Minority Rule, the American Founding, and the Marxist Theory of the State

Introduction

Recent studies on the decline of American democracy focus on institutional failures, partisan division, and the solidification of minority rule. Ari Berman’s book, *Minority Rule*, fits within this discourse, and the Guardian’s review highlights its key assumption: that the U.S. is an “undemocratic democracy,” a republic whose founding principles have been undermined over time. This article challenges that view as historically inaccurate. Using Marxist state theory and the history of the American Revolution, it argues that the U.S. constitutional system was intentionally designed to limit popular sovereignty and maintain the political power of property owners.

The US Constitution was never intended as a democratic blueprint, but rather as a counter-revolutionary tool to control and undo the democratic changes sparked by the 1776 revolution. This chapter explores how this assertion fits into the wider academic discussions.

The Social Dynamics of the American Revolution

The American Revolution was not solely an elite political rupture but a period of intense popular mobilisation. Alfred Young’s microhistorical study of George Hewes demonstrates the political agency of artisans and labourers in revolutionary Boston.¹ Gary Nash’s synthetic account likewise emphasises the “lower-sort republicanism” that animated popular committees, militia organisations, and town meetings.² Archival petitions from Massachusetts and Pennsylvania reveal widespread demands for price regulation, debt relief, and expanded suffrage during the 1770s and early 1780s.³

These developments generated what Nash describes as a “radical democratizing impulse," which challenged the established elites and called for significant political reform.

The Revolution’s democratic energies generated significant elite anxiety. Gordon Wood’s The Creation of the American Republic remains the foundational account of this ideological shift. Wood demonstrates that leading figures — Madison, Hamilton, Morris — increasingly viewed popular politics as destabilising.⁴ Their correspondence reveals deep concern over “the turbulence and follies of democracy.”⁵

Woody Holton’s Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution extends this analysis by emphasising the economic dimension: debtor-relief legislation, paper money issuance, and tax resistance threatened the interests of bondholders and merchants.⁶ Holton’s use of state legislative records shows that the Constitutional Convention was convened in response to these pressures, not merely to address interstate commerce or diplomatic weakness.

Anti-Federalist writings provide crucial evidence for understanding how contemporaries perceived the Constitution. Melancton Smith’s speeches at the New York ratifying convention warned that the proposed system represented a “transfer of power from the many to the few.”⁷ Archival notes from the debates show that Smith and others objected specifically to the Senate’s malapportionment, the indirect election of the president, and the lifetime tenure of federal judges.⁸

These critiques align with Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, which argued that the Constitution reflected the interests of property owners seeking to stabilise social relations after a decade of popular unrest.⁹ Although Beard’s thesis has been debated extensively, recent scholarship — notably Michael Klarman’s The Framers’ Coup — has revived aspects of his argument by demonstrating the extent to which the Convention operated outside popular control.¹⁰

The institutional architecture of the Constitution — the Senate, the Electoral College, the separation of powers, and the independent judiciary — must be understood as mechanisms designed to restrain democratic participation. Archival records from the Convention show explicit discussions of the need to “check the impetuous vortex” of popular politics.¹¹ The Senate was conceived as a body representing “the wealth of the nation.” At the same time, the judiciary was insulated from electoral accountability to ensure “firmness” in protecting property rights.¹²These features were not accidental. They were deliberate responses to the democratic mobilisation of the preceding decade.

Marxist theory provides a conceptual framework for understanding why the Constitution took this form. Marx and Engels argued that the state is “a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie.”¹³ Lenin, in State and Revolution, emphasised that the bourgeois state is structurally incapable of serving as an instrument of genuine popular rule.¹⁴ Trotsky, in The Revolution Betrayed, stressed that the form and function of the state are determined by underlying class relations, not by constitutional ideals.¹⁵

From this perspective, the American state’s institutional architecture reflects the class interests of those who shaped it. The Senate’s malapportionment, the Electoral College’s indirect mechanism, and the judiciary’s insulation from democratic oversight are structural features designed to limit the political power of non‑propertied classes.

The Supreme Court’s historical trajectory illustrates this continuity. Early Court decisions — Calder v. Bull (1798), Fletcher v. Peck (1810), Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) — reveal a consistent pattern of protecting contract rights and property interests.¹⁶ While the Court has occasionally upheld measures favourable to labour or civil rights, such decisions have typically occurred under conditions of intense social pressure. When those pressures recede, the Court reverts to its structural role as a defender of property. The Federalist Society’s contemporary influence intensifies this tendency but does not fundamentally alter it.

Liberal Reformism and Its Limits

The Guardian review concludes with examples of successful ballot initiatives in Michigan and Wisconsin, suggesting that such reforms demonstrate the resilience of democratic participation. Yet these cases illustrate the limits of liberal reformism rather than its promise. Archival data from the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission show that while the initiative altered district boundaries, it did not change the underlying distribution of political power or the state's socioeconomic structure.¹⁷ Similarly, Senate debates over filibuster reform reveal that institutional veto points persist because both major parties benefit from them under different circumstances.¹⁸

To conclude, the answer to the crisis of American democracy is… the building of an independent political movement of the working class.” Whether one accepts this political prescription or not, the underlying historical insight is clear: the institutions of American governance were constructed to limit popular sovereignty, and their contemporary functioning reflects that foundational purpose. Any analysis that treats these institutions as neutral mechanisms capable of straightforward democratisation fails to grasp the historical depth of the problem.

This article contends that current forms of minority rule in the U.S. are not distortions but rooted in its original democratic framework. The U.S. Constitution was deliberately structured to limit democratic participation and uphold property-based political dominance. When viewed through Marxist state theory and the history of the American Revolution, this shows a consistent thread in American political evolution. Recognizing this continuity is crucial for evaluating the scope of reforms and the potential for deeper political change.

Notes

1. Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).
2. Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (New York: Viking, 2005).
3. Massachusetts Archives, vol. 210; Pennsylvania State Papers, Revolutionary Series.
4. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).
5. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 24 October 1787, in The Papers of James Madison, vol. 10.
6. Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
7. Melancton Smith, New York Ratification Debates, 20 June 1788.
8. New York Public Library, Melancton Smith Papers.
9. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1913).
10. Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
11. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention, 14 June 1787.
12. Ibid.
13. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).
14. Vladimir I. Lenin, State and Revolution (1917).
15. Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (1937).
16. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
17. Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission Records, 2021–22.
18. Congressional Record, 117th Congress (2021–22).