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Tuesday, 19 November 2013
Film Review: A Field in England - Ben Wheatley's Civil War drama , 90mins. Starring: Reece Shearsmith, Richard Glover, Michael Smiley (15) Geoffrey Macnab
Friday, 1 November 2013
E.P. Thompson, the New Left, and the Politics of Historical Evasion: A Marxist Reassessment
The fiftieth anniversary of The Making of the English
Working Class has triggered many commemorations, most earnest and uncritical, that
avoid direct confrontation with the political implications of E.P. Thompson’s
historical approach. Scott Hamilton’s The Crisis of Theory fits into this
pattern. It is a thorough, often sympathetic, sometimes insightful book, but
ultimately avoids addressing key issues. Its main argument that Thompson’s
separation from the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1956 marked a “crisis
of theory” from which he never fully recovered functions more as a storytelling
device than a rigorous historical analysis, dramatising a rupture that Hamilton
does not deeply explore.
The issue isn't that Hamilton misreads Thompson, but that he
declines to engage with the political tradition that shaped him. Thompson
didn't come from a Marxist movement nor break away from one. He was formed in
the Stalinist environment of the CPGB in the 1940s, a Stalinism that had
already lost its revolutionary essence, become nationalist, and aligned with
the Popular Front’s strategy of subordinating the working class to
“progressive" bourgeois sectors. Mentioning a “crisis of theory” in 1956 suggests
Thompson had a revolutionary theory beforehand, which isn't true. Hamilton’s
book, by neglecting this crucial context, unintentionally reveals the
limitations of its preferred historiographical tradition.
The Politics Hamilton Cannot Confront
Hamilton’s early chapters stand out as some of his best, yet
even they show signs of evasion. He details Thompson’s political apprenticeship
in the CPGB thoughtfully, but he downplays its significance, showing leniency
towards the brothers’ patriotic enthusiasm. Frank Thompson’s wartime complaint
that it was “humiliating” to sit by while other nationalities fought for
Britain conflicts with any notion of genuine internationalism.
This detail matters: it reflects the CPGB's political
climate in the 1940s, where nationalism disguised as Marxism, Popular Frontism
appeared as internationalism, and Stalinism claimed to represent revolutionary
continuity. Thompson emerged from the war as a staunch Stalinist, and his
subsequent record shows no indication that he confronted the Moscow Trials or
the purge of the Bolshevik Old Guard.
Hamilton’s silence regarding the Trotsky–Stalin conflict is
intentional, not accidental. It reflects a fundamental structural choice.
Addressing this conflict would mean challenging the core ideas of Stalinism:
the rejection of perpetual revolution, the promotion of “socialism in one
country,” and the shift of Marxism from a scientific theory of global
revolution to a nationalist, gradualist ideology. Thompson embraced this
framework completely, influencing his political views, his approach to history,
and his opposition to theory. Hamilton cannot openly recognise this without
undermining his entire argument.
The Communist Party Historians’ Group: The Missing
Foundation
The most noticeable omission in Hamilton’s book is the
absence of the Communist Party Historians’ Group and, most importantly, Dona
Torr. It is difficult to credit an account of Thompson’s formation that omits
the person most responsible for it. Torr was not merely a mentor. She was the
architect of the CPHG’s national‑radical historiography, the intellectual
bridge between Popular Front politics and “history from below.” Her biography
of Tom Mann, situating him as “a late representative in a story of England’s
long-running struggle,” is the template for The Making of the English
Working Class. The working class appears not as a class defined by its
objective position in capitalist production, but as the bearer of an instinctively
radical national tradition. This is not Marxism. It is Popular Frontism
translated into historiography.
Thompson’s later rejection of the CPHG’s approach as
“quaintly empirical" was more of a stylistic critique than a fundamental
disagreement. The core assumptions, such as nationalism, empiricism, scepticism
of theory, and opposition to internationalism, remained consistent in his work.
Hamilton’s lack of comment on Torr is therefore deliberate. Addressing her
would mean challenging the entire Popular Front.
1956 and the New Left: A Break Without a Rupture
Hamilton’s most compelling chapters explore Thompson’s exit
from the CPGB and the establishment of The New Reasoner. However, even here,
the key question remains unasked: was Thompson’s departure a move toward
revolutionary Marxism, or just a change within a non-revolutionary political
context? At the Wortley Hall Conference in April 1957, John Saville stated that
the goal was to develop a body of Marxist ideas relevant to the British working
class, which involved examining “our own working-class movement and its
history.” David North’s response is particularly impactful: The real problem
was not insufficient knowledge of Manchester or Liverpool in the 1820s, “but
what had happened inside the Russian Communist Party in the 1920s.”
Thompson and Saville shifted their focus from the
international class struggle to the national radical tradition. However, this
was not a departure from Stalinism but a continuation of it. Thompson’s
antagonism toward Trotskyism further supports this, as he told The Newsletter
that Trotskyist views “tend toward the petrification and perpetuation of
sectarian division.” Slaughter remembered Thompson describing Trotskyism as
“sectarian, ultra-left and anti-revolutionary," indicating that he was
still embedded within Stalinist ideas rather than emerging from them.
Hamilton’s interpretation of the Thompson–Anderson dispute
is proficient yet lacks depth. Your review observes that neither party framed
their arguments within an internationalist Marxist perspective. The entire
debate centred on nationalist ideas. Anderson’s claim of an ‘epochal bourgeois
revolution’ spanning from the twelfth to the nineteenth century was a Ptolemaic
construct, a theoretical framework designed to uphold English exceptionalism.
While Thompson’s counterargument, backed by stronger archival research, also
remained confined to national boundaries, neither addressed the crucial
question: how the English Revolution integrates into the global development of
capitalism and international class struggles. The conflict did not reflect
lively theory; rather, it reflected fatigue within theoretical approaches.
The Making of the English Working Class: Achievement and
Limit
The Making remains a significant work, yet its focus on
subjective experience comes at the expense of downplaying the objective,
international, and scientific aspects of Marxism. This tension is at the core
of Thompson’s approach. While his effort to preserve the stories of “the poor
stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver” from “the
enormous condescension of posterity” is compelling, it results in portraying
the working class as a moral subject rather than a revolutionary force. Their
radicalism appears instinctive rather than rooted in theory, their history
remains national instead of international, and their struggle is cultural
rather than political. This is not Marxism. It is radical liberalism with a
working‑class accent.
Hamilton’s The Crisis of Theory is an important yet
ultimately vague book, often enlightening but evasive in key areas. By
excluding the Historians’ Group, Dona Torr, and the Socialist Labour League’s
critique, it omits the crucial material needed to evaluate what Thompson’s 1956
“crisis” actually addressed or left unresolved. The reality, which is simpler
and more uncomfortable, is that Thompson did not face a theoretical crisis
because he never truly had a revolutionary theory to start with. His split from
the CPGB was organisational rather than ideological. His politics stayed
nationalist, empiricist, and opposed to the internationalist Marxism he knew
only through Stalinist distortions. This essay aims to contribute to the view
of Thompson not as a tragic figure who lost a theory, but as a symbol of a
political tradition that never actually held one.
Friday, 13 September 2013
A short Interview With Historian John Morrill
Sunday, 28 July 2013
No Newes is Good Newes
Sunday, 14 July 2013
Jayne E. E. Boys, London’s News Press and the Thirty Years' War: A Study of Early News Culture and the Crisis of the Stuart State
Jayne Boys, London’s News Press and the Thirty Years' War
is a useful and at times illuminating study of early seventeenth-century news
culture. But it is also a symptomatic product of a contemporary historiography
that has lost sight of the deeper social and economic forces driving the early modern state's crisis. Boys reconstructs the mechanics of coranto
production with admirable diligence. Yet, her refusal to confront the
fundamental historiographical debates surrounding the Thirty Years’ War leaves
her analysis floating above the very historical ground on which her subject
rests.
The book’s central claim—that the Thirty Years’ War
generated an unprecedented demand for printed news in England, thereby helping
to create a recognisable reading public—is sound enough. Boys’ use of the
Trumbull papers, Joseph Mead’s correspondence, and the corantos themselves
vividly evokes a society in which ordinary readers, for the first time, could
form independent judgments about European politics. This development was indeed
destabilising for a Stuart regime accustomed to monopolising political interpretation
through pulpit and court.
But Boys treats this destabilisation as nearly an accidental
side effect of a remote religious conflict, rather than a reflection of a
broader structural crisis across Europe that was also weakening the Stuart
state. In this approach, she reproduces the limited and domesticated
perspectives seen in much recent scholarship.
Boys observes the government’s escalating attempts to
suppress the press, including Weckherlin’s appointment in 1627, Laud’s control
via the High Commission, and the harsh prosecutions of Burton, Bastwick,
Prynne, and Williams by the Star Chamber. She compares James I’s strategic
understanding of public opinion with Charles I’s reckless apathy. While these
are significant observations, Boys presents them more as administrative errors than
as signs of a deeper political illness.
The Stuart monarchy was not just slow to adapt to a shifting
media environment; it was fundamentally unable to. A regime built on the
weakening basis of feudal power could not forever suppress the rise of a public
sphere created by the uneven growth of capitalist relations. Boys hints at this
contradiction but never states it explicitly.
The Historiographical Failure: Evading the General Crisis
The book’s main weakness is its near-total neglect of the
historiographical debate over the true nature of the Thirty Years’ War.
Although Boys frames her analysis within revisionist and post-revisionist discussions on newsprints, she ignores the deeper, long-standing debate over the war’s fundamental essence. The common view
today—that the war was Europe's last major religious conflict—is both
incomplete and intellectually evasive. This perspective lets historians categorise the war as a cultural or confessional issue, avoiding exploration
of the wider economic and social transformations taking place in Europe.
The Marxist tradition, however, viewed the Thirty Years’ War
as part of a broader seventeenth-century crisis. Hobsbawm saw it as a
breakdown of feudal systems across the continent. At the same time, Polišenský argued that
its roots lay in the uneven growth of early capitalist economies, which led to
clash regions where different systems met violently.
This interpretation is essential to grasping why English
news culture surged when it did. The craving for uncensored news wasn't just
curiosity about a foreign conflict; it mirrored broader structural pressures—economic upheaval, political deadlock, ideological division—that pushed Europe toward war and England toward revolution. By neglecting this
literature, Boys strips her findings of their historical significance, recording
symptoms without addressing the underlying issues.
There are also more concrete problems. Boys’ reliance on
printed calendars of state papers rather than the manuscript State Papers
Domestic has already been criticised, and rightly so. Her repetition of the long-corrected
misidentification of the press licenser “Cottington” is not a trivial slip. It
reveals a methodological complacency at odds with the book’s claims to archival
rigour. This is not fatal to her argument, but it reflects a broader tendency:
a willingness to treat the surface of events as sufficient, without probing the
deeper structures that give them significance.
The Thirty Years’ War and Current Historiography
The Thirty Years’ War is still one of the most misunderstood
events in early modern history. Modern historians generally see it as the final
and most intense expression of Europe’s religious conflicts: a destructive outbreak of confessional hostility ultimately settled by the pragmatic
diplomacy of Westphalia. This popular view, common in mainstream scholarship,
is neat, morally comforting, and politically static. However, it fails to
capture the event’s full complexity.
The “war of religion” thesis simplifies a continentwide
social and political collapse into a mere theological dispute. It frames the
conflict as a cultural drama instead of acknowledging it as a fundamental
structural crisis. This perspective masks the underlying forces that made the
war both possible and unavoidable.
The Marxist tradition offered a far more ambitious
explanation. Eric Hobsbawm located the war within the general crisis of the
seventeenth century: a Europe-wide breakdown of feudal structures marked by
agrarian collapse, fiscal exhaustion, demographic contraction, and political
fragmentation. J. V. Polišenský went further, identifying the war’s origins in
the uneven development of emerging capitalist economies. This unevenness
produced “buffer” regions—zones caught between incompatible economic and
political systems—where conflict was most likely to ignite.
This view sees the Thirty Years’ War not as a mere religious
conflict but as a fundamental upheaval. Religion served as the ideological
language, not the primary cause. The prevalent focus on confessional
explanations today mirrors a wider trend among historians to Favor social
narratives. By depicting the war as a battle of beliefs rather than a struggle
over material interests, historians sidestep the crisis of the feudal system
and the rise of capitalist dynamics that shaped the century. Consequently, the
war is viewed as a moral tragedy rather than a significant political event.
This is important because the Thirty Years’ War was not an
isolated event. It was part of a broader crisis across Europe that also
destabilised the Stuart monarchy, transformed state institutions, and created new forms of political communication, such as the rise of English news culture.
Viewing the war only as a religious conflict overlooks its true significance.
A historiography that refuses to confront the conflict's
structural roots cannot explain why the war lasted thirty years, why it
engulfed half of Europe, or why its consequences were so transformative. The
confessional thesis offers description without explanation. The Marxist
tradition, by contrast, insists that the war must be understood as a decisive
episode in the long, uneven transition from feudalism to capitalism.
Boys has written a clear, competent, and often engaging
study. She restores England to its proper place within a Europewide news
culture and shows how the early press became entangled with the crisis of
monarchical authority. But her refusal to confront the broader crisis of the seventeenth century—its economic roots, political contradictions, and social upheavals—means her book ultimately explains less than it
describes.
📚 Core Modern Scholarship
(Confessional / Post‑Revisionist Paradigm)
These works represent the dominant “war of religion”
interpretation in current historiography.
- Olaf
Asbach & Peter Schröder (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion
to the Thirty Years’ War (Routledge, 2014). A comprehensive survey of
current scholarship, emphasising religious and political motives across
multiple theatres of conflict.
- Ronald
G. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe,
1618–48 (Palgrave, 1997). A widely used introduction reflecting the
mainstream confessional and political framing.
- Stephen
J. Lee, The Thirty Years War (Routledge, 1991). A concise
overview in the “Lancaster Pamphlets” series, typical of the post‑revisionist
synthesis.
- Herbert
Langer, Thirty Years’ War (Hippocrene Books, 1980). A narrative
account that strongly emphasises religious conflict and state politics.
📚 Marxist &
Structural Interpretations (General Crisis Framework)
These works challenge the confessional paradigm and locate
the war within the seventeenth-century general crisis and the uneven
transition from feudalism to capitalism.
- Eric
Hobsbawm, The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (essays in Past
& Present and later collected). Places the Thirty Years’ War
within a Europe‑wide structural breakdown of feudal society.
- J.
V. Polišenský, The Thirty Years War and War and Society in
Europe, 1618–1648. Argues that uneven capitalist development produced
“buffer zones” where incompatible systems collided, generating conflict.
(These Marxist works are not in the search results but
are essential to the historiographical debate you are engaging with. Their
absence from current mainstream bibliographies is itself symptomatic of the
field’s ideological drift.)
📚 Classic Works &
Older Historiography
These texts shaped earlier interpretations and remain useful
for understanding the field's evolution.
- The
Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IV: The Thirty Years’ War
(Macmillan/Cambridge University Press, 1934). A monumental early‑20th‑century
synthesis.
- Carl
J. Friedrich, The Age of the Baroque, 1610–1660 (Harper &
Brothers, 1952). Connects the war to the liquidation of the medieval
imperial order.
- Hajo
Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation (Knopf,
1959). Detailed chapters on the war’s phases and the Peace of Westphalia.
- Georges
Pagès, The Thirty Years War 1618–1648 (Harper & Row, 1970).
A classic narrative account.
📚 Useful Thematic and
Contextual Works
These works are not exclusively about the war but provide
essential context.
- David
Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century (St. Martin’s Press,
1966). Includes a substantial section on the war within broader European
crisis dynamics.
- Earle
E. Cairns, Christianity Through the Centuries
Sunday, 30 June 2013
" To Have no Newes is good Newes"
Sunday, 16 June 2013
" To Have no Newes is good Newes"
Monday, 27 May 2013
Horses, People and Parliament: The English Civil War and the Retreat from Social Explanation
Gavin Robinson’s Horses, People and Parliament in the
English Civil War (Ashgate, 2012) is, at first glance, a tightly focused
monograph on a seemingly narrow subject: the requisitioning of horses by
Parliament’s armies during the 1640s. Yet the book’s significance lies not in
its topic but in what it reveals about the state of English Civil War
historiography nearly forty years after the collapse of the Marxist and Whig
frameworks that once dominated the field. Robinson’s study is a microcosm of
the post‑revisionist settlement: empirically diligent, theoretically self‑conscious,
and almost entirely evacuated of social explanation. It demonstrates, with
almost painful clarity, how far the discipline has retreated from the attempt
to understand the English Revolution as a revolution.
Examining Robinson’s work is therefore examining the
intellectual trajectory of Civil War studies itself. The book’s strengths and
weaknesses are not merely personal but symptomatic of a broader
historiographical transformation—one that has replaced structural analysis with
administrative micro‑history, class conflict with identity construction, and
revolutionary causation with discursive contingency. In this sense, Horses,
People and Parliament is not simply a study of wartime resource extraction.
It is an artefact of a discipline that has lost sight of the social forces that
made the English Revolution historically necessary.
The Empirical Achievement: Reconstructing Wartime
Extraction
Robinson’s archival labour is substantial and, on its own
terms, valuable. Drawing on Parliamentary ordinances, county committee papers,
constables’ returns, and the records of the Committee for Compounding, he
reconstructs in granular detail how Parliament attempted to convert a nominal
claim on the nation’s resources into actual horseflesh for Essex’s army and
later the Eastern Association. The book’s structure — propositions, seizure,
quotas, purchase — traces the evolution of Parliament’s efforts from voluntary
subscription to coercive requisition as the war dragged on and the gap between
what Parliament claimed to control and what it could actually extract became
impossible to ignore.
This material is genuinely useful. It confirms, with
documentary precision, what an older generation of historians argued from a
different theoretical standpoint: that Parliament’s authority in the localities
was not a given but something that had to be manufactured, contested, and
enforced against a population that was, in the main, reluctant, self‑interested,
or simply indifferent to the constitutional questions at stake in London. The
picture that emerges — of committees improvising bureaucratic machinery, of
constables dragging their feet, of horse‑owners hiding animals or claiming
exemption — is a powerful corrective to any account of the war that treats
“Parliamentarian” or “Royalist” England as blocs of the committed.
Robinson’s evidence shows that the English state in the
1640s was not a coherent national apparatus but a fragile project struggling to
impose itself on a population divided by locality, class, and economic
interest. The requisitioning of horses becomes a window into the broader
problem of wartime state‑building: how to mobilise resources in a society where
authority was dispersed, contested, and often resisted.
Yet this empirical achievement raises questions that
Robinson’s theoretical framework cannot answer. Why did some counties comply
more readily than others? Why did certain social layers gravitate toward
Parliament while others clung to the monarchy? Why did the extraction of horses
— a seemingly technical matter — map so clearly onto deeper conflicts over
property, privilege, and the organisation of the economy? These questions are
latent in Robinson’s archive, but his interpretive apparatus prevents him from
addressing them.
Robinson’s central argument is that allegiance was not a
“fixed underlying condition” but something “constructed” through action,
performance, and administrative categorisation. He insists identities were
imposed on people regardless of their actual sympathies. This is presented as a
significant theoretical advance. In reality, it is the familiar post‑1980s
linguistic‑turn orthodoxy: dissolve political identity into discourse, treat
allegiance as performative, emphasise contingency and local negotiation, and
reject essentialist or interest‑based explanations.
This framework is not without insight. Robinson is right
that county committees often imputed allegiance based on behaviour rather than
belief, and that this had real, often punitive, consequences. But the
difficulty is what such a framework systematically excludes. By treating
allegiance as a discursive artefact rather than a social relation, Robinson cannot
explain why certain behaviours emerged in the first place. The result is a
picture of allegiance as a floating administrative category, detached from the
material conditions that shaped people’s willingness or refusal to comply.
The problem is not simply theoretical. It is methodological.
Robinson’s approach forbids him from asking the most basic questions about the
English Revolution: why this conflict, at this time, with these social
consequences? Why did the struggle over horses, money, and workforce map so
clearly onto deeper conflicts over land, market relations, and political
authority? Why did Parliament’s demands resonate with some sections of society
and provoke resistance in others?
These are not optional questions. They are the conditions of
possibility for understanding the English Revolution. Without them, the war
becomes a drama of administrative improvisation rather than a struggle between
antagonistic social forces.
The Historiographical Retreat: From Revolution to Micro‑Administration
Robinson’s book reflects a broader historiographical shift
that has reshaped Civil War studies since the late 1970s. The first wave of
this retreat was the revisionist school — Conrad Russell, John Morrill, Mark
Kishlansky — whose project was to dismantle the Marxist and Whig narratives
that treated the Civil War as the product of long‑term structural tensions.
Revisionism insisted on localism over national conflict, contingency over
causation, elite consensus over social antagonism, and the denial of any
meaningful “revolutionary” content. Revisionism reimagined the English
Revolution as an accidental conflict triggered by short‑term political
mismanagement.
By the 1990s, revisionism’s narrow political focus had
become untenable. The field responded not by returning to social explanation
but by embracing the cultural turn. Post‑revisionism added discourse, identity,
performativity, and micro‑history. This produced a historiography that was
richer in texture but still evacuated of social content. Allegiance became a
matter of “identity construction,” political conflict a matter of “discursive
negotiation,” and the revolution itself a matter of “contested meanings.”
Robinson’s book is a perfect example of this phase. It takes
a genuinely important question — how Parliament extracted resources from a
divided society — and reframes it as a problem of administrative categorisation
and performative allegiance. It treats the social forces that made extraction difficult or possible as background noise.
The cumulative effect of revisionism and post‑revisionism
has been the production of a Civil War historiography in which the revolution
has no structural causes, no social agents, no economic content, and no
necessity. It becomes a conflict of committees, ordinances, identities, and
discourses — a revolution without revolutionaries.
Restoring the Revolution: A Materialist Counter‑Argument
To understand the English Revolution, one must restore what
the older Marxist tradition understood: that the conflict between king and
Parliament was inseparable from the transformation of English society between
1500 and 1640. The growth of a market in land, the differentiation of the
peasantry, and the rise of a commercial gentry and merchant class increasingly
at odds with a monarchy organised around courtly privilege and feudal
prerogative were not background conditions but the revolution's substance.
The requisitioning of horses is not simply an administrative
process. It is a window into the uneven development of agrarian capitalism, the
differentiation of the peasantry, the rise of a commercial gentry, and the
conflict between market forces and feudal prerogatives. The struggle over
horses reflects deeper struggles over who controlled the means of mobility,
production, and war.
Robinson’s archive contains this story, but his framework
prevents him from telling it. His committees operate in a social vacuum. His
horse‑owners resist or comply for reasons he never explores. His counties
differ in their responses, but he treats the reasons for those differences as
unknowable or irrelevant. The war becomes a drama of administrative
improvisation rather than a struggle between antagonistic classes.
A materialist explanation would begin by recognising that
allegiance was shaped not by discourse but by social interest. The willingness
to give up horses, money, or workforce was not a matter of identity but of
class position. The conflict over resource extraction was inseparable from the
conflict over the social order itself.
Finally, the book’s pricing — over $120 at release — is not
incidental. It reflects the transformation of Civil War historiography into a
professionalised, inward‑facing academic discourse. The English Revolution,
once a subject of mass political interest, has been sequestered in a university
library market increasingly detached from broader public engagement with the
revolution's meaning. This is not merely unfortunate. It is part of the same
depoliticising process that has stripped the revolution of its social meaning.
Robinson’s book is therefore best mined for its archival
detail, not followed for its interpretive framework. It is a product of a
historiography that has abandoned the attempt to explain the English Revolution
as a revolution — and replaced it with a focus on discourse, identity, and
administrative practice that leaves the deeper social conflict untouched.
Conclusion
Horses, People and Parliament is a useful empirical
study of wartime state‑building, and Robinson’s insistence that Parliament’s
authority in the counties was fragile, contested, and had to be actively
constructed is a genuine corrective to accounts that treat the parliamentary
war effort as smoothly effective. But the book’s larger theoretical ambitions—to displace explanations grounded in social interest with an account centred on discourse and the performative construction of identity—exemplify the limitations of much academic historiography of the period.
The English Revolution was a bourgeois revolution, however
unevenly and confusedly its participants understood it. To treat allegiance as
a free‑floating administrative artefact is to miss the deeper conflict over the
country's social and economic order. Robinson’s book, and the historiographical
tradition it belongs to, cannot explain why the revolution occurred, why it
took the form it did, or why it had the consequences it did. It documents the
revolution while obscuring its meaning.
Restoring that meaning requires a return to materialist explanation—to the recognition that the English Revolution was not a drama of
identity but a struggle over property, privilege, and the organisation of
society itself. Robinson’s archive points toward this story. A different historiography must tell it.
Monday, 6 May 2013
Conrad Russell and the “Mirage” of the English Revolution: Revisionism, Anti Marxism, and the Politics of Historiography
Introduction
Recent efforts by the coalition government to modify the
National Curriculum have reignited a familiar ideological debate. Conservative
ministers and their media allies frequently label critics of their reforms as
“Marxists,” a term that often serves more political purpose than accurate
description. For more than twenty years, a concerted effort has been ongoing
within academia to discredit and marginalise Marxism as a method for historical
analysis. This campaign has been especially active in the historiography of the
English Civil War, where a revisionist school aims to challenge both Whig and
Marxist interpretations of the seventeenth-century conflict.
A key influence on this revisionist shift was Conrad
Russell’s 1990 History Today essay, “The Bourgeois Revolution: A Mirage.” With
a populist tone and a polemical aim, Russell strongly challenged the idea that
the events of the 1640s represented a revolutionary break. Nonetheless, his
argument was based on weak intellectual grounds and aimed to undermine
materialist and class-based theories of historical change.
This article revisits Russell’s intervention, situating it
within the wider revisionist project inaugurated by G. R. Elton and Alfred
Cobban, and assessing its methodological, theoretical, and political
implications. It argues that Russell’s essay was less a work of historical
scholarship than a manifesto for a historiographical reorientation that sought
to sever ideas from their material basis and dissolve the English Revolution
into a sequence of contingencies devoid of social meaning.
Russell’s Argument in Context
Russell’s essay emerged at a time when the Soviet Union's
collapse encouraged commentators to dismiss Marxism as intellectually dead.
Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man offered a philosophical
backing for what was essentially a political celebration of liberal capitalism.
Russell’s contribution aligned with this trend in seventeenth-century
historiography, arguing that no revolutions took place in the 1640s or in 1688.
This was a radical claim. Before Russell's work, many
believed a revolutionary rupture had occurred. His argument relied
significantly on Alfred Cobban’s book, The Social Interpretation of the French
Revolution, which argued that political upheaval could be separated from class
struggles. Cobban’s cautious approach to social explanations became the foundation
of a revisionist school, defined more by its opposition to Whig and Marxist
views than by a clear alternative explanation.
Russell adopted this scepticism wholesale. His central wager
that Marxist historiography depends on the thesis of a “rising middle class” was
a caricature. Marxist historians never relied on such a crude model, and
contemporaries themselves, including royalists, described the events of the
1640s as a “revolution. Russell ignored this evidence.
A key flaw in Russell’s essay is its failure to engage with
Marx’s own works. Russell does not mention Marx’s depiction in the Communist
Manifesto of the bourgeoisie as a class that “cannot exist without constantly
revolutionising the instruments of production”, and that dissolves “all fixed,
fast-frozen relations." Instead, he merges Whig and Marxist
historiographies into a single category of “dialectical thinking,” a
simplification that suggests either unfamiliarity with or disregard for Marxist
theory.
Russell dismisses dialectics based on a misinterpretation of
Marx’s approach. In the 1859 preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy," Marx explains the dynamic between base and
superstructure: social being influences consciousness, but ideological forms
serve as the means by which actors realise underlying conflicts and confront
them. Therefore, Russell’s focus on the “autonomy of the mind” criticizes a
distorted version of Marxism rather than Marxism directly.
The Roots of Revisionism: Elton and Empiricism
Russell’s intervention should be seen as part of a broader
revisionist movement initiated by G. R. Elton. In his book The Practice of
History, Elton strongly challenged E. H. Carr’s view that historical
interpretation is fundamentally theoretical. Elton advocated for an “empirical,
thesis-free" approach to history, implying that choosing and organising
evidence are not theoretical actions. Russell embraced this empiricism to
justify a history that excludes social explanations.
Elton’s earlier essay, “The High Road to Civil War,” already
set the stage for a revisionist view of the seventeenth century, emphasising
political contingency over structural tensions. Russell’s essay built on this,
dismissing efforts to frame the Civil War as a result of class conflict or
material contradictions.
Distorting the ‘Storm Over the Gentry’ Debate
Russell’s analysis of the mid-20th-century debate involving
R. H. Tawney, Lawrence Stone, Hugh Trevor-Roper, and J. H. Hexter is somewhat
selective. As Norah Carlin has highlighted, the gentry and aristocracy were not
clearly separate classes; both derived wealth from land and trade, held
influence at court and in Parliament, and social mobility between them was
common. Tawney’s assertion that the gentry was a rising revolutionary class
went beyond the arguments of Marx or Engels.
Perry Anderson’s idea that the English Civil War was a
bourgeois revolution “by proxy,” executed by a part of the ruling class for the
bourgeoisie, raised important theoretical questions. Russell ignored these
issues completely, instead viewing the debate as proof of Marxism’s
shortcomings rather than engaging with it as a nuanced historiographical
conflict.
His application of Hexter is especially telling. Russell
adopts Hexter’s scepticism of social determinism but ignores Hexter’s claim
that the Civil War was a true constitutional conflict. This selective use
indicates a writer who cherry-picks authoritative voices to support a preformed
conclusion rather than genuinely engaging with their arguments.
Russell often stresses the “autonomy of the mind,” implying
that religious and political loyalties are not solely determined by class.
However, Marxism acknowledges the nuanced development of ideas. Christopher
Hill’s The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution emphasises that Marx
did not view ideas merely as "pale reflections" of economic
interests.
Hill’s work shows that ideological forms become influential
because they meet the needs of important social groups, reflecting a
dialectical rather than mechanical relationship. Even historians who are not
sympathetic to Marxism, like Robert Ashton, have recognised the usefulness of
understanding religious and constitutional ideologies as rooted in material and
class interests.
Russell’s argument that class analysis is impossible because
bourgeois and gentry elements supported both sides does not hold up. Ashton’s
research on royalist support in London reveals a nuanced pattern: various parts
of the bourgeoisie supported different factions for reasons that class analysis
can clarify. Hill acknowledged this complexity, offering detailed
qualifications about who fought for which side and why, including that
religious beliefs, not just economic motives, influenced many participants.
Russell’s oversimplified critique of Marxist determinism falls apart with even
basic scrutiny.
The Political Function of Revisionism
Jim Holstun has characterised Russell’s work as a manifesto
advocating for historical revisionism. Mary Fullbrook pointed out the resulting
void: by dismantling the notion that the Civil War was a significant event in
world history, revisionists felt no need to explain it beyond a dismissive
reference by one historian, describing it as a “bloody tiff” between king and
subjects. This shift in historiography coincided with a broader trend in
university departments, moving away from “history from below” toward renewed
interest in capitalists, bankers, and markets. This change’s political purpose
was evident: to detach the study of the seventeenth century from any framework
that might interpret revolutionary change as driven by social contradictions,
rather than by accident, contingency, or the independent flow of ideas.
Russell’s “Mirage” was not just a critique of the English
Civil War. It was part of a wider ideological effort to discredit Marxism,
undermine social explanations, and portray history as a series of isolated
events. Even after twenty years, the core debate persists: can history be
understood through class and material interests, or should it be seen as a
collection of unrelated episodes devoid of social significance?
Notes
Primary Works by Conrad Russell
- Russell,
Conrad. Unrevolutionary England, 1603–1642. London: Hambledon
Press, 1990.
- Russell,
Conrad. Parliaments and English Politics, 1621–1629. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979.
- Russell,
Conrad. The Origins of the English Civil War. London: Macmillan,
1973.
- Russell,
Conrad. The Causes of the English Civil War. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990.
- Russell,
Conrad. The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991.
- Russell,
Conrad. “Parliamentary History in Perspective, 1604–1629.” History
61 (1976): 1–27.
Revisionist Scholarship (Elton, Sharpe, Christianson,
Morrill, Fulbrook, Kenyon)
- Elton,
G. R. “A High Road to Civil War?” In From the Renaissance to the
Counter‑Reformation: Essays in Honour of Garrett Mattingley, edited by
Charles Carter, 1966.
- Elton,
G. R. The Practice of History. London: Collins, 1967.
- Morrill,
John. The Revolt of the Provinces. London: Longman, 1980 (orig.
1976).
- Sharpe,
Kevin, ed. Faction and Parliament. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
- Christianson,
Paul. “The Causes of the English Revolution: A Reappraisal.” Journal of
British Studies 15, no. 2 (1976): 40–75.
- Christianson,
Paul. “The Peers, the People, and Parliamentary Management in the First
Six Months of the Long Parliament.” Journal of Modern History 50
(1978).
- Fulbrook,
Mary. “The English Revolution and the Revisionist Revolt.” Past &
Present (JSTOR).
- Kenyon,
John. “Revisionism and Post‑Revisionism in Early Stuart History.” Journal
of Modern History 64 (1992): 686–699.
Marxist and Materialist Scholarship (Hill, Anderson,
Ashton, Hexter)
- Hill,
Christopher. “Parliament and People in Seventeenth‑Century England.” Past
and Present 92 (1981): 100–124.
- Hill,
Christopher. The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
- Anderson,
Perry. Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: Verso, 1974.
- Ashton,
Robert. The English Civil War. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1978.
- Ashton,
Robert. The City and the Court, 1603–1643. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979.
- Hexter,
J. H. “Power Struggle, Parliament, and Liberty in Early Stuart England.” Journal
of Modern History 50 (1978): 1–50.
- Hexter,
J. H. “The Myth of the Middle Class in Tudor England.” History Today
(1961).
- Hexter,
J. H. “Storm Over the Gentry.” In Reappraisals in History, 1961.
General Historiography and Context
- Cust,
Richard, and Ann Hughes, eds. Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies
in Religion and Politics, 1603–1642. London: Longman, 1989.
- Hughes,
Ann. The Causes of the English Civil War. London: Macmillan, 1991.
· Cogswell,
Thomas. “Coping with Revisionism in Early Stuart History.” Journal of Modern
History 62 (1990): 538–551.








