of origin) to assume
leading positions there. Still, they left their former positions in the West
empty. For converts and those Muslim staying behind in the West, that move,
like Ghannouchi's, dealt a serious blow to the image of the Western Brothers,
pilling evidence of the opportunism of these leaders and the uncertain future
of the Western Brotherhood as a whole. Vidino suggests that the scene is
perhaps ready for post-Ikhawanism, like post-communism during the 1970s and the
1980s.
The
extensive details about the extremely divergent pool of opinions between the
Brotherhood's inner circle, the small group of decision-makers, and their
contestants, as well as the dissatisfactions, even the dissenting voices of
second rank leaders in the provinces, as brilliantly displayed in Willi's study,
however, are never a waste of time for the perceptive reader. Such details
specify that Willi has actually spelt everything except the essential, or
perhaps he has gradually broached upon that essential. For if they amount to
anything, these extensive details remain food for thought because they confirm
how a structure or movement founded for reform cannot by any stretch of the
imagination propagate towards reform's antithesis: revolution. Such a situation
does not result because of the overblown narcissistic drives of certain leaders
or the fact that an ageing leadership in the Guidance Office was cut off from
rapidly evolving reality, the way Will tries to convince us.
With
a rapidly evolving revolutionary situation or overblown egos, leaders'
out-of-touch are solid empirical factors. However, as the historical experience
of the long durée shows, they remain marginal because each of Willi's listed
factors enjoys no autonomous scenario of its own. The fact that the radical
Qutbists won over the al-Telemsani-influenced members of the Shura council or
became dominant in the Guidance Office does not alter the situation that the
Brotherhood remains marred in theoretical poverty as literally not a single
figure among its presumed thinkers dares to question the bedrock of the world's
political economy. The Brotherhood's early bidder for the presidency before
Morsi was Khairat el-Shatir, a proponent of the Qutbist ultra-conservative
approach but equally an ambitious business conglomerate with literally billions
of dollars. As his asset! The contradiction in combining piety and worldly
success in a world deemed by Qutbists corrupt to the marrow is worthy of a
study all on its own. That study can explain how the Brotherhood has had no
qualms over sending emissaries to Washington DC and freely giving assurances
concerning Israel's future security. Not a small number of observers mistake
this Brotherhood's maneuverer as realpolitik. It offers a death blow to
ordinary Egyptians' expectations for a substantial rupture from Mubarak's era.
This is an example of Willi's impressive display of facts minutely scanned but
are not pressed enough to yield and distil a solid historical reading showcasing
that reform cannot befriend and accommodate revolt, in the sense that it cannot
meet the people's minimum expectations in the wake of ousting an enduring
dictator such as Hosni Mubarek.
The
Brotherhood's appeal to the U.S. establishment specifies two issues, not one.
Apart from showcasing the leadership's lust for political power (al-Anani 2022,
10), its readiness to play with the available-but-abusive so-called 'rules of
the game' indicates the extent to which the movement suffers from a severe
theoretical confusion. The stipulation of the theoretical clarity stands at
odds with Willi's broodings over tactical issues such as the Brotherhood's
decades of incarceration and overall underground work carried out as an opposition
entity made the movement apathetic to, not just, unready to assume political
rule. All these are true but theoretical muddiness made the Brotherhood it is
own worst enemy because that muddiness renders it incapable of embracing its
historical responsibility. Indeed, the shallowness of its theoretical
foundation largely decides its incapacity of spotting an alternative to the
post-1945 American order. The combination of putting people of the like of
al-Shatir's calibre in key positions in the movement illustrates that they take
the laws of the market economy for granted. Similarly, their unconditional
readiness to compromise on matters both delicate and of principle, such as the
Palestinian Question, confirms those readings which trust in the Brotherhood as
a radical alternative to Mubarek's corrupt ways are not only slightly mistaken
but fundamentally false.
Suffice
it to note that ever since its inception in 1928, the Society has never
introduced itself except as a fundamentally reformist movement. Why pity the
Brotherhood against reformism, the reader legitimately asks? The short answer
is that Islam is either revolutionary or it is not. In this context, it is
worth noting that Prophet Muhammad did not rub shoulders with the Meccan
capitalists of his own time, not because he was not capable or that the
opportunity did not present itself. For historical accuracy, the Meccan lords
pleaded with him to preside over them. And it is he who did not accept because
he knew he would be serving their caravans and businesses, and he was looking
for a world without caravans and businesses. In the case of the Brotherhood, as
Willi's succinct study brilliantly shows but rarely seizes on the fact that the
Brotherhood had never been missing committed activists with exceptional talents
and organizational skills. Therefore, to blame one faction or pity one subgroup
against another is to participate in confusing, not elucidating, Egypt's
revolutionary/counterrevolutionary situation.
Vidino's
synthesis from the interviews and email exchanges puts its hand directly on the
spot where it hurts the Western Brothers the most, that is, on the future of
the movement as a whole. I learned how the multicultural Society envisioned by
Western Brotherhood is exactly the opposite of what Western governments have in
mind or plan for their nations. Pierre Durrani and Mohamed Louizi's testimonies
both note how the Brotherhood flouted multiculturalism to maintain its parallel
societies or ghettos: anti-universal Muslims communicating with like-minded
Muslims and cheating the hospitality extended by Western societies. For
anti-universal Muslims nurse the illusion that they can conquer Rome from
within one day. Rome here is that mythical Western capital in the prophetic
tradition. Despite Vidino being bemoaning how Western governments lack a
long-term and consistent approach to the Society, this very duplicity in
bending laws and abusing multiculturalism could be behind the U.S. policy
planners' decision to let Morsi and his government down. Likely, U.S. planners
did not want another heart-breaking Islamic republic, à la Iran. And in cutting
the head of the mother movement in Egypt, its Western offshoots will be
automatically powerless. In this context, we can read the ongoing feuds between
Brotherhood leaders inside and outside Egypt, Ghannouchi's statement in favour
of post-Islamism, and the assassination of Mohamed Kamel, rendering the
Brotherhood's revolutionary bid into nought.
The
powerful point of the two books is how they allow Brotherhood members to speak
and allow several voices and insiders' informed opinions to sketch the readers',
not necessarily the authors', final analysis. The fact that the two authors
speak and read Arabic, along with other languages, is an asset and facilitates
their intentions to translate their humility and patience (unlike
attention-grabbing Orientalists carrying out pseudo-scholarly works) to learn
from the materials and synthesize their learning in these two books. The two
authors are likely to transform how Islamist movements are approached and
understood through such studies. Willi's study, in particular, highlights the
role of functional social movements (in a similar vein to functional states) as
the American establishment does not want to divulge the Brotherhood from a
functional role, namely: quelling genuine revolutionary movements or those that
can propagate toward upsetting the post-1945 world order. In The Fourth Ordeal,
readers find that "U.S. strategic planners used an active and conscious
policy of mobilizing political Islam to crush ideologies unfavourable to U.S.
interests." (117). Unfortunately, Willi overlooks this methodological
thread where he has failed in his critical observation, for the Brotherhood was
specifically founded to suppress the nationalistic aspirations that emerged in
1920 (Soueif 1999, 224).
Speaking
of the number of ordeals and given the reformist agenda of the Brotherhood or,
more precisely, its lust for power, it is unlikely that the Brotherhood will
cease playing with fire from which it bitterly tasted four times so far. Other
ordeals will follow suit because, at the moment of composing these lines,
reliable news reports circulate that the Brotherhood has been repeatedly involved
in direct talks with representatives of General Sissi's government, the very
person who caused the Brotherhood's demise. The fact that the Brotherhood is
even willing to sit and consider proposals by Sissi's representatives is
evidence of its political naivety. Many will rebut that aspiration to play a
role in the future of their country. The number of ordeals, and the vocabulary
itself, as the word mihnā or ordeal in Arabic stipulates a momentary but also
necessary hardship from which a positive situation will eventually follow,
expresses a willingness to impersonate the naïveté of an idiot and cancel
ordinary Egyptians' historical destiny.
References:
Al-Anani,
Khalil. Ed. 2021. Islamism and Revolution Across the Middle East:
Transformation of Ideology and Strategy after the Arab Spring. I.B. Tauris.
Al-Aswany,
Alaa. 2021. The Republic of False Truths: A Novel. Knopf: New York and London.
Trans. S. R. Fellowes
Bayat,
Asef. 2021. Revolutionary Life: The Everyday of the Arab Spring. Harvard
University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England.
Bayat,
Asef. 2017. Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab
Spring. Stanford University Press.
Soueif,
Ahdaf. 1999. The Map of Love. Bloomsbury Publishing, London and New York.
Traboulsi,
Fawwaz, 2014. thāwārt bilā thouwār. (Revolutions without Revolutionaries) Dar
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