Wednesday, 2 December 2009

The London History Festival - Kensington Central Library 3 November 2009

In 2009 editor of History Today Paul Lay discussed with historian John Adamson abo Charles I and the origins of the English Civil War.

John Adamson is a fellow of Peterhouse College, Cambridge and his book The Noble Revolt has been described as "a work of great style and imagination as well as scholarship... As with a great 19thcentury novel, the story and the characters will become your friends for life."[1]

Early on in his career, Adamson courted controversy, according to Roger Richardson" In the early 1990s John Adamson found himself at the centre of a significant historical controversy about his bold re-interpretation of the English Civil War as the "last baronial revolt".[2]

Mark Kishlansky of Harvard University led the attack by accusing Adamson of "slipshod work, misleading handling of the evidence and weakly supported conclusions. The dispute spilt out from the academic journals in which it had originated to the newspaper press and many of the big names of the historical profession at that time - Conrad Russell, Lawrence Stone and Hugh Trevor-Roper among them - weighed in on one side or the other".

The History Today discussion began with elaboration by Adamson on why he began his book The Noble Revolt in 1640. From the beginning, Adamson sought to distance himself from any form of the socio-economic explanation of the civil war.

He accused some historians of relying too much on large abstract forces, and the role of the individual had been underestimated. He said he did not agree with long term views, these got us nowhere, and he certainly did not agree that there was a bourgeois revolution. He felt that an "economic determinist" viewpoint did not explain too much.
Adamson echoed the prevailing academic orthodoxy that there was no bourgeois revolution mainly because he felt there was no rising bourgeoisie and that people from all social classes can be found on either side of the struggle.

Adamson concurs with an increasingly large number of historians who see Cromwell, as a representative of the declining gentry rather than a rising bourgeoisie. Adamson believes that Cromwell never intended a revolution. Adamson's premise that the bourgeoisie was on both sides was of levelled at Christopher Hill.

In her obituary of Christopher Hill Ann Talbot, states that "Hill, of course, was well aware that there were gentlemen and landowners on the Parliamentary side in the Civil war and small farmers and artisans on the Royalist side. He had read enough Marx and Lenin to know that one could not expect a chemically real revolution in which the members of one social class lined up one side of the barricades and those of the other on the opposite side. However, he was sensitive enough to his historical sources to detect the social currents that brought people of diverse social backgrounds into a struggle against the king and well-grounded enough in history to identify new and revolutionary ideas in the curious and archaic guise in which they appearedas the ideologists of the revolution ransacked the Bible and half-understood historical precedent for some kind of theory to explain what they were doing".[3]

Adamson explained his reasoning behind his rejection of a Marxist understanding of history. He believed that socialism had collapsed with the coming down of the Berlin Wall in 1989. He incorrectly stated that no one had anticipated the fall of the wall and communism, which is not valid. He went on to say that there has been in the past too much emphasis on social classes in the civil war, but in reality, the war was much more about personal allegiances and decisions.

According to Adamson, the war was caused by Charles 1 and his inexperience and vanity. Adamson during the meeting expressed much sympathy for Charles 1st. As can be seen from this quote from his book The Noble Revolt "From the cabin at the stern of the barge, Charles caught a glimpse of the gilded weather-vanes of Whitehall Palace before the boat turned westwards, past the Abbey, and under the great east window of St Stephen's Chapel the Commons' chamber, and the scene of his most recent political debacle. It would be seven years before Charles saw his palace again".

The meeting at the London History Festival is crucial in so much as it gives a glimpse at what a revisionist argument looks like. While Adamson said a lot of what he was against he said little about what he was for.




[1] (Ed Smith, The Times.Com
[2] Not the main act but a prelude to drama- https://www.timeshighereducation.com/cn/books/not-the-main-act-but-a-prelude-to-drama/209736.article
[3] "These the times ... this the man": an appraisal of historian Christopher Hill by Ann Talbot 25 March 2003-www.wsws.org

Thursday, 12 November 2009

The Impact of the English Civil Wars — A Marxist Critique of the Revisionist Counter Revolution in Historiography

Introduction

The historiographical struggle over the English Civil War has never been a mere academic quarrel. It is a battle over the meaning of revolution itself. J.S. Morrill’s The Impact of the English Civil Wars (1991) stands as a defining statement of the revisionist school that, from the 1970s onward, sought to dismantle the Marxist interpretation forged by Christopher Hill and the Communist Party Historians’ Group. The revisionists rejected the English Revolution as a bourgeois revolution, denied the existence of a rising bourgeoisie, and insisted that the conflict was driven not by social transformation but by religious sensibilities and constitutional misunderstandings. Morrill and his allies “set out to demolish this framework,” replacing class analysis with a focus on “short-term political accidents” and local particularities that fragment the national narrative.¹

This historiographical turn did not arise in a vacuum. It coincided with the international shift to the right: the defeats of the working class, the collapse of the post-war consensus, the rise of Thatcher and Reagan, and the deepening crisis of Stalinism. In this climate, an academic orthodoxy emerged that denied the revolutionary character of the seventeenth century and, by implication, the possibility of revolutionary change in the present. The new orthodoxy insisted “there was no bourgeois revolution because there was no rising bourgeoisie,” a position that functioned to teach that “mass movements cannot fundamentally alter the social order.”² Morrill’s volume must therefore be understood not simply as a scholarly intervention but as a contribution to the intellectual counter‑revolution of the late twentieth century.

The Revisionist Project: Methodological Fragmentation as Ideology

The Marxist interpretation, developed most powerfully by Christopher Hill and the Communist Party Historians’ Group, located the English Civil War within the world‑historical process of bourgeois revolution. It understood the conflict as the overthrow of a feudal‑absolutist state by social forces aligned with emergent capitalist relations. Morrill and his revisionist colleagues—Conrad Russell, Kevin Sharpe, and others—explicitly set out to dismantle this framework. They denied “there was a rising bourgeoisie,” insisted that “people of all social classes fought on both sides,” and rejected the very notion of a revolution, portraying the conflict instead as a “contingent breakdown of the constitution that got out of hand.”³

This methodological shift was not innocent. The revisionists replaced structural analysis with short‑term political accidents, substituted national dynamics with micro‑studies of localities, and elevated religious discourse to an autonomous causal force. In doing so, they evacuated the conflict of its social content. The result was an historiography that dissolved the English Revolution into a series of disconnected episodes, stripped of class dynamics and historical necessity.

The Political Context: Revisionism and the Neoliberal Turn

The ascendancy of revisionism in the 1970s and 1980s coincided with profound political transformations: the defeats of the working class, the collapse of the post‑war consensus, the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganism, and the accelerating crisis of Stalinism. These developments created fertile ground for an academic orthodoxy hostile to the very idea of revolution.The new orthodoxy insisted “there was no bourgeois revolution because there was no rising bourgeoisie,” a position that functioned to teach that “mass movements cannot fundamentally alter the social order.”⁴

This was not merely a shift in scholarly fashion. It was the intellectual counterpart to the political counter‑revolution of the period. By denying the revolutionary character of the seventeenth century, revisionism implicitly denied the possibility of revolutionary change in the present.

The Flaws of Revisionism: A Caricature of Marxism

The revisionist claim that the presence of nobles on the Parliamentary side and commoners on the Royalist side disproves the class character of the conflict rests on a crude misunderstanding of Marxism. “No serious Marxist has ever expected a chemically pure revolution where every member of one class lines up neatly against every member of another.”⁵ The decisive question is not the social origins of individual participants but the class interests served by the contending forces and the objective historical outcomes of the struggle.

By these criteria, the English Civil War was unmistakably a bourgeois revolution. It abolished feudal tenures, destroyed the Crown’s independent executive power, established the supremacy of Parliament as an organ of the gentry and merchant classes, and cleared the path for capitalist agriculture and trade. These transformations were not accidental by‑products of a constitutional misunderstanding; they were the necessary results of deep‑seated social and economic contradictions.

Morrill’s insistence on religion as the primary cause is an evasion. The question is not whether religion mattered—of course it did—but why religious conflict assumed the forms it did at that specific historical moment. The rise of Puritanism, the proliferation of radical sects, and the ideological ferment of the 1640s cannot be understood apart from the processes of enclosure, the dissolution of the monasteries, and the broader dynamics of primitive accumulation. To treat religion as autonomous is to retreat into idealism.

The Stakes: Historical Materialism and the Meaning of Revolution

The revisionist dismissal of the English Revolution has implications far beyond seventeenth‑century studies. If the English Civil War was merely a constitutional accident or a religious quarrel, then the concept of bourgeois revolution itself collapses. And if bourgeois revolutions are mythical, then the Marxist conception of history—rooted in class struggle and the transformation of modes of production—is fatally undermined.

This is precisely the intellectual climate in which postmodernism, identity politics, and the rejection of “grand narratives” have flourished. The denial of the English Revolution is part of a broader ideological offensive against historical materialism.

Hill’s work, despite its limitations, remains valuable because it insists on what the revisionists deny: that the English Civil War was a revolution, that it was made by the mass of the population, and that it fundamentally transformed English society. Morrill’s volume, by contrast, must be read as a document of the intellectual counter‑revolution—a scholarly expression of the political reaction of the late twentieth century.

Conclusion

Morrill’s The Impact of the English Civil Wars is emblematic of a historiographical project that seeks to sever the English Revolution from its social foundations and to deny its revolutionary character. By elevating religion to an autonomous causal force, by dissolving national dynamics into local contingencies, and by caricaturing Marxism as a theory that demands “chemically pure” class alignments, the revisionists obscure the profound social transformations that shaped the conflict.⁶ The abolition of feudal tenures, the destruction of the Crown’s independent executive power, the rise of Parliament as the political instrument of the gentry and merchant classes, and the clearing of obstacles to capitalist development were not accidental by‑products of a constitutional crisis. They were the objective outcomes of a bourgeois revolution.

The stakes of this debate extend far beyond seventeenth‑century historiography. To deny the English Revolution is to deny the historical reality of bourgeois revolution itself, and with it the Marxist conception of history as the unfolding of class struggle. It is no coincidence that revisionism flourished alongside the rise of postmodernism, identity politics, and the repudiation of “grand narratives.” Morrill’s volume must therefore be read critically, not as a neutral scholarly contribution but as a document of the intellectual counter‑revolution that accompanied the political reaction of the late twentieth century. Against this, the Marxist tradition—despite its own internal contradictions—remains indispensable for understanding the English Civil War as a transformative moment in world history, a revolution made by the mass of the population and one that fundamentally reshaped the social order.

Notes

  1. “Set out to demolish this framework… short-term political accidents.”
  2. “There was no bourgeois revolution because there was no rising bourgeoisie… mass movements cannot fundamentally alter the social order.”
  3. “There was no rising bourgeoisie… contingent breakdown of the constitution.”
  4. “The prevailing academic orthodoxy is that there was no bourgeois revolution…”
  5. “No serious Marxist has ever expected a chemically pure revolution…”
  6. “The revisionist argument… reveals a crude, caricatured understanding of Marxism.”

 


Sunday, 1 November 2009

Stalin's Nemesis: The Exile and Murder of Leon Trotsky, Bertrand M. Patenaude’s Faber & Faber Hardcover – 18 Jun. 2009

The historiography of Leon Trotsky has historically been a battleground reflecting larger ideological struggles. Few revolutionaries have faced such prolonged distortion, vilification, and erasure. Trotsky’s political legacy—linked to the October Revolution and the global socialist movement—continues to generate fierce scholarly and political debates. Bertrand M. Patenaude’s book, Stalin’s Nemesis: The Exile and Murder of Leon Trotsky (also published as Trotsky: Downfall of a Revolutionary in the U.S.), engages with this contentious history especially at a time when post-Soviet liberal and conservative groups are actively trying to undermine Trotskyism as both a historical and current force. Therefore, Patenaude’s biography should be seen not just as a scholarly work on Trotsky, but also as a reflection of the ideological context in which it was created.

This review contends that Patenaude’s work plays a dual, contradictory role. It corrects significant falsehoods found in Robert Service’s widely criticized Trotsky biography, providing an important corrective. However, Patenaude’s narrative remains limited by the liberal-academic framework it is created within, reflecting many of the political and methodological biases typical of anti-Marxist history. Consequently, while the biography is sometimes sympathetic and quite readable, it ultimately fails to fully understand Trotsky’s political ambitions or the broader historical forces that influenced his life and death.

I. Patenaude’s Intervention Against the Post‑Soviet School of Falsification

Patenaude’s most notable scholarly achievement is not his biography but his scathing review of Robert Service’s Trotsky in The American Historical Review. This review, later used by the International Committee of the Fourth International in its documentation against anti-Trotskyist misinformation, revealed numerous factual inaccuracies, distortions, and methodological flaws in Service’s work. Patenaude remarked: “I have counted more than four dozen [mistakes]… At times, the errors are jaw-dropping.”

The biography by Service was found to be completely unreliable, according to Patenaude, due to errors such as confusing Trotsky’s sons, misidentifying the largest party in the First Duma, a mistaken reference to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, reversing Trotsky’s 1940 stance on U.S. involvement in World War II, and citing the wrong year of Trotsky’s widow Natalia Sedova’s death.

The Marxist author David North correctly characterized Patenaude’s review as “a damning critique of Service’s fundamental skills as a historian.” In this context, Patenaude’s contribution plays a crucial political and historiographical role: it protects the accuracy of the historical record from a surge of post-Soviet revisionism that aims to undermine revolutionary Marxism by distorting the reputations of its key figures.

II. Liberal Biography and the Limits of Method

While Patenaude’s critique of Service highlights his strengths, it also reveals the limits of his own biography. Despite having unprecedented access to Trotsky’s papers at Harvard and the Hoover Institution, Patenaude’s account is still influenced by the ideological biases of the liberal academic world. His tendency toward a novelistic, character-focused style — a trend that's becoming more common in modern biography — is not well-suited for accurately tracing the political and theoretical growth of a revolutionary Marxist.

The issue extends beyond style. The liberal biographical approach relies on methodological individualism, which simplifies political history to leaders' psychology, replacing structural analysis with anecdotes and gossip. Patenaude’s frequent digressions into Trotsky’s personal life — including a salacious story about his affair with Frida Kahlo — illustrate this trend. While this material might interest a general audience, it offers limited insight into Trotsky’s political development or the broader historical forces that influenced it.

Even more concerning are Patenaude’s unsupported political claims. He states that Trotsky "helped create the first totalitarian state,” a statement that not only has no supporting evidence but also echoes Cold War liberal stereotypes that equate Bolshevism with Stalinism. Likewise, his mention of Trotsky’s attempt to “cloak the Bolshevik coup” shows a shallow understanding of 1917 historiography and a passive acceptance of anti-revolutionary stories.

III. The Erasure of Trotskyism as a Movement

One of the most significant shortcomings of Patenaude’s biography is its almost complete neglect of Trotskyism as a political movement. The book barely mentions the Fourth International, the Transitional Programme, or the global network of militants who carried on Trotsky’s fight against Stalinism. This omission is deliberate. Recognizing Trotskyism as a vibrant movement — rather than just the tragic aftermath of a lost revolution — would force acknowledgment of Trotsky’s ongoing critique of Stalinism and his emphasis on the importance of international working-class struggle.

Patenaude heavily relies on sources from former Trotskyists who later disaffiliated, which further distorts the narrative. While these testimonies have some value, they need careful contextualization — something Patenaude seldom offers. Consequently, his depiction of the Trotskyist movement reduces it to a series of “sects” engaged in “splits and mergers," creating a caricature that hides the actual political debates that motivated the movement.

IV. The Hoover Institution and the Politics of Archival Knowledge

Patenaude’s connection to the Hoover Institution—known for its anti-Communist scholarship—is relevant to the limitations of his work. The Hoover archives hold valuable resources on the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union. However, these materials are influenced by Cold War-era ideological views that portray Bolshevism as a departure from liberal modernity. Despite his scholarly thoroughness, Patenaude’s biography still operates within this ideological framework.

This is clear in how he handles the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalinist terror. Although Patenaude highlights Trotsky’s personal tragedies—such as the killing of his family, his exile-induced isolation, and the constant danger of assassination—he does not place these events within Trotsky's own analysis of bureaucratic decline. As a result, the political significance of Trotsky’s fight against Stalinism becomes obscured by a focus on personal suffering rather than political context.

V. Conclusion: The Politics of Historical Memory

Patenaude’s Stalin’s Nemesis demonstrates notable narrative skill and occasional insights. It vividly depicts Trotsky’s last decade and serves as a needed correction to Robert Service's distortions. However, it does not fully achieve a thorough historical understanding of Trotsky’s life, politics, and legacy. Its liberal perspective, dependence on impressionistic sources, and overlooking of Trotskyism as a movement make it insufficient as a political biography.

The struggle over Trotsky’s historical image is not an antiquarian dispute. It is an ideological conflict rooted in contemporary class relations and the political needs of ruling strata. Trotsky’s programme — international proletarian revolution, workers’ democracy, and the fight against bureaucratic degeneration — remains a threat to both Stalinist apologetics and capitalist triumphalism. Any serious historiography must therefore approach Trotsky not as a tragic figure of the past but as a revolutionary whose ideas remain relevant to the present.

Readers interested in Trotsky’s life and ideas should examine his writings and prominent Marxist biographies from before the post-Soviet revisionist wave. While Patenaude’s biography offers an approachable overview, it does not replace a thorough, politically rigorous exploration of Trotsky’s revolutionary contributions.

 

 

Wednesday, 7 October 2009

The Milosevic Trial: William Walker’s role as provocateur

William Walker, the former head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) insisted in his testimony to The Hague that Slobodan Milosevic had knowledge of the events in Kosovo and should be held responsible for the atrocities carried out there.

Former Yugoslav President Milosevic is on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for crimes against humanity. He faces five counts of war crimes in Kosovo and has been indicted for another 61 counts of war crimes, including genocide, for alleged crimes in Croatia and Bosnia.

Walker’s testimony was key to the prosecution’s efforts to establish Milosevic’s guilt. He said of the accused, “His knowledge was in many respects quite detailed. I never wavered in my opinion that I was dealing with the person who was in maximum control of events in Kosovo, at least from the Serb side.”

Walker’s testimony on the alleged massacre at Racak in particular was meant to prove that Milosevic was responsible for the events in Kosovo and that the NATO bombing of Serbia was a justifiable response. Then US Foreign Secretary Madeleine Albright called Racak a “galvanising incident”, while for German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher, “Racak became the turning point”.

To emphasis the importance of his account, judges at the Hague tribunal gave Walker nearly two days to testify. In contrast, when Milosevic asked how long he had to question the witness he was told by Judge May, “Three hours, no more: if you refrain from arguing with the witness, if you refrain from repeating the question, if you ask short questions you will be able to get more done.”

Despite this obvious bias on the part of the court, things did not turn out quite the way the prosecution wanted. Walker’s testimony served to highlight the central role he had played in proclaiming Racak as a massacre and thus paving the way for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia.

William Walker was head of the KVM, which was set up under the control of the OSCE after an agreement between Milosevic and the US envoy Richard Holbrooke in October 13, 1998. Before becoming head of the KVM, Walker was a deputy to the Reagan administration’s Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrahams, who was implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, through which the US illegally supplied weapons to the right-wing Contras who were seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government.

Prior to his appearing at The Hague, two of Walker’s weapons inspectors had given evidence about the events in Kosovo leading up to the NATO bombing—his deputy General Karol Drewienkiewicz and Colonel Richard Ciaglinski. They had also given evidence about the alleged massacre at Racak.

What happened at Racak?

On January 15, 1999, Serbian police and army personnel, accompanied by KVM inspectors and the media, mounted an operation against ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) gunmen, whom they thought were hiding out in Racak, after ambushing and killing three policemen. The army sent in armoured troop carriers and artillery into Racak, Petroovo, Malopoljce and Renaja. Two days later, after intense fighting between the Yugoslav forces and the KLA, Drewienkiewicz and Walker visited the area. Drewienkiewicz explained how, on the way, “Walker made it clear to me that I was to adopt an extremely uncompromising attitude in this matter.” When they arrived, the KLA took them to a gully that contained 45 dead bodies.

Once the bodies had been discovered, Drewienkiewicz told the court, “Walker’s assistant rushed to the top of a hill to phone through to NATO.” At a press conference that evening, Walker announced that there had been a massacre (without mentioning the deaths of the three policemen). Shortly before the announcement Drewienkiewicz said he heard Walker on the phone to Richard Holbrooke saying, “Dick, you can kiss your Nobel Peace Prize goodbye.” Drewienkiewicz added, “I was surprised at the time that he was as specific as to refer to the event as a massacre. However, I do agree with what he said.”

Walker admitted that Drewienkiewicz had briefed him 14 hours before—the night of January 15—about fighting in the area between the KLA and the army and that three policemen had been killed in the vicinity three or four days before. He also knew on January 15 of police reports that 15 KLA militia had been killed at Racak, but at the press conference he said he disbelieved them. Film also shows him walking amongst KLA uniformed corpses.

Walker still held his press conference on January 16 without mentioning the dead policeman or the KLA and saying that the bodies were all civilians. His press statement was, he said, “totally my creation” (page 6805). Walker admitted that he was “not a crime scene investigator” (page 6801) and when one arrived—Judge Danica Marinkovic—on January 17, he refused to meet her. During his testimony, he said he had no recollection of Holbrooke or NATO commander General Wesley Clark speaking to him—“No recollection of myself talking to some of the people who have later said they talked to me.”

However, Wesley Clark does remember talking to Walker. In his book Clark describes a phone call from Walker on January 16:

“Wes, we’ve got trouble here” he began. “I know a massacre when I see one. I’ve seen them before, when I was in Central America. And I am looking at a massacre now... There are forty of them in a ditch, maybe more. These aren’t fighters, they’re farmers, you can tell by looking at their hands and their clothes. And they have been shot at close range”.

This account has been disputed by the findings of a Finnish forensics team called in to investigate the incident. The team was firstly critical of the fact that, in the haste to describe the incident at Racak as a massacre, basic crime scene procedures had not been observed. Three days after the event, the Finnish forensic team reported that at no point was the scene of the incident isolated to stop unauthorised access. The report stated, “The scene should then be photographed and videotaped, any evidence be collected and victims localised and marked at site... victims should then be placed in individual bodybags for transport to the morgue. With respect to Racak none of this was done or was done partially and improperly”. The team had no independent verification of the massacre and had to rely on information from the OSCE and European Union observers or the press. Other findings show that only one dead victim was a woman. One victim was under 15 years of age. Six had suffered single gunshot wounds. Most of the 44 were covered by multiple wounds from different angles and elevations, characteristic of a firefight rather than a close range execution. Only one had been shot at close range and no signs of post-mortem mutilations were found. The team could not confirm that the victims were from Racak.

Compare Walker’s response to Racak with his attitude to the murder of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador or the killing of teenagers in Pec by the KLA. In El Salvador Walker tried to blame the killing of the Jesuits on guerrillas dressed as soldiers. He told the ICTY, “I made an inaccurate statement, in hindsight”. When the KLA was blamed for the killing of the Serb teenagers in Pec he said, “When you don’t know what has happened, it’s lot more difficult to sort of pronounce yourself ... To this day we do not know who committed that act.” He did not exercise the same degree of caution regarding Racak.

When Milosevic tried to raise the events in El Salvador, Judge May intervened by saying: “Your attempt to discredit this witness with events so long ago the Trial Chamber has ruled as irrelevant.” And later: “This is an absurd question, absolutely absurd. Now you’re wasting everybody’s time.”

Milosevic drew attention to the fact that Walker was at the same airport, Illopango, with Lt. Col. Oliver North who was gun running to the Contras, while Walker was supposedly providing them with humanitarian aid. Walker explained this by saying, “Unbeknownst to me, unbeknownst to the State Department, unbeknownst essentially to the world, a Colonel Oliver North in the National Security Council was doing things that were eventually determined by Judge Walsh and his commission to be illegal.”

Walker’s account discredited

Milosevic continued to try and discredit Walker’s account and his interpretation of events in Racak. He asked of Walker, “Now that we are talking about Racak, in your statement you say the following: ‘As I was watching these bodies, I noticed a few things. First of all, judging by the wounds and the blood around them, and also the pools of dried blood on the land around the bodies; it was obvious that these were the clothes that the people wore when they were killed. There was no doubt in my mind that they died where they were lying. The quantity and the location of the blood on the soil in front of them, each and every one of them, was a clear indication of that’.”

Milosevic asked for a series of photos of the bodies to be shown in the correct order and asked, “Where is this blood by the bodies or by individual bodies? Where did you see traces of blood there?”

This began the following exchange:

Walker: “On that picture?”...

Milosevic: “Are there any traces of blood here anywhere?”

Walker: “I assume that’s blood.”

Milosevic: “You’re talking about pools of blood on the soil, and on the soil there is no blood at all.”

Walker: “Not in this picture.”

Milosevic: “Not on the previous picture either. Is there any blood, any traces of blood, any pools of blood here on the soil either?”

Walker: “Not on that picture.”

Milosevic: “Not even here, there is no trace of blood anywhere on the ground, and we see that there are rocks all around.”

Some of the photographs used in the trial came from one of Walker’s observers in the KVM, a London Metropolitan police inspector, Ian Robert Hendrie. Hendrie had recently given evidence to the trial regarding his trip to the “massacre site”. When asked by Milosevic if he toured the site accompanied or alone, Hendrie said that someone had shown him around. He was asked whom and he replied, “I don’t know.” Hendrie could not explain why his photographs showed only patches of blood and not pools.

In his previous testimony, the chief forensic pathologist for the ICTY, Eric Baccard, admitted the stiffness and position of the dead bodies was unusual and it was possible they were moved. From the bullet wounds he said it was impossible to tell if they were due to “accident, homicide or an armed conflict.”

In one incident Milosevic asked Walker if he knew a Canadian Historian Roly Keith, who had been with NATO for 30 years and was head of the KVM in Kosovo Polje. Walker said he did not and so could not recollect his own head of KVM in Kosovo. The reason for Walker’s selective memory was apparent when Milosevic produced a quote from Keith which contradicted Walker’s testimony as to the situation in Kosovo. Keith said, “I can testify to the fact that in February and March there was no genocide. When it comes to ethnic cleansing, I was not present nor did I see events which could be characterised as ethnic cleansing. In connection to my previous answer, I wish to state that I was witness to a series of incidents, and most of them were caused by the KLA, for which the security forces aided by the army reacted.”

Walker’s silences and evasions over the activities of the KLA were again brought out when Milosevic asked if he had read the March 12, 2000 article in the Sunday Times entitled, “CIA aided Kosovo guerrilla army”. Walker said he had not. The article explained how US intelligence agents helped train the KLA before NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. The CIA were ceasefire monitors in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, while they were giving the KLA training manuals and field advice.

The article also questions Walker’s role in preparing the way for NATO air strikes. “The American agenda consisted of their diplomatic observers, a.k.a. the CIA, operating on completely different terms to the rest of Europe and the OSCE, said a European envoy.” While Walker dismissed claims that he wanted airstrikes, he admitted that the CIA was involved in the countdown to them.

Walker said: “Overnight we went from having a handful of people to 130 or more. Could the agency have put them in at that point? Sure they could. It’s their job. But nobody told me”. While no proof exists that Walker was a CIA agent, his role was in many respects no different.

The article goes on to say that according to ex-CIA sources, diplomatic observers were “a CIA front, gathering intelligence on the KLA arms and leadership. One agent said: ‘I’d tell them which hill to avoid, which wood to go behind, that sort of thing’. Klorin Krasniqi, a New York builder and one of the KLA’s largest financiers said: ‘It was purely the Albanian Diaspora helping their brothers’.”

The article describes how the KLA got round a loophole that permitted sniper rifles to be exported to hunting clubs. Agim Ceku, a KLA commander, had established many contacts during the latter stages of the war through his work in the Croatian army. He said the Croatian army had been receiving help from an American company called Military Professional Resources Inc., whose personnel were in Kosovo at the time.

Walker’s testimony was another debacle for The Hague tribunal. Far too much information was released as to the real series of events that led up to the bombing of Serbia in 1999. Whether there was a massacre at Racak will need further study, although sufficient evidence has been shown for any objective observer to err on the side of caution. What is certain is that Walker played a pivotal role in providing NATO with justification for the bombing of Yugoslavia.




Obituary: Alvaro Cunhal—leading betrayer of Portugal’s 1974 revolution

By Keith Livesey and Paul Mitchell

Four years saw the death at age 91 of Alvaro Cunhal, leader of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) for more than 30 years, from 1961 to 1992. This long-serving Stalinist functionary played a crucial role in helping to save Portuguese capitalism from the revolutionary upheaval known as the “Carnation Revolution” that followed the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in 1974.

During the revolutionary upheaval, Cunhal acted as minister without portfolio in several provisional governments and continued as a deputy in the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic until 1987.

The death of Cunhal evoked gushing praise from Portuguese and international leaders who recognised the threat posed to international capitalism by the 1974-1975 revolution. Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio, announcing a national day of mourning for Cunhal, called him “a great man whose life is connected with the history of the twentieth century. He has his place among us in the fight against the authoritarian regime, in the revolution and the consolidation of Portuguese democracy.”

Cunhal was born November 10, 1913, in Coimbra, northern Portugal, during a period of great political and social crisis. The period of the First Republic between 1910 and 1926 witnessed eight presidents and 45 governments. A radical working class carried out a general strike in 1917 and provoked two states of siege.

In Russia, the Bolsheviks provided the leadership for a successful revolution in October 1917. It was a powerful vindication of Leon Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution. In opposition to the Menshevik conception that Russia was too economically backward for socialism, Trotsky insisted that the real dynamics of Russian development could be understood only within the context of the world economy. Consequently, the democratic tasks once associated with the bourgeois revolution could only be completed under the leadership of the working class, drawing behind it the rural masses, as a component part of a socialist revolution that must be completed on the global arena.

The Bolshevik leaders knew that the construction of socialism in impoverished and war-ravaged Russia was dependent on successful workers’ revolutions in Germany and other more highly industrialised countries. It was on this basis and with the help of the Communist International (Comintern) that the PCP was formed in 1921.

But the subsequent evolution of the PCP and all the world’s communist parties were shaped by the rise to power of a bureaucratic caste within the USSR under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. The orientation of the Comintern changed radically after Lenin’s death. The unveiling of the theory of “socialism in one country” by Stalin and Bukharin in 1924 provided the ideological foundation for the abandonment of the programme of world socialist revolution and the increasing subordination of the international workers’ movement to the Stalinist bureaucracy’s defence of its own material interests. This produced massive defeats for the working class: most catastrophic of all was Hitler’s accession to power in Germany in 1933, following which Trotsky concluded that the Soviet Communist Party and its satellite parties in the Comintern could not be reformed and called for the founding of the Fourth International to carry forward the struggle for world socialist revolution.

Stalinism and the Popular Front

Stalinism’s political disarming of the working class was also to prove disastrous in Portugal. Economic instability and an insurgent working class had produced a right-wing coup in 1926, and by 1933, influenced by Mussolini’s fascism in Italy, the formal declaration of an authoritarian “New State” by Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. The fascist National Union (UN) party was made the only legal party, and independent trade unions and strikes were outlawed. Salazar established strict censorship and created a vicious secret police force.

The PCP was outlawed and its leadership imprisoned or driven into exile. The party had been purged in 1929, following the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and Bento Gonçalves, who had only joined the organisation the previous year, installed as General Secretary.

Cunhal joined the PCP in 1931 whilst studying law at university and left for the Soviet Union to attend a congress of Communist youth in September 1935. It was at this time that the Stalinist bureaucracy began to advance its policy of building “popular fronts” with “democratic” bourgeois governments and liberal-reformist elements worldwide supposedly to combat fascism and defend the USSR.

Cunhal, who came to epitomise the policy of popular frontism in Portugal became the leader of the youth organisation and joined the Central Committee of the PCP in 1936 at the age of 22.

That year marked a crucial turning point in European history. In June, mass strikes brought France to the brink of revolution. In Spain, in July, fascist military officers led by General Franco attempted a coup, sparking a workers’ uprising and precipitating civil war. By imposing the popular front policy and opposing the independent political mobilisation of the working class against all factions of the bourgeoisie, the Comintern played a critical role in defending Spanish capitalism, liquidating the Spanish revolution and making possible the victory of Franco’s fascist forces.

The Portuguese Communist Party adopted the same political line, helping to block the possibility of the Portuguese workers challenging the Salazar regime, which was able to survive the Second World War and plagued the country for another three decades.

Despite the suppression of the PCP—Cunhal spent a total of 15 years in jail—the party maintained its slavish adherence to the Stalinist two-stage theory of revolution. According to this false and disastrous conception, during the “first stage” of the revolution, which had a national-bourgeois character, the working class had to subordinate itself and its class interests to supposedly progressive bourgeois forces. The “second stage,” the socialist revolution, was put off to an ever-more-distant future.

In 1945, as a means of defending his rule in the face of increasing social agitation, Salazar introduced an amnesty for political prisoners and a limited relaxation of censorship. In the parliamentary election that year, the PCP joined the Movement of Democratic Unity (MUD), a coalition of bourgeois forces from across the political spectrum (including the extreme right). When the MUD withdrew, claiming the elections were rigged, its leadership was arrested.

In 1958, the PCP supported General Humberto Delgado, a prominent leader in the “New State,” when he contested the presidency in opposition to the official National Union candidate who won the election after widespread ballot rigging. Salazar altered the constitution in order to prevent further direct elections to the presidency.

Cunhal became secretary general of the PCP in 1961 and three years later formed the Patriotic Front for National Liberation (FPLN) with the Socialist Party and liberal bourgeois figures such as Delgado.

In 1970, Cunhal reiterated the Stalinist two-stage theory. He wrote that “at each stage of the revolution the proletariat must have a corresponding system of alliances with different classes and layers of the population... The proletariat’s allies for the socialist revolution are not the same as for the national democratic revolution.”

This was a wholesale repudiation of Marxism and the critical lessons of the twentieth century, including, above all, the Russian Revolution. It was also a forewarning of the role the PCP would play in the revolution that erupted a few years later.

The early 1970s witnessed a huge international crisis of the capitalist system. US President Richard Nixon withdrew the dollar from the gold standard and ended the Bretton Woods agreement that had underpinned the world economy since 1944, helping precipitate a severe recession.

Although the Salazar regime had done everything in its power to keep Portugal backwards and isolated, the country could not be insulated from the world economy. During the 1960s, foreign investment in Portugal trebled, mainly from the United States. By 1973, 150 companies dominated the entire economy headed by a few very wealthy Portuguese families.

The PCP and the Junta

In the 1970s, the Portuguese ruling elite confronted a massive strike wave at home and uprisings in the colonies. Nearly one half of the national budget was spent keeping 150,000 troops abroad fighting the national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Compulsory military service combined with low pay to intensify grievances in the army and stimulated an oppositional movement amongst the troops known as the “Movement of the Captains,” which later developed into the Armed Forces Movement (MFA).

On April 25, 1974, the MFA overthrew Salazar’s successor Marcello Caetano, claiming it was “interpreting the wishes of the people.” A National Salvation Council or Junta was formed, composed entirely of high-ranking military officers, with General Antonio de Spinola, the army’s second in command and a director of two of Portugal’s leading monopolies, as president.

Spinola intended to limit the coup to a simple “renovation,” but it immediately brought the masses onto the streets demanding further change. Workers began taking over factories, offices and shops, and peasants occupied farmlands. The revolutionary atmosphere spread throughout the armed forces, with soldiers and sailors marching alongside the workers, carrying banners calling for socialism.

Previously banned parties emerged from underground or exile, including the PCP and the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) led by Mario Soares. The more far-sighted members of the ruling elite knew the vital role these parties would be called upon to play in preventing the development of the social revolution. Cunhal was brought back from exile in Moscow and given a military welcome at the airport. He was given the second most important ministerial post in the government, a chauffeur and a bodyguard, and the PCP was given a five-storey building.

One of the critical questions posed by the revolution concerned the nature of the officers’ movement, the MFA, which had adopted the slogan of “the alliance of the MFA and the people”—a slogan never challenged by the PCP, PSP and various “left” groups. Instead, Cunhal reached a de facto agreement with the MFA, declaring it “is the motive force and guarantee of our revolution.... [T]he PCP holds that the alliance between the popular movement and the MFA is a necessary and decisive factor for the establishment of a democratic regime, a prime guarantee of the development of the revolutionary process.” The PCP newspaper Avante condemned those who called for a government of “socialist option” as “completely unrealistic.”

The MFA, while it postured demagogically, represented the armed might of the capitalist state and, potentially, at least, represented the threat of a new dictatorship. It was intent on suppressing any independent political activity by the working class—particularly when this threatened to undermine the power of the army. It declared, “No political-military organisations outside the AFM [MFA] will be permitted in the armed forces, whether they represent parties or not, since all military personnel must be integrated into their own movement.”

At the time, the International Committee of the Fourth International and its Portuguese supporters, the League for the Construction of the Revolutionary Party, demanded that the PCP and PSP break with the bourgeois parties, the state machinery and MFA, and fight for the dissolution of the army and the creation of workers, peasants and soldiers soviets.

Instead, the PCP’s Avelino Gonçalves joined Cunhal in the First Provisional Government as minister of labour to enforce labour discipline and implement the austerity programme in the MFA’s “battle for production.” The PCP exhorted workers to “Save the National Economy” and condemned any manifestation of independent activity by the working class.

Subsequent provisional governments, which included Cunhal, introduced anti-strike laws, and workers who refused to obey military orders were arrested and told they would only be reinstated “on condition they took no further part in political activity.”

The revolution betrayed

The actions of the social democrats and the Stalinists gave reaction a second wind and led to two further coup attempts in September 1974 and March 1975.

The government then approved an economic plan endorsed by the MFA that excluded “the social-democratic control of the management of capitalism,” but called for partial nationalisations, the takeover of some large and badly managed estates, and increased foreign investment.

The PCP dutifully declared that business had been “nationalised in the service of the people,” but the capitalist nationalisation proposed differed little from that carried out in many Western countries after World War II, which left economic and state power in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Nationalisation was also a method of installing state-appointed managers in enterprises that had been occupied by workers.

Elections were held on April 25, 1975, in which the PSP won nearly 38 percent of the vote, the semi-fascist Popular Democratic Party (PPD) took 26.4 percent and the PCP 13 percent. But with no sign of the promised agrarian reforms, landless agricultural workers joined the urban insurrectionary movement, seized the large farming estates and started developing them collectively. The PCP called the occupations “anarchistic” and proposed that all future occupations be controlled by the unions (which it in turn controlled).

Between June and August 1975, following the exit of the PSP and PPD from the fourth provisional government, the PCP and its allies were left in virtual control of the state and the ministries. The military wing of the PCP dominated the MFA’s Council of the Revolution.

The MFA and PCP convened a Front of Revolutionary Unity (FUR) to “institutionalise” the “pact” between the MFA and the people. FUR was a popular front set-up to betray the revolution at the most critical moment and received the support of most of the left groups who claimed its so-called “popular assemblies” were “autonomous organs of popular power” that provided “a way forward for the revolutionary process.”

These popular assemblies, in fact, functioned to destroy the independent character of the workers’ committees that had emerged and prevent moves towards dual power and the creation of soviets or workers’ councils. The assemblies were vetted by the MFA and subject to military control at all levels to ensure their “independence from all parties.” No political organisations were to be permitted in the armed forces except the MFA itself.

When these measures proved unable to contain working class resistance, the PCP-dominated fifth provisional government resigned in order to avoid a direct revolutionary challenge to bourgeois rule, along with Prime Minister General Vasco Gonçalves, a leading member of the MFA and a figure closely associated with the PCP. The PCP, along with the PSP and PPD, joined a sixth provisional government—headed by Admiral Jose Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo—which immediately circulated plans for austerity and repression.

The crisis reached fever pitch. The sixth government and the Council of the Revolution were opposed by so many sections of society that a situation of dual power existed. But within days, the army moved in to dismantle barricades and disarm workers and soldiers with scarcely a shot being fired. “Rank-and-file” military organisations, which in the previous weeks had mobilised tens of thousands in demonstrations, dissolved in the face of some 200 commandos.

A new constitution was proclaimed on April 2, 1976, and elections for a new parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, led to a PSP victory. Almost immediately, Soares turned to the International Monetary Fund and implemented a structural adjustment programme at the behest of big business.

The Portuguese bourgeoisie weathered the revolution thanks to the betrayal of Cunhal’s PCP and its left hangers-on, who tied the working class to the bourgeois parties, the state machine and the MFA. Had the Portuguese revolution triumphed, it would have been a mighty blow to international capital and inspired social movements developing throughout the world in the 1970s. A New York Times editorial on February 17, 1975, gives some indication of the crisis at the time, declaring “a communist takeover of Portugal might encourage a similar trend in Italy and France, create problems in Greece and Turkey, affect the succession in Spain and Yugoslavia and send tremors throughout Western Europe.”

However, neither Cunhal nor the PCP had any intention of mounting a “communist takeover.” Cunhal’s political conceptions, which were essentially those of a Portuguese petit-bourgeois nationalist, were made plain in an interview he gave to Quaderni Comunisti in 1995. He absolved Stalinism and himself for the betrayals of the working class in the twentieth century. He thought that “capitalism’s potentialities were underestimated and socialism’s potentialities overestimated” and that “the way ahead may not lie in attempts to define a world-wide strategy for communists.” He blamed Mikhail Gorbachev “as the number one culprit for that great historic disaster which was the USSR’s collapse and disintegration.” He attacked the European Union from the right saying, “The major consequences of European integration for Portugal are very serious. With a policy of national capitulation, the right wing government sacrifices Portuguese interests to foreign interests.”

Today, the PCP retains its influence within the largest Portuguese trade union federation, the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers, which has played an invaluable role in imposing austerity measures promulgated by one government after another. Such is Cunhal’s real legacy.

.




Monday, 31 August 2009

Against Empiricism and the Apotheosis of the Victors: E.H. Carr, Marxism, and the Crisis of Bourgeois Sovietology

Introduction: The Historical Stakes of the Debate

The current state of historiography on the Russian Revolution reflects a broader decline in bourgeois intellectual pursuits. Instead of sparking a renaissance, the fall of the Soviet Union led to a reactionary period where studies of 1917 became tools for imperialist ideology. Amid this bleak context, Edward Hallett Carr's work emerges as a testament to an earlier era—when bourgeois scholarship, despite its political constraints, maintained a dedication to accuracy, thorough archival research, and intellectual rigor.

Carr belongs to the same generation as Haimson and Baron, scholars who “took the revolution seriously as an object of study and treated its protagonists as historical actors worthy of intellectual engagement.”¹ This is a significant observation. It highlights the shift from the time when the Russian Revolution was seen as a major global event to today, when it is often viewed as a cautionary tale or a pathological anomaly.

It should be made clear to the reader the objective limits of Carr’s achievement. His empiricism, however meticulous, could not substitute for a Marxist understanding of the class forces that shaped the revolution and the rise of Stalinism. Carr “could describe what happened; he could not fully explain why it happened.”² This is the central contradiction of Carr’s work: a historian “strongly impregnated with Marxist ways of thinking,” yet fundamentally alien to the revolutionary perspective of Marxism.

Carr’s Empiricism and Its Class Foundations

Carr’s multi-volume History of Soviet Russia stands, despite some flaws, as the most comprehensive bourgeois effort to reconstruct the early Soviet era. His archival research revealed Stalinist falsifications when such revelations demanded considerable intellectual bravery. His analysis of Trotsky in The Interregnum and Socialism in One Country was “fair and detailed,” and he recognised that the anti-Trotsky campaign was "unprincipled," motivated by “subjective considerations of personal power."³

Carr’s empiricism was notably politically aware, reflecting a liberal scholar’s view that history is a sequence of faits accomplis whose importance is only understood retrospectively through their outcomes. This perspective supports Carr’s famous assertion that history cannot be written in the subjunctive mood, emphasizing that historians must accept events as they happen, without wishing they were different.

Carr’s methodology “implicitly ratified the outcome.”⁴ The defeat of the Left Opposition becomes, in this framework, not a contingent result of a political struggle but an inevitable expression of historical necessity. The victors write history not only in fact but in principle.

This approach is the exact opposite of the Marxist method. In Marxism, exploring historical alternatives is a vital political task rather than mere speculation. Trotsky consistently argued that Stalinism’s victory was not set in stone; it was the result of a struggle that could have gone differently. denying this would dismiss the agency of the working class and reduce history to a passive record of inevitability.

“The Bolshevik Utopia”: A Symptom of Theoretical Blindness

Carr’s description of Marxism as "utopian" reveals his ideological bias, not a simple mistake. This portrayal stems from his class perspective. Marxism fought against utopian socialism for decades because utopianism relies on moral appeals rather than analyzing real social dynamics. Marx and Engels showed that socialism develops from the inherent conflicts within capitalism, not just from reformers' visions.

Carr’s inability to grasp this leads him to interpret October 1917 as an act of voluntarism—“men of extraordinary will” imposing their vision on a backward society.⁵ As your document states, Carr “could not grasp … that October 1917 was the expression of a mass social movement, the product of the contradictory development of Russian capitalism and its insertion into the world imperialist system.”⁶

This is more than just a theoretical mistake; it is a political error. By portraying the revolution as solely the Bolsheviks' subjective initiative, Carr masks the underlying class forces that enabled the revolution. He turns a global historical event into a conflict of individual characters and personal aspirations.

Luxemburg, Terror, and the Historical Conditions of Violence

Your document’s treatment of Luxembourg’s critique of terror is historically precise and politically essential. Luxemburg’s statement that the proletarian revolution “requires no terror for its aims; it hates and despises killing”⁷ has been repeatedly weaponised by anti‑communist historians to portray the Bolsheviks as bloodthirsty fanatics. But Luxemburg wrote these words in December 1918, in the midst of the German Revolution, and directed them as much at the German Social Democrats—who were preparing the murder of the Spartacists—as at the Bolsheviks.

The Bolshevik response, articulated by Lenin and Trotsky, was grounded in the concrete conditions of the civil war. The terror was not a matter of choice but a necessity imposed by the counter‑revolution, supported by international imperialism. As your document notes, “the question was not whether the revolution would employ violence … but whether the working class would defend itself or be crushed.”⁸ Luxembourg’s own murder by the Freikorps confirmed this with tragic clarity.

The Degeneration of Soviet Historiography and the Collapse of the Academic Left

Outside the International Committee of the Fourth International, “there has been no historian who has bettered Carr’s work.”⁹ Vadim Rogovin stands alone as the only scholar to have advanced the study of the Left Opposition in a serious, Marxist manner.

The drying up of Trotsky scholarship after the 1970s is not an academic accident. It reflects, as David North argued, the political demoralisation of the left intelligentsia, the rise of post‑modernism, and the abandonment of materialism. The retreat from objective truth has rendered academic historians incapable of engaging with Trotsky, “who embodied the unity of theory and practice, of intellectual work and revolutionary action.”¹⁰

The result is a historiographical landscape dominated by biographies of Stalin—treating him as a “fascinating monster”—while Trotsky is ignored, caricatured, or dismissed. This is not scholarship but ideological accommodation to the needs of the existing order.

Conclusion: The Task of Marxist Historiography

 “The task of recovering the truth of the Russian Revolution … now falls to the ICFI and the movement it is building.”¹¹ This is not a rhetorical flourish. It is a sober assessment of the historical situation.

Bourgeois scholarship, even at its best, cannot provide a scientific understanding of the Russian Revolution. Carr’s work remains a landmark precisely because it represents the last moment in which bourgeois historiography retained a commitment to truth. The subsequent degeneration of the field reflects the decay of bourgeois culture itself.

The responsibility for advancing the historical truth of 1917—and for drawing the revolutionary lessons necessary for the working class—rests with Marxism. It rests with the International Committee of the Fourth International.

Footnotes

  1. Carr belonged to a generation that “took the revolution seriously as an object of study and treated its protagonists as historical actors worthy of intellectual engagement.”
  2. “Carr could describe what happened; he could not fully explain why it happened.”
  3. Carr’s treatment of Trotsky is described as “fair and detailed,” and the anti‑Trotsky campaign as “unprincipled” and driven by “subjective considerations of personal power.”
  4. “His methodology implicitly ratified the outcome.”
  5. Carr viewed the Bolsheviks as “men of extraordinary will who imposed their vision on a backward society.”
  6. “He could not grasp … that October 1917 was the expression of a mass social movement.”
  7. Luxembourg wrote that the revolution “requires no terror for its aims; it hates and despises killing.”
  8. “The question was not whether the revolution would employ violence … but whether the working class would defend itself or be crushed.”
  9. “Outside the confines of the International Committee of the Fourth International, there has been no historian who has bettered Carr’s work.”
  10. The academic historians are described as incapable of engaging with Trotsky, “who embodied the unity of theory and practice.”
  11. “The task of recovering the truth of the Russian Revolution … now falls to the ICFI and the movement it is building.”

 

Tuesday, 28 July 2009

"These the times ... this the man": an appraisal of historian Christopher Hill


By Ann Talbot

Christopher Hill, the renowned expert on seventeenth-century English history, who died on February 24 at the age of 91, lived through the great upheavals of the twentieth century. Its wars and revolutions moulded the mind of a historian who looked back from one revolutionary century to another, giving him a unique insight into his subject and his books a lasting value that few historians can claim.

Hill influenced the way in which an entire generation of students and general readers saw the English Civil War, and even when in more recent years with the fall of the Soviet Union his view that the events of the 1640s constituted a revolution has been widely rejected, academics still define their position on the period in opposition to his analysis. Within a week of his death, however, it was not just the value of his academic work that was being discussed in the press but his own political activity as a member of the Communist Party, when it was alleged that Hill had been a Soviet agent.

Hill seems to be a mass of contradictions. There is Hill the Master of Balliol College, Oxford and prestigious academic; Hill the popular historian who would give lectures at the Socialist Workers Party summer schools where masses of young people would crowd in to hear him speak about the seventeenth century revolution—and now we are told there is Hill the Soviet mole. If we are to draw a coherent picture out of all this, we have to see Hill in the context of his time. As his fellow Yorkshireman Andrew Marvell said of Oliver Cromwell, “If these the times, then this must be the man.”

Hill was himself part of a historical phenomenon. Born in 1912 the son of a well-to-do solicitor, he was educated at St. Peter’s School York. It was a privileged existence, but its apparent security was overshadowed by the great political and economic turmoil of the period. A child of five when the Russian Revolution broke out, Hill grew to maturity at the time of the abortive revolution in China, of the British General Strike of 1926 and the Great Crash of 1929. The 1920s saw mass unemployment and hunger marches. By the time Hill went up to Oxford in 1931, unemployment had risen to nearly 3 million. As one historian has said of the 1926 General Strike, “The class divisions of the country were starkly revealed, even if they did not spill over into violence.”

He was already expressing left-wing views as a schoolboy, although it has never been clear when precisely he joined the Communist Party. This was one of the areas of his life about which Hill was always reticent. At Oxford, he came under the influence of Humphrey Sumner, an expert on Russian history who arranged for him to go to Russia for an extended stay in 1935. He came back fluent in Russian but never spoke about what he had done while he was there, pleading that he had been ill most of the time. In 1936, he became a lecturer at University College Cardiff, but in 1938 returned to Balliol where he remained until he retired as master of the college in 1978. His 40 years at Balliol were only briefly interrupted by his wartime service, during which he was seconded as an intelligence officer to the Foreign Office.

His period at the Foreign Office was another aspect of his life that he was reluctant to discuss. The historian Dr Anthony Glees, a specialist in modern German history at Brunel University, now claims that he has discovered documents which show that Hill kept his membership of the Communist Party secret while he was working at the Foreign Office. Dr Glees, who has not published the evidence to back up his allegations, claims that Hill acted as an agent of influence on behalf of the Soviet Union while he worked first as a liaison officer for military intelligence and then as head of the Russian desk at the Foreign Office. Glees considers it inconceivable that the Foreign Office would have employed Hill if the security services had known about his party membership. He told the London Times, “His failure to own up to his party membership was outrageous, sinister and highly suspicious.”

There is something more than a little artificial about this indignation. It would have been rather more surprising to find that Hill was not a member of the Communist Party by 1940 since so many young intellectuals of his generation were either members or sympathisers. Nor can it be assumed that such an orientation inevitably implied support for revolution. It was entirely possible in this period to be both a patriotic subject of his Britannic Majesty and a “friend” of the Soviet Union, as for example the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb were. As Trotsky pointed out in his Revolution Betrayed, in the case of people like the Webbs, “Friendship for the Soviet bureaucracy is not friendship for proletarian revolution but on the contrary insurance against it” ( The Revolution Betrayed, Labor Publications, Detroit, 1991, p. 258).

There was a significant section of the British ruling class who saw in the Soviet Union their best hope of preserving Britain’s position in the world and preventing revolution at home. Hill’s selection for an extended stay in the Soviet Union and his secondment to the Foreign Office suggests that at an early stage in his career he was being groomed by a section of the ruling class who looked on the Soviet Union under bureaucratic control as just such an insurance against revolution.

Ever since the end of World War I, Britain had faced a thoroughgoing political, social, economic and intellectual crisis as the position it had held since the mid-eighteenth century as the leading world power was eclipsed by the rise of the United States. For a time, it even seemed possible that the next major world conflict would be between Britain and the US, until the older power learned to accept its newly subordinate position. At the same time class relations that had been based on Britain’s position of world dominance, which had allowed the creation of a large labour aristocracy and trade union bureaucracy who worked with the Liberals to maintain social peace, were seriously destabilised by Britain’s relative decline.

With its rapid industrialisation, the Soviet Union seemed to offer a model of how Britain’s declining industries might be revived and its increasing weight internationally offered a potential counterbalance to the growing power of the US in world affairs. But most of all the example of the Stalinist bureaucracy impressed reformists like the Webbs as the means by which the working class could be brought under control.

If Hill had remained a civil servant or died in the war before he wrote his books, it is doubtful whether anyone would have been very interested in his political activities. He would have been one among many and would certainly not have rated any media interest. Guy Fawkes would still be the most famous old boy of St. Peter’s school. What makes his wartime political activities significant is the question of how it affects his reputation as a historian of seventeenth-century England and that question was there to be asked long before the recent revelations.

What any serious reader interested in history or politics wants to know is, when we read Hill’s books are we reading the work of an apologist for the Stalinist bureaucracy or of someone who was genuinely struggling to make a Marxist analysis of an aspect of English history? It has to be said that this is a complex question. Not everyone who was attracted to the bureaucratically degenerated Communist Party could be classified with the Webbs. 

The most gifted and outstanding representatives of the British intellectual elite, whether poets, novelists, scientists, musicians or historians, associated themselves with the Communist Party because the old institutions of church and state had lost their hold over the imaginations of the young while the Soviet Union seemed to embody all that was new, modern and progressive.

The Communist Party attracted minds of the very highest intellectual calibre, as can be seen from the fact that many of the developments that were made in biochemistry during the post-war period were prepared by the group around J.D. Bernal, J.B.S. Haldane and other biologists who were prominent supporters of the Communist Party at Cambridge. For minds of this order of brilliance, the Communist Party became a pole of attraction since despite its degeneration under Stalin it still retained vestiges of the immensely powerful intellectual heritage of Marx and Engels.

They could not pursue their intellectual work in isolation from the influence of the Stalinist bureaucracy, however. Despite the fact that the Cambridge biologists were all leading geneticists they accepted the fraudulent work of Lysenko because Lysenko had Stalin’s support. The influence of Stalinism on the historians was if anything even greater. The Cambridge biologists never adopted Lysenko’s theories in their own work, but historians associated with the Communist Party developed an approach to history that was directly influenced by the politics of the bureaucracy.

The Communist Party sponsored a form of “People’s History”, which is typified by A.L. Morton’s People’s History of England in which the class character of earlier rebels, revolutionaries and popular leaders was obscured by regarding them all as representatives of a national revolutionary tradition. This historical approach reflected the nationalism of the bureaucracy, their hostility to internationalism and their attempts to form an unprincipled alliance with the supposedly democratic capitalists against the fascist Axis countries. People’s history was an attempt to give some historical foundation to the policies of Popular Front—the subordination of the working class to supposedly progressive sections of the bourgeoisie and the limiting of political action to the defence of bourgeois democracy—which provided a democratic facade to the systematic murder of thousands of genuine revolutionaries, including Trotsky. It was the approach that Christopher Hill was trained in, along with E.P. Thompson, Rodney Hilton and Eric Hobsbawm, who were part of the Marxist Historians Group and came under the influence of Maurice Dobb and Dona Torr.

There is something Jesuitical about the relationship of these historians to Marxism. They seem to have been capable of partitioning their minds and pursuing a scientific Marxist approach to history up to the point where the Stalinist bureaucracy drew the line, like the Jesuit scientists who would pursue their investigations as far as the Church authorities permitted, but no further. It was an approach that was further encouraged by the extreme specialisation of academic life that enabled them to concentrate on very narrow areas of history that never brought them into direct collision with the bureaucracy on political questions.

It is notable that of the Marxist Historians Group Hill wrote on the seventeenth century, Thompson on the eighteenth century, Hobsbawm mostly on the nineteenth century and Hilton on the Middle Ages. But none of them specialised in the twentieth century. In more recent areas of history, as in politics, the control of the Stalinist bureaucracy was too great to allow the free development of Marxist thought and whether deliberately or not they all avoided venturing into the modern arena. It is notable that E.H. Carr, who was never a member of the Communist Party but wrote on the history of the Russian Revolution and expressed a high regard for Trotsky, was for long periods unemployed and unemployable because his views clashed with those on both the left and right of British academic life.

Hill’s sole attempt at modern history, his study of Lenin, is undoubtedly his weakest book. It is marred by repeated attacks on Trotsky, who is dismissed as one of the “Westernising theoreticians” of the revolutionary movement. Discussing whether Trotsky could ever have become the leader of the Bolshevik Party after Lenin’s death, Hill concludes, “Such a view exaggerates, I think, the importance of Trotsky in the party.”

As Hill should have known, the British government were well aware of Trotsky’s importance since they would not allow him into the country when he requested asylum. But still Hill’s historical faculties would not let him deny that Trotsky was a great orator, that he organised the insurrection which brought the Bolsheviks to power, and nor does he avoid giving Trotsky more references in the index than Stalin. At no point does Hill repeat the false charges that the Stalinists made against Trotsky and his followers at the Moscow trials. Even in this book, which is certainly hack work, Hill did not make himself fully a Stalinist hack. His criticisms of Trotsky are ill-judged and betray an ignorance of his subject, rather than being malicious and dishonest. He retained a core of intellectual honesty in a work that was written in 1947 as the lines were being drawn for the Cold War, which was designed to defend the Russian Revolution and not to win him friends in high places at home or in the Kremlin.

If his book on Lenin represented the low point of Hill’s work, the best was yet to come as he began to publish his remarkable series of books on the English revolution that were to change the way in which the period was understood. His years of greatest productivity came after 1957 when he left the Communist Party following the Soviet invasion of Hungary that suppressed a workers’ uprising. The fact that Hill was not among the most politically advanced elements of the party—those who then joined the Fourth International—is perhaps a greater tribute to them than it is a criticism of him. His subsequent work showed him to be a better historian than he was a political thinker.

Hill’s great achievement as a historian was to challenge the accepted consensus of Whig history—that Britain had been peculiarly blessed with a tranquil history based on gradual change and had achieved peaceful progress through class compromise without the excesses of revolution. 

The most outstanding representative of the Whig tradition is Macaulay and it was continued in the twentieth century by his nephew Trevelyan. It had the advantage that it was at once suited to Liberalism and Labourism. It was a tradition that was physically embodied in the Trevelyan’s country house at Wallington, Northumberland, where Macaulay’s desk is preserved and which was the scene of annual Labour picnics. The roofed central court of this house is decorated with historical scenes and not a revolution among them—as the national epic unfolds from prehistoric times to the triumph of industry and empire in Victorian Britain. They were images that adorned children’s history books well into the twentieth century and underlay much of the popular consciousness of British history.

The term the “Whig interpretation of history” dates back to Sir Herbert Butterfield’s slim volume of that name. As a polemic, it was not particularly well aimed and has often since been directed at economic determinism rather than the Victorian view of British history that was its target. But the name has stuck. The Whiggish view of history gained ground as Britain achieved a degree of social stability as its economic supremacy emerged that must have been surprising to many contemporaries given its turbulent past history. Writing in the midst of the 1848 revolutions and as the Chartists marched in London, the historian J.M. Kemble expressed the sense of Britain’s special destiny:

“On every side of us thrones totter and the deep foundations of society are convulsed. Shot and shell sweep the streets of capitals which have long been pointed out as the chosen abodes of order: cavalry and bayonets cannot control populations whose loyalty has become a proverb here, whose peace has been made a reproach to our own miscalled disquiet. Yet the exalted Lady who wields the sceptre of these realms sits safe upon her throne and fearless in the holy circle of her domestic happiness, secure in the affections of people whose institutions have given to them all the blessings of an equal law.”

The sense that in Britain things were done differently and without continental excess was not entirely new. Burke had expressed it in his Reflections on the French Revolution, but there were plenty of voices to gainsay him and the social disturbances in the years of economic upheaval that followed the Napoleonic wars were a testimony to the contrary. Luddism, anti-corn law agitation, the anti-poor law movement, strikes and most of all Chartism demonstrated that Britain was not an island of social peace.

Nonetheless, the Whig interpretation of history had deep roots in the consciousness of the British political class. The visitor to Chatsworth House in Derbyshire can still see in the great entrance hall a fireplace inscribed with the legend “1688 The year of our liberty.” It refers to the “Glorious Revolution” when James II quit his throne and his kingdom overnight and William of Orange was installed as king. This was the kind of palace revolution that the British ruling class increasingly preferred to look back on rather than the revolution in the 1640s when they had executed the king, conveniently overlooking the fact that James would not have run if he had not remembered the fate of his father—Charles I.

The myth of the “Glorious Revolution” was the target of Hill’s first published article, which appeared in the Communist International under the pseudonym E.C. Gore in 1937. It was followed in 1940 by a short essay, The English Revolution 1640, which contained a concise statement of the arguments that Hill was to spend the rest of his life elucidating.

Hill never acknowledged having read Trotsky, but there are distinct parallels between his attacks on the Whig interpretation of history and Trotsky’s brief but trenchant analysis in Where is Britain Going? in which he identified two revolutionary traditions in British history—that of the Cromwell in the seventeenth century and later of Chartism—both of which were denied by the prevailing conception of gradualism that characterised the Whig view of history. “The ‘great’ national historian Macaulay,” Trotsky wrote, “vulgarises the social drama of the seventeenth century by obscuring the inner struggle of forces with platitudes that are sometimes interesting but always superficial.”

Trotsky recognised Cromwell as a revolutionary leader of the bourgeoisie, whose New Model Army was not merely an army but a party with which he repeatedly purged Parliament until it reflected the needs of his class and suppressed the Levellers who represented the plebeian elements who wanted to take the revolution further than was necessary for capitalist society to thrive. Whether he got it from Trotsky, or arrived at his assessment of Cromwell independently by reading Marx and Engels, Hill reflected this analysis of Cromwell in God’s Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (1970) in which he explored Cromwell’s revolutionary role. It was a measured portrait of the man that recognised his ruthless pursuit of the interests of the class he represented—as when he had the leaders of the Levellers executed and in Ireland where he sacked the towns of Drogheda and Wexford, executing the captured garrison and civilian population. If in concluding that Cromwell’s historical importance could be compared to that of Stalin as much as Lenin, Hill revealed that his affiliations still lay with the party he had left in 1957, he perhaps also revealed something of his own inner feelings when he said of the English revolution, “The dreams of a Milton, a Winstanley, a George Fox, a Bunyan, were not realised; nor indeed were those of Oliver himself: ‘would that we were all saints’.”

Employing the Old Testament phraseology of the seventeenth century he concluded, “The sons of Zeruiah proved too strong for the ideals which had animated the New Model Army.” For the seventeenth century revolutionaries the Sons of Zeruiah represented the forces of reaction that had prevented them achieving their vision of utopia. Perhaps Hill also thought of the Soviet Union as a country in which the Sons of Zeruiah had proved too strong.

Hill’s achievements were twofold. Firstly he identified the mid-seventeenth century crisis as a revolution, which in the case of Britain overthrew the rule of one class and brought another to power. Secondly he recognised that revolutions are made by the mass of the population and that for a revolution to take place the consciousness of that mass of people must change, since revolutions are not made by a few people at the top although the character of their leadership is crucial at certain points. 

These achievements were considerable at the time and are of continuing relevance today, when historians increasingly reject any serious economic or social analysis and argue that revolutions are nothing but the work of a tiny group of conspirators. Hill conveys a sense of the organic character of revolution and views the many ordinary people who made the seventeenth century revolution with admirable humanity.

He has been criticised by later historians for only using the published sources and not making any use of the manuscript material that is available. Hill had some excuse for doing so, however, in that the amount of published material from this period when censorship collapsed is so enormous. In the 1640s everyone had something to say about the way the world was going and everyone who was literate wanted to get into print. It is a dramatic contrast with the preceding centuries, when only a small elite with government approval found their way into print. If later historians have made far greater use of unpublished manuscript sources, this to some degree reflects the extent to which Hill made the published sources his own so that they have had to look for new material.

What fundamentally separates Hill from his detractors is not that they have turned to new sources, but that they have rejected his conclusion that a bourgeois revolution took place in the mid-seventeenth century. The prevailing academic orthodoxy is that there was no bourgeois revolution because there was no rising bourgeoisie and that people from all social classes can be found on either side of the struggle. Even Cromwell, it is argued, can better be understood as a representative of the declining gentry rather than the rising bourgeois. He and those around him aimed not at revolution, but wished merely to restore what they believed to be the ancient constitution of the kingdom. The whole unpleasant episode could have been avoided if only Charles II had been a little wiser.

Hill, of course, was well aware that there were gentlemen and landowners on the Parliamentary side in the civil war and small farmers and artisans on the Royalist side. He had read enough Marx and Lenin to know that one could not expect a chemically pure revolution in which the members of one social class lined up one side of the barricades and those of the other on the opposite side. However, he was sensitive enough to his historical sources to detect the social currents that brought people of diverse social backgrounds into struggle against the king and well grounded enough in history to identify new and revolutionary ideas in the curious and archaic guise in which they appeared—as the ideologists of the revolution ransacked the Bible and half understood historical precedent for some kind of theory to explain what they were doing.

Most of all he was sufficiently astute to realise that when the people execute their king after a solemn trial and much deliberation, it is not the result of a misunderstanding but has a profound revolutionary significance entailing a complete break with the feudal past. Although the monarchy was later restored and the triumphant bourgeoisie were soon eager to pretend that the whole thing had been a ghastly mistake, no monarch sat easily on the throne after that event until quite late in Victoria’s reign.

More serious Marxist criticisms of Hill are that he always maintains an essentially national approach to the English revolution, which he does not place in an international context, and that he has a tendency to romanticise the religious movements of the period and to be too dismissive of their rational intellectual descendants such as Newton and Locke. In part these characteristics arise from the national orientation of his social class and reflect even in Hill vestiges of the Whig outlook that imagined a peculiarly English political tradition rooted in millennial seventeenth century visionaries like Bunyan that was entirely separate from Enlightenment thought. 

More significantly it reflects the influence of the popular front politics and national outlook of Stalinism. With Hill this is evident more in what he does not write than in what he does write.
Within the strict confines of the few decades that comprise the Civil War and Commonwealth period, Hill had some reason to concentrate on the many religious sects which to modern eyes are so strange that their connection with revolution is by no means obvious. In The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (1965), Hill performs a useful task in showing that although there was no Jean-Jacques Rousseau or Karl Marx in the English revolution the revolutionaries of the period were moved by definite social, political and economic ideas—albeit expressed in a religious form.

In the period after 1660, all these groups lose their revolutionary impetus, but Hill persists in pursuing them as though they retained their political significance. Like E.P. Thompson he was concerned to demonstrate that there was a distinctive English revolutionary tradition than ran intact from the Civil War to modern times. He had therefore no interest in showing the continental origins of many of the ideas that inspired the English revolution, such as natural rights theory that was to play such a significant role in the development of Enlightenment thought and the political ideas of subsequent centuries. Nor was he interested in examining how the English philosopher, John Locke, or the political theorist, Algernon Sidney, took up the ideas that had been expressed in the course of the English revolution and distilled them into a more precise programmatic form that could be developed in turn by American and French revolutionaries.

The science of the period that did so much to inspire a rational approach to politics and society was only of interest to him insofar as he could connect the scientists directly to the revolutionary movement. He never explored the complex relationship between the impetus to social revolution and the scientific revolution, because the increasingly rational and materialistic conclusions of science were uncongenial to him. The materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza was outside his orbit and even Newton, for all his mysticism and millennial visions, left Hill cold.

Yet within the 20-year period from 1640 to 1660, Hill’s historical achievements were significant in his own lifetime and are likely to prove more so in the future because current academic history is hardly less complacent than the Whig interpretation of history was in Hill’s day. Simon Schama, who recently presented A History of Britain for the BBC, declares himself to be “a born-again Whig”. His account of the Civil War in volume two of the books that accompany the series is full of colourful incident and fascinating detail, but there is no analysis of the contending class forces involved and the clash of interests that led to the bloody suppression of the Levellers, or to Cromwell’s repeated purges of Parliament and his personal dictatorship.

The actions with which Cromwell ensured the success of the revolution are, for Schama, excesses or deviations which violated “precisely the parliamentary independence that the war had been fought to preserve.” This is Whig history indeed, although to be fair to Macaulay it is a neutered variety of the genre.


Set against this background Hill’s analysis of the Civil War takes on a very contemporary significance. As an historian he stands head and shoulders above his detractors and his books deserve to be read and reread, and if with a critical eye, it should always be with the knowledge that his limitations and faults as much as his great historical insights and innovations are the product of his time. He may be bettered, but never dismissed, and only bettered by those who have studied him.